US Codex
Pub. L.
Notes

Division F — Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023

117th Congress · Approved Dec 23, 2022 · 136 Stat. 2395

DIVISION F Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023

SEC. 6001. Short Title; Table of Contents.

(a)
Short Title.— This division may be cited as the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023”.
(b)
Table of Contents.— The table of contents for this division is as follows:

DIVISION F— INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023

Sec. 6001. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 6002. Definitions.

Sec. 6003. Explanatory statement.

TITLE LXI— INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 6101. Authorization of appropriations.

Sec. 6102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.

Sec. 6103. Intelligence Community Management Account.

Sec. 6104. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.

Sec. 6105. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.

TITLE LXII— CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 6201. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE LXIII— GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 6301. Modification of requirements for certain employment activities by former intelligence officers and employees.

Sec. 6302. Counterintelligence and national security protections for intelligence community grant funding.

Sec. 6303. Extension of Central Intelligence Agency law enforcement jurisdiction to facilities of Office of Director of National Intelligence.

Sec. 6304. Annual reports on status of recommendations of Comptroller General of the United States for the Director of National Intelligence.

Sec. 6305. Timely submission of classified intelligence budget justification materials.

Sec. 6306. Copyright protection for civilian faculty of the National Intelligence University.

Sec. 6307. Modifications to Foreign Malign Influence Response Center.

Sec. 6308. Requirement to offer cyber protection support for personnel of intelligence community in positions highly vulnerable to cyber attack.

Sec. 6309. Enforcement of cybersecurity requirements for national security systems.

Sec. 6310. Review and briefing on intelligence community activities under Executive Order 12333.

Sec. 6311. Assessing intelligence community open-source support for export controls and foreign investment screening.

Sec. 6312. Annual training requirement and report regarding analytic standards.

Sec. 6313. Review of Joint Intelligence Community Council.

Sec. 6314. Required policy for minimum insider threat standards.

Sec. 6315. Unfunded priorities of the intelligence community.

Sec. 6316. Submission of covered documents and classified annexes.

Sec. 6317. Improvements to program on recruitment and training.

Sec. 6318. Measures to mitigate counterintelligence threats from proliferation and use of foreign commercial spyware.

Sec. 6319. Personnel vetting performance measures.

Sec. 6320. Proactive cybersecurity.

TITLE LXIV— MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Subtitle A— Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 6401. Modifications to responsibilities and authorities of Director of National Intelligence.

Sec. 6402. Annual submission to Congress of National Intelligence Priorities Framework.

Sec. 6403. Disposition of records of Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Subtitle B— Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 6411. Clarification regarding protection of Central Intelligence Agency functions.

Sec. 6412. Expansion of reporting requirements relating to authority to pay personnel of Central Intelligence Agency for certain injuries to the brain.

Sec. 6413. Historical Advisory Panel of Central Intelligence Agency.

Sec. 6414. Authority of Central Intelligence Agency to provide protection for certain personnel.

Sec. 6415. Notification of use of certain expenditure authorities.

Sec. 6416. Office supporting Central Intelligence Agency workforce wellbeing.

Subtitle C— Elements of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise

Sec. 6421. Inclusion of Space Force as element of intelligence community.

Sec. 6422. Oversight of Defense Intelligence Agency culture.

Subtitle D— Other Elements

Sec. 6431. Modification of advisory board in National Reconnaissance Office.

Sec. 6432. Establishment of advisory board for National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

Sec. 6433. Elevation of the commercial and business operations office of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

Sec. 6435. Study on personnel under Strategic Intelligence Partnership Program.

Sec. 6436. Briefing on coordination between intelligence community and Bureau of Industry and Security.

TITLE LXV— MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Subtitle A— Intelligence Matters Relating to the People’s Republic of China

Sec. 6501. Report on wealth and corrupt activities of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

Sec. 6502. Identification and threat assessment of companies with investments by the People’s Republic of China.

Sec. 6503. Intelligence community working group for monitoring the economic and technological capabilities of the People’s Republic of China.

Sec. 6504. Annual report on concentrated reeducation camps in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China.

Sec. 6505. Assessments of production of semiconductors by the People’s Republic of China.

Subtitle B— Miscellaneous Authorities, Requirements, and Limitations

Sec. 6511. Notice of deployment or transfer of containerized missile systems by Russia, China, or Iran.

Sec. 6512. Intelligence community coordinator for Russian atrocities accountability.

Sec. 6513. Lead intelligence community coordinator for countering and neutralizing proliferation of Iran-origin unmanned aircraft systems.

Sec. 6514. Collaboration between intelligence community and Department of Commerce to counter foreign commercial threats.

Sec. 6515. Intelligence assessment on foreign weaponization of advertisement technology data.

Sec. 6516. Intelligence community assessment regarding Russian gray zone assets.

Subtitle C— Reports and Other Matters

Sec. 6521. Report on assessing will to fight.

Sec. 6522. Report on threat from hypersonic weapons.

Sec. 6523. Report on ordnance of Russia and China.

Sec. 6524. Report on activities of China and Russia targeting Latin America and the Caribbean.

Sec. 6525. Report on support provided by China to Russia.

Sec. 6526. Report on global CCP financing of port infrastructure.

Sec. 6527. Sense of Congress on provision of support by intelligence community for atrocity prevention and accountability.

TITLE LXVI— INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKFORCE MATTERS

Sec. 6601. Improving onboarding of personnel in intelligence community.

Sec. 6602. Report on legislative action required to implement Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative.

Sec. 6603. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community assessment of administration of polygraphs in intelligence community.

Sec. 6604. Timeliness in the administration of polygraphs.

Sec. 6605. Policy on submittal of applications for access to classified information for certain personnel.

Sec. 6606. Technical correction regarding Federal policy on sharing of covered insider threat information.

Sec. 6607. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community report on use of space certified as sensitive compartmented information facilities.

Sec. 6608. Improving prohibition of certain personnel practices in intelligence community with respect to contractor employees.

Sec. 6609. Definitions regarding whistleblower complaints and information of urgent concern received by inspectors general of the intelligence community.

TITLE LXVII— MATTERS RELATING TO EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

Subtitle A— General Matters

Sec. 6701. Definitions.

Sec. 6702. Additional responsibilities of Director of National Intelligence for artificial intelligence policies, standards, and guidance for the intelligence community.

Sec. 6703. Director of Science and Technology.

Sec. 6704. Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer.

Subtitle B— Improvements Relating to Procurement

Sec. 6711. Additional transaction authority.

Sec. 6712. Implementation plan and advisability study for offices of commercial integration.

Sec. 6713. Pilot program on designated emerging technology transition projects.

Sec. 6714. Harmonization of authorizations to operate.

Sec. 6715. Plan to expand sensitive compartmented information facility access by certain contractors; reports on expansion of security clearances for certain contractors.

Sec. 6716. Compliance by intelligence community with requirements of Federal Acquisition Regulation relating to commercially available off-the-shelf items and commercial services.

Sec. 6717. Policy on required user adoption metrics in certain contracts for artificial intelligence and emerging technology software products.

Sec. 6718. Certification relating to information technology and software systems.

Subtitle C— Reports

Sec. 6721. Reports on integration of artificial intelligence within intelligence community.

Sec. 6722. Report on potential benefits of establishment of ICWERX.

Sec. 6723. Requirements and report on workforce needs of intelligence community relating to science, technology, engineering, and math, and related areas.

Subtitle D— Talent, Education, and Training

Sec. 6731. Report on establishment of technology acquisition cadre.

Sec. 6732. Emerging technology education and training.

Subtitle E— Other Matters

Sec. 6741. Improvements to use of commercial software products.

Sec. 6742. Code-free artificial intelligence enablement tools policy.

TITLE LXVIII— OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 6801. Improvements relating to continuity of Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board membership.

Sec. 6802. Modification of requirement for office to address unidentified anomalous phenomena.

Sec. 6803. Comptroller General of the United States audits and briefings on unidentified anomalous phenomena historical record report.

Sec. 6804. Report on precursor chemicals used in the production of synthetic opioids.

Sec. 6805. Assessment and report on mass migration in the Western Hemisphere.

Sec. 6806. Report on international norms, rules, and principles applicable in space.

Sec. 6807. Assessments of the effects of sanctions imposed with respect to the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine.

Sec. 6808. Assessment of impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on food security.

Sec. 6809. Pilot program for Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation to undertake an effort to identify International Mobile Subscriber Identity-catchers.

Sec. 6810. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research assessment of anomalous health incidents.

Sec. 6811. Repeal and modification of certain reporting and briefing requirements.

Sec. 6812. Increased intelligence-related engineering, research, and development capabilities of minority institutions.

Sec. 6813. Reports on personnel vetting processes and progress under Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative.

Sec. 6814. Reports relating to programs of record of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

Sec. 6815. Plan regarding Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center.

Sec. 6816. Report on use of publicly available social media information in personnel vetting determinations.

Sec. 6817. Report on strengthening workforce diversity planning and oversight.

Sec. 6818. Report on transition of National Reconnaissance Office to digital engineering environment.

Sec. 6819. Briefing on Department of Homeland Security intelligence activities.

Sec. 6820. Report on declassification efforts of Central Intelligence Agency.

Sec. 6821. Report on National Space Intelligence Center.

Sec. 6822. Report on implementation of Executive Order 13556, regarding controlled unclassified information.

Sec. 6823. National Museum of Intelligence and Special Operations.

Sec. 6824. Technical corrections.

SEC. 6002. Definitions.

In this division:
(1)
Congressional intelligence committees.— The term “congressional intelligence committees” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(2)
Intelligence community.— The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given such term in such section.

SEC. 6003. Explanatory Statement.

The explanatory statement regarding this division, printed in the House section of the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and in the Senate section of the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation of this division as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of conference.

TITLE LXI Intelligence Activities

SEC. 6101. Authorization of Appropriations.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2023 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Federal Government.

SEC. 6102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.

(a)
Specifications of Amounts.— The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 6101 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the Federal Government are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this division.
(b)
Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.—
(1)
Availability.— The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.
(2)
Distribution by the president.— Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the executive branch of the Federal Government.
(3)
Limits on disclosure.— The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—
(A)
as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));
(B)
to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C)
as otherwise required by law.

SEC. 6103. Intelligence Community Management Account.

(a)
Authorization of Appropriations.— There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2023 the sum of $664,445,000.
(b)
Classified Authorization of Appropriations.— In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2023 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 6102(a).

SEC. 6104. Restriction on Conduct of Intelligence Activities.

The authorization of appropriations by this division shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

SEC. 6105. Increase in Employee Compensation and Benefits Authorized by Law.

Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

TITLE LXII Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System

SEC. 6201. Authorization of Appropriations.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year 2023.

TITLE LXIII General Intelligence Community Matters

SEC. 6301. Modification of Requirements for Certain Employment Activities by Former Intelligence Officers and Employees.

(a)
In General.— Subsections (a) and (b) of section 304 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a) are amended to read as follows:

“(a) Post-employment Restrictions.—

“(1) Covered post-service position.—

“(A) Permanent restriction.—Except as provided by paragraph (2)(A)(i), an employee of an element of the intelligence community who occupies a covered intelligence position may not occupy a covered post-service position for a designated prohibited foreign country following the date on which the employee ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position.

“(B) Temporary restriction.—Except as provided by paragraph (2)(A)(ii), an employee of an element of the intelligence community who occupies a covered intelligence position may not occupy a covered post-service position during the 30-month period following the date on which the employee ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position.

“(2) Waiver.—

“(A) Authority to grant temporary waiver.—

“(i) Waivers of permanent restriction.—On a case-by-case basis, the Director of National Intelligence may temporarily waive the restriction in paragraph (1)(A) with respect to an employee or former employee who is subject to that restriction only after—

“(I) the employee or former employee submits to the Director a written application for such waiver in such form and manner as the Director determines appropriate;

“(II) the Director determines that not granting such waiver would result in a grave detrimental impact to current or future intelligence operations of the United States; and

“(III) the Director provides the congressional intelligence committees with a detailed justification stating why not granting such waiver would result in a grave detrimental impact to current or future intelligence operations of the United States.

“(ii) Waivers of temporary restriction.—On a case-by-case basis, the Director may temporarily waive the restriction in paragraph (1)(B) with respect to an employee or former employee who is subject to that restriction only after—

“(I) the employee or former employee submits to the Director a written application for such waiver in such form and manner as the Director determines appropriate; and

“(II) the Director determines that such waiver is necessary to advance the national security interests of the United States.

“(B) Period of waiver.—A waiver issued under subparagraph (A) shall apply for a period not exceeding 5 years. The Director may renew such a waiver.

“(C) Revocation.—The Director may revoke a waiver issued under subparagraph (A) to an employee or former employee, effective on the date that is 60 days after the date on which the Director provides the employee or former employee written notice of such revocation.

“(D) Tolling.—The 30-month restriction in paragraph (1)(B) shall be tolled for an employee or former employee during the period beginning on the date on which a waiver is issued under subparagraph (A) and ending on the date on which the waiver expires or on the effective date of a revocation under subparagraph (C), as the case may be.

“(E) Notification.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director issues a waiver under subparagraph (A) or a revocation of a waiver under subparagraph (C), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees written notification of the waiver or revocation, as the case may be. Such notification shall include the following:

“(i) With respect to a waiver issued to an employee or former employee—

“(I) the details of the application, including the covered intelligence position held or formerly held by the employee or former employee;

“(II) the nature of the activities of the employee or former employee after ceasing to occupy a covered intelligence position;

“(III) a description of the national security interests that will be advanced by reason of issuing such waiver; and

“(IV) the specific reasons why the Director determines that issuing such waiver will advance such interests.

“(ii) With respect to a revocation of a waiver issued to an employee or former employee—

“(I) the details of the waiver, including any renewals of such waiver, and the dates of such waiver and renewals; and

“(II) the specific reasons why the Director determined that such revocation is warranted.

“(b) Covered Post-service Employment Reporting.—

“(1) Requirement.—During the period described in paragraph (2), an employee who ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position shall—

“(A) report covered post-service employment to the head of the element of the intelligence community that employed such employee in such covered intelligence position upon accepting such covered post-service employment; and

“(B) annually (or more frequently if the head of such element considers it appropriate) report covered post-service employment to the head of such element.

“(2) Period described.—The period described in this paragraph is the period beginning on the date on which an employee ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position.

“(3) Regulations.—The head of each element of the intelligence community shall issue regulations requiring, as a condition of employment, each employee of such element occupying a covered intelligence position to sign a written agreement requiring the regular reporting of covered post-service employment to the head of such element pursuant to paragraph (1).”

(b)
Definition of Designated Prohibited Foreign Country.— Subsection (g) of such section is amended—
(1)
by redesignating paragraphs (4) through (6) as paragraphs (5) through (7), respectively; and
(2)
by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:

“(4) Designated prohibited foreign country.—The term ‘designated prohibited foreign country’ means the following:

“(A) The People’s Republic of China.

“(B) The Russian Federation.

“(C) The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

“(D) The Islamic Republic of Iran.

“(E) The Republic of Cuba.

“(F) The Syrian Arab Republic.”

(c)
Additional Written Notice.—
(1)
In general.— Subsection (d) of such section is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(3) Written notice about restrictions.—The head of each element of the intelligence community shall provide written notice of the restrictions under subsection (a) to any person who may be subject to such restrictions on or after the date of enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023—

“(A) when the head of the element determines that such person may become subject to such covered intelligence position restrictions; and

“(B) before the person ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position.”

(2)
Conforming amendment.— Paragraph (2) of such subsection is amended in the paragraph heading by adding “ about reporting requirements” after “ Written notice”.
(d)
Revised Regulations.—
(1)
Definition of covered intelligence position.— In this subsection, the term “covered intelligence position” has the meaning given such term by such section 304.
(2)
Submission.— Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees new or updated regulations issued to carry out such section 304, as amended by subsections (a), (b), and (c) of this section.
(3)
Requirements.— The regulations issued under paragraph (1) shall—
(A)
include provisions that advise personnel of the intelligence community of the appropriate manner in which such personnel may opt out of positions that—
(i)
have been designated as covered intelligence positions before the effective date established in subsection (e) of this section; or
(ii)
may be designated as covered intelligence provisions before such designation becomes final; and
(B)
establish a period of not fewer than 30 days and not more than 60 days after receipt of the written notice required under paragraph (3) of subsection (d) of such section 304, as added by subsection (c)(1) of this section, within which such personnel may opt out of a covered intelligence position and the accompanying obligations imposed by subsection (a)(1)(A) of such section 304, as amended by subsection (a) of this section.
(4)
Certification.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees—
(A)
a written certification for each head of an element of the intelligence community who has issued new or updated regulations pursuant to paragraph (2); and
(B)
for each head of an element of the intelligence community who has not issued such new or updated regulations, an explanation for the failure to issue such new or updated regulations.
(e)
Effective Date of Permanent Restrictions.— Subsection (a)(1)(A) of such section 304, as amended by subsection (a) of this section, shall apply only to persons who occupy a covered intelligence position on or after the date that is 45 days after the date on which new or updated regulations are issued under subsection (d)(2) of this section.
(f)
Repeal.— Section 402 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104–293) is hereby repealed.

SEC. 6302. Counterintelligence and National Security Protections for Intelligence Community Grant Funding.

(a)
In General.— Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 121. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY PROTECTIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY GRANT FUNDING.

“(a) Disclosure as Condition for Receipt of Grant.—The head of an element of the intelligence community may not award a grant to a person or entity unless the person or entity has certified to the head of the element that the person or entity has disclosed to the head of the element any material financial or material in-kind support that the person or entity knows, or should have known, derives from the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or the Republic of Cuba, during the 5-year period ending on the date of the person or entity’s application for the grant.

“(b) Process for Review of Grant Applicants Prior to Award.—

“(1) In general.—The head of an element of the intelligence community may not award a grant to a person or entity who submitted a certification under subsection (a) until such certification is received by the head of an element of the intelligence community and submitted to the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to the process set forth in paragraph (2).

“(2) Process.—

“(A) In general.—The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with such heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall establish a process to review the awarding of a grant to an applicant who submitted a certification under subsection (a).

“(B) Elements.—The process established under subparagraph (A) shall include the following:

“(i) The immediate transmission of a copy of each applicant’s certification made under subsection (a) to the Director of National Intelligence.

“(ii) The review of the certification and any accompanying disclosures submitted under subsection (a) as soon as practicable.

“(iii) Authorization for the heads of the elements of the intelligence community to take such actions as may be necessary, including denial or revocation of a grant, to ensure a grant does not pose an unacceptable risk of—

“(I) misappropriation of United States intellectual property, research and development, and innovation efforts; or

“(II) other counterintelligence threats.

“(c) Annual Report Required.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 and not less frequently than once each year thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report identifying the following for the 1-year period covered by the report:

“(1) The number of applications for grants received by each element of the intelligence community.

“(2) The number of such applications that were reviewed using the process established under subsection (b)(2), disaggregated by element of the intelligence community.

“(3) The number of such applications that were denied and the number of grants that were revoked, pursuant to the process established under subsection (b)(2), disaggregated by element of the intelligence community.”

(b)
Applicability.— Subsections (a) and (b) of section 121 of such Act, as added by subsection (a), shall apply only with respect to grants awarded by an element of the intelligence community after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c)
Clerical Amendment.— The table of contents preceding section 2 of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 120 the following:

“Sec. 121. Counterintelligence and national security protections for intelligence community grant funding.”.

SEC. 6303. Extension of Central Intelligence Agency Law Enforcement Jurisdiction to Facilities of Office of Director of National Intelligence.

(a)
In General.— Section 15(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(a)) is amended—
(1)
in paragraph (1)—
(A)
in subparagraph (C), by striking “ ; and” and inserting a semicolon;
(B)
by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E);
(C)
by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following:

“(D) within an installation owned, or contracted to be occupied for a period of one year or longer, by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and”

; and

(D)
in subparagraph (E), as redesignated by subparagraph (B), by inserting “ or (D)” after “ in subparagraph (C)”;
(2)
in paragraph (2), by striking “ or (D)” and inserting “ or (E)”; and
(3)
in paragraph (4), by striking “ in subparagraph (A) or (C)” and inserting “ in subparagraph (A), (C), or (D)”.
(b)
Conforming Amendment.— Section 5(a)(4) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3506(a)(4)) is amended by inserting “ and Office of the Director of National Intelligence” after “ protection of Agency”.

SEC. 6304. Annual Reports on Status of Recommendations of Comptroller General of the United States for the Director of National Intelligence.

(a)
Definition of Open Recommendations.— In this section, the term “open recommendations” refers to recommendations of the Comptroller General of the United States that the Comptroller General has not yet designated as closed.
(b)
Annual Lists by Comptroller General of the United States.— Not later than September 30, 2023, and each September 30 thereafter through 2028, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Director of National Intelligence a list of all open recommendations made to the Director, disaggregated by report number and recommendation number.
(c)
Annual Reports by Director of National Intelligence.— Not later than 120 days after the date on which the Director receives a list under subsection (b), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on the actions taken by the Director and actions the Director intends to take, alone or in coordination with the heads of other Federal agencies, in response to each open recommendation identified in the list, including open recommendations the Director determines are closed and recommendations the Director determines do not require further action, as well as the basis for such determinations.

SEC. 6305. Timely Submission of Classified Intelligence Budget Justification Materials.

Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 506I the following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):

“SEC. 506J. CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE BUDGET JUSTIFICATION MATERIALS.

“(a) Definitions.—In this section:

“(1) Budget.—The term ‘budget’ has the meaning given the term ‘budget of the President’ in section 506A.

“(2) Classified intelligence budget justification materials.—The term ‘classified intelligence budget justification materials’ means, with respect to a fiscal year, the materials submitted to Congress by the Director of National Intelligence in support of the budget for that fiscal year that are classified or otherwise protected from public disclosure.

“(b) Timely Submission.—Not later than 5 days after the date on which the President submits to Congress the budget for each fiscal year pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the classified intelligence budget justification materials for the element for that budget.”

SEC. 6306. Copyright Protection for Civilian Faculty of the National Intelligence University.

(1)
by redesignating the second subsection (c) as subsection (d);
(2)
by striking subsection (c) and inserting the following:

“(c) Use by Federal Government.—

“(1) Secretary of defense authority.—With respect to a covered author who produces a covered work in the course of employment at a covered institution described in subparagraphs (A) through (L) of subsection (d)(2), the Secretary of Defense may direct the covered author to provide the Federal Government with an irrevocable, royalty-free, worldwide, nonexclusive license to reproduce, distribute, perform, or display such covered work for purposes of the United States Government.

“(2) Director of national intelligence authority.—With respect to a covered author who produces a covered work in the course of employment at the covered institution described in subsection (d)(2)(M), the Director of National Intelligence may direct the covered author to provide the Federal Government with an irrevocable, royalty-free, world-wide, nonexclusive license to reproduce, distribute, perform, or display such covered work for purposes of the United States Government.”

; and

(3)
in paragraph (2) of subsection (d), as so redesignated, by adding at the end the following:

“(M) National Intelligence University.”

SEC. 6307. Modifications to Foreign Malign Influence Response Center.

(a)
Renaming.—
(1)
In general.— Section 119C of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3059) is amended—
(A)
in the section heading, by striking “ response”; and
(B)
in subsection (a), by striking “ Response”.
(2)
Clerical amendment.— The table of contents in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 119C and inserting the following:

“Sec. 119C. Foreign Malign Influence Center.”.

(3)
Conforming amendment.— Section 589E(d)(2) of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283; 10 U.S.C. 2001 note prec.) is amended by striking “ Response”.
(4)
Reference.— Any reference in law, regulation, map, document, paper, or other record of the United States to the “Foreign Malign Influence Response Center” shall be deemed to be a reference to the Foreign Malign Influence Center.
(b)
Director of National Intelligence Authority to Terminate.— Section 119C of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3059) is further amended—
(1)
by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
(2)
by inserting after subsection (d) the following:

“(e) Termination.—After December 31, 2028, the Director of National Intelligence may terminate the Center, but only if the Director of National Intelligence submits to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a determination that the termination of the Center is appropriate, which includes—

“(1) a detailed description that other offices or entities within the intelligence community—

“(A) have the capabilities to perform the functions of the Center; and

“(B) will exercise the functions of the Center upon the termination of the Center; and

“(2) a detailed description of—

“(A) the actions the Director of National Intelligence will take to conduct an orderly wind-down of the activities of the Center; and

“(B) the proposed timeline for such actions.”

(c)
Report.—
(1)
Definition of appropriate committees of congress.— In this subsection, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(A)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(B)
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C)
the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2)
In general.— Not later than December 31, 2025, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report assessing the continued need for operating the Foreign Malign Influence Center.

SEC. 6308. Requirement to Offer Cyber Protection Support for Personnel of Intelligence Community in Positions Highly Vulnerable to Cyber Attack.

(a)
In General.— Section 6308(b) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3334d(b)) is amended—
(1)
in paragraph (1)—
(A)
by striking “ may provide” and inserting “ shall offer”;
(B)
by inserting “ and shall provide such support to any such personnel who request” before the period at the end; and
(2)
in the subsection heading, by striking “ Authority” and inserting “ Requirement”.
(b)
Plan.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives an implementation plan for providing the support described section 6308(b) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3334d(b)), as amended by subsection (a), including a description of the training and resources needed to implement the support and the methodology for determining the personnel described in paragraph (2) of such section.

SEC. 6309. Enforcement of Cybersecurity Requirements for National Security Systems.

(a)
Definitions.— In this section:
(1)
Cybersecurity requirements for national security systems.— The term “cybersecurity requirements for national security systems” means the minimum cybersecurity requirements established by the National Manager, consistent with the direction of the President and in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, that applies to all national security systems operated by, on the behalf of, or administered by the head of an element of the intelligence community.
(2)
National manager.— The term “National Manager” means the National Manager for National Security Systems designated by the President.
(3)
National security systems.— The term “national security systems” includes—
(A)
national security systems (as defined in section 3552(b) of title 44, United States Code); and
(B)
information systems described in paragraph (2) or (3) of section 3553(e) of such title.
(b)
Implementation Deadline.— The cybersecurity requirements for national security systems shall include appropriate deadlines by which all elements of the intelligence community shall have fully implemented the requirements.
(c)
Reevaluation and Updates.— Not less frequently than once every 2 years, the National Manager shall reevaluate and update the cybersecurity requirements for national security systems.
(d)
Resources.— Each head of an element of the intelligence community that owns or operates a national security system shall update plans of the element to prioritize resources in such a manner as to fully implement the cybersecurity requirements for national security systems by the deadline established pursuant to subsection (b) for the next 10 fiscal years.
(e)
Exemptions.—
(1)
In general.— The head of an element of the intelligence community may exempt a national security system owned or operated by the element from the cybersecurity requirements for national security systems if done so in accordance with the procedures established under paragraph (2).
(2)
Exemption procedures.— The National Manager shall, consistent with the direction of the President, establish procedures that govern—
(A)
the circumstances under which the head of an element of the intelligence community may exempt a national security system under paragraph (1); and
(B)
the process for implementing the exemption.
(3)
Annual reports on exemptions.—
(A)
In general.— Each year, the National Manager and the Director of National Intelligence shall—
(i)
submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report documenting all exemptions made under paragraph (1) during the period covered by the report, along with the justifications for the exemptions; and
(ii)
in the case of an exemption made by the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research under such paragraph, submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a separate report describing the exemption and the justification for it.
(B)
Manner.— Each report submitted under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted with such classification as the Director considers appropriate and with due regard for the protection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods.

SEC. 6310. Review and Briefing on Intelligence Community Activities under Executive Order 12333.

(a)
Review and Briefing Required.— No later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall—
(1)
conduct a review to ascertain the feasibility and advisability of compiling and making public information relating to activities of the intelligence community under Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities); and
(2)
provide the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives with a briefing on the findings of the Director with respect to the review conducted under paragraph (1).
(b)
Matters Addressed.— The review and briefing required by subsection (a) shall address the feasibility and advisability of making available to the public information relating to the following:
(1)
Data on activities described in subsection (a)(1), including the following:
(A)
The amount of United States person information collected pursuant to such activities.
(B)
Queries of United States persons pursuant to such activities.
(C)
Dissemination of United States person information pursuant to such activities, including masking and unmasking.
(D)
The use of United States person information in criminal proceedings.
(2)
Quantitative data and qualitative descriptions of incidents in which the intelligence community violated Executive Order 12333 and associated guidelines and procedures.
(c)
Considerations.— In conducting the review under subsection (a)(1), the Director shall consider—
(1)
the public transparency associated with the use by the intelligence community of the authorities provided under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), including relevant data and compliance incidents; and
(2)
the application of the transparency model developed in connection with such Act to activities conducted under Executive Order 12333.
(d)
Disaggregation for Public Release.— In conducting the review under subsection (a)(1), the Director shall address whether the relevant data and compliance incidents associated with the different intelligence community entities can be disaggregated for public release.

SEC. 6311. Assessing Intelligence Community Open-Source Support for Export Controls and Foreign Investment Screening.

(a)
Pilot Program to Assess Open Source Support for Export Controls and Foreign Investment Screening.—
(1)
Pilot program authorized.— The Director of National Intelligence shall designate an element of the intelligence community to carry out a pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of providing enhanced intelligence support, including intelligence derived from open source, publicly and commercially available information—
(A)
to the Department of Commerce to support the export control and investment screening functions of the Department; and
(B)
to the Department of Homeland Security to support the export control functions of the Department.
(2)
Authority.— In carrying out the pilot program required by paragraph (1), the element designated by the Director under such paragraph—
(A)
shall establish a process for the provision of information as described in such paragraph; and
(B)
may—
(i)
acquire and prepare data, consistent with applicable provisions of law and Executive orders;
(ii)
modernize analytic systems, including through the acquisition, development, or application of automated tools; and
(iii)
establish standards and policies regarding the acquisition, treatment, and sharing of open source, publicly and commercially available information.
(3)
Duration.— The pilot program required by paragraph (1) shall be carried out during a 3-year period.
(b)
Plan and Report Required.—
(1)
Definition of appropriate committees of congress.— In this subsection, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(A)
the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B)
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Plan.—
(A)
In general.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland Security, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a plan to carry out the pilot program required by subsection (a)(1).
(B)
Contents.— The plan submitted under subparagraph (A) shall include the following:
(i)
A list, developed in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland Security, of the activities of the Department of Commerce and the Department of Homeland Security that will be supported by the pilot program.
(ii)
A plan for measuring the effectiveness of the pilot program and the value of open source, publicly and commercially available information to the export control and investment screening missions.
(3)
Report.—
(A)
In general.— Not later than 540 days after the date on which the Director submits the plan under paragraph (2)(A), the Director shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the findings of the Director with respect to the pilot program.
(B)
Contents.— The report submitted under subparagraph (A) shall include the following:
(i)
An assessment of the feasibility and advisability of providing information as described in subsection (a)(1).
(ii)
An assessment of the value of open source, publicly and commercially available information to the export control and investment screening missions, using the measures of effectiveness under paragraph (2)(B)(ii).
(iii)
Identification of opportunities for and barriers to more effective use of open source, publicly and commercially available information by the intelligence community.

SEC. 6312. Annual Training Requirement and Report Regarding Analytic Standards.

(a)
Policy for Training Program Required.— Consistent with sections 1019 and 1020 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3364 and 3364 note), the Director of National Intelligence shall issue a policy that requires each head of an element of the intelligence community, that has not already done so, to create, before the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, an annual training program on the standards set forth in Intelligence Community Directive 203, Analytic Standards (or successor directive).
(b)
Conduct of Training.— Training required pursuant to the policy required by subsection (a) may be conducted in conjunction with other required annual training programs conducted by the element of the intelligence community concerned.
(c)
Certification of Completion of Training.— Each year, each head of an element of the intelligence community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a certification as to whether all of the analysts of that element have completed the training required pursuant to the policy required by subsection (a) and if the analysts have not, an explanation of why the training has not been completed.
(d)
Reports.—
(1)
Annual report.— In conjunction with each briefing provided under section 1019(c) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3364(c)), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on the number and themes of compliance incidents reported to intelligence community analytic ombudspersons relating to the standards set forth in Intelligence Community Directive 203 (relating to analytic standards), or successor directive.
(2)
Report on performance evaluation.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of analysis at each element of the intelligence community that conducts all-source analysis shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report describing how compliance with the standards set forth in Intelligence Community Directive 203 (relating to analytic standards), or successor directive, is considered in the performance evaluations and consideration for merit pay, bonuses, promotions, and any other personnel actions for analysts within the element.
(e)
Rule of Construction.— Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the Director from providing training described in this section as a service of common concern.
(f)
Sunset.— This section shall cease to be effective on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 6313. Review of Joint Intelligence Community Council.

(a)
In General.— The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct a review of the Joint Intelligence Community Council established by section 101A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3022).
(b)
Elements.— The review conducted under subsection (a) shall cover the following:
(1)
The number of meetings the Council has held, by year.
(2)
An analysis of the issues the Council has addressed.
(3)
The effect the Council has had on the decisionmaking of the Director of National Intelligence.
(4)
Potential revision to the membership or functions of the Council.
(c)
Briefing.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide the congressional intelligence committees and the subcommittees on defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a briefing on the review conducted pursuant to subsection (a).

SEC. 6314. Required Policy for Minimum Insider Threat Standards.

(a)
Requirement.— Section 102A(f) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(f)) is amended—
(1)
by redesignating paragraphs (8) and (9) as paragraphs (9) and (10), respectively; and
(2)
by inserting after paragraph (7) the following new paragraph:

“(8) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure there is established a policy for minimum insider threat standards for the intelligence community and ensure compliance by the elements of the intelligence community with that policy.”

(b)
Compliance and Reporting.— Title III of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“SEC. 313. INSIDER THREAT POLICY COMPLIANCE AND REPORTING.

“The head of each element of the intelligence community shall—

“(1) implement the policy established in accordance with section 102A(f)(8); and

“(2) concurrent with the submission to Congress of budget justification materials in support of the budget of the President for a fiscal year that is submitted to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, submit to Congress a certification as to whether the element is in compliance with such policy.”

(c)
Conforming Amendment.— Section 102A(x)(3) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3024(x)(3)) is amended by inserting “ , including the policy under subsection (f)(8),” after “ policies of the intelligence community”.
(d)
Clerical Amendment.— The table of contents preceding section 2 of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 312 the following new item:

“Sec. 313. Insider threat policy compliance and reporting.”.

SEC. 6315. Unfunded Priorities of the Intelligence Community.

Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):

“SEC. 514. UNFUNDED PRIORITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: ANNUAL REPORT.

“(a) Annual Report.—Not later than 10 days after the date on which the budget of the President for a fiscal year is submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the Director of National Intelligence, the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on the unfunded priorities of the programs under the jurisdiction of such head.

“(b) Elements.—

“(1) In general.—Each report under subsection (a) shall specify, for each unfunded priority covered by such report, the following:

“(A) A summary description of such priority, including the objectives to be achieved if such priority is funded (whether in whole or in part).

“(B) Whether such priority will satisfy a covert action or support collection against requirements identified in the National Intelligence Priorities Framework of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (or any successor mechanism established for the prioritization of programs and activities), including a description of such requirements and the related prioritization level.

“(C) The additional amount of funds recommended in connection with the objectives under subparagraph (A).

“(D) Budget information with respect to the unfunded priority, including—

“(i) the appropriation account;

“(ii) the expenditure center; and

“(iii) the project and, if applicable, subproject.

“(2) Prioritization of priorities.—Each report shall present the unfunded priorities covered by such report in overall order of urgency of priority among unfunded priorities.

“(c) Unfunded Priority Defined.—In this section, the term ‘unfunded priority’, in the case of a fiscal year, means a program, activity, or mission requirement of an element of the intelligence community that—

“(1) is not funded in the budget of the President for the fiscal year as submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code;

“(2) is necessary to fulfill a covert action or to satisfy an information requirement associated with the collection, analysis, or dissemination of intelligence that has been documented within the National Intelligence Priorities Framework; and

“(3) would have been recommended for funding by the head of the element of the intelligence community if—

“(A) additional resources had been available for the budget to fund the program, activity, or mission requirement; or

“(B) the program, activity, or mission requirement has emerged since the budget was formulated.”

SEC. 6316. Submission of Covered Documents and Classified Annexes.

(a)
Requirement.— Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), as amended by section 6315, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):

“SEC. 515. SUBMISSION OF COVERED DOCUMENTS AND CLASSIFIED ANNEXES.

“(a) Covered Document Defined.—In this section, the term ‘covered document’ means any executive order, memorandum, or policy directive issued by the President, including national security Presidential memoranda and Presidential policy directives, or such successor memoranda and directives.

“(b) Requirement.—Not later than 7 days after the date on which the President issues or amends a covered document, the President, acting through the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives the covered document and any classified annex accompanying that document if such covered document or annex contains a direction to, establishes a requirement for, or includes a restriction on any element of the intelligence community.”

(b)
Initial Submission.— Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives each covered document and classified annex required under section 515 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), in effect as of the date of enactment of this Act.
(c)
Repeal.— Section 310 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 115–31; 50 U.S.C. 3312) is hereby repealed.

SEC. 6317. Improvements to Program on Recruitment and Training.

Section 1022 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3222) is amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 1022. PROGRAM ON RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING.

“(a) Program.—

“(1) Requirement.—The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall carry out a program to ensure that selected individuals are provided funds for academic training (including with respect to both undergraduate and postgraduate education), or to reimburse for academic training previously obtained—

“(A) in capabilities, missions, or skillsets, especially in the fields of science, technology, math, and engineering, to address workforce requirements in which the intelligence community is deficient or likely to be deficient in the future; or

“(B) for such individuals who have backgrounds or experiences that the Director has identified as—

“(i) contributing to capabilities, missions, or skillsets in which the intelligence community is deficient or likely to be deficient in future; and

“(ii) being underrepresented in the intelligence community or likely to be underrepresented in the future.

“(2) Commitment.—An individual selected for participation in the program shall commit to employment with an element of the intelligence community for a period that the Director determines is commensurate with the amount of funding provided to the individual under the program and under such terms and conditions as the Director considers appropriate.

“(3) Designation.—The program shall be known as the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program.

“(4) Outreach.—The Director, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall maintain a publicly available internet website on the program that describes—

“(A) the intent of the program;

“(B) the conditions and requirements for selection and participation;

“(C) application instructions;

“(D) the areas covered by the program pursuant to the review conducted under subsection (b)(2); and

“(E) any other details the Director determines appropriate.

“(b) Elements.—In carrying out the program under subsection (a), the Director shall—

“(1) establish such requirements relating to the academic training of participants as the Director considers appropriate to ensure that participants are prepared for employment as intelligence professionals; and

“(2) on an annual basis, review the areas that will contribute to the capabilities, missions, and skillsets in which the intelligence community is deficient or is likely to be deficient in the future.

“(c) Use of Funds.—Funds made available for the program under subsection (a) shall be used—

“(1) to provide a monthly stipend for each month that a participant is pursuing a course of study;

“(2) to pay the partial or full tuition of a participant for the completion of such course of study;

“(3) to reimburse a participant for tuition paid by the participant before becoming an employee of an element of the intelligence community, including with respect to providing payments for student loans used for such tuition;

“(4) to pay for books and materials that the participant requires or required to complete such course of study;

“(5) to pay the expenses of the participant for travel requested by an element of the intelligence community in relation to such program; or

“(6) for such other purposes the Director considers reasonably appropriate to carry out such program.”

SEC. 6318. Measures to Mitigate Counterintelligence Threats from Proliferation and Use of Foreign Commercial Spyware.

(a)
Definitions.— In this section:
(1)
Covered device.— The term “covered device” means any electronic mobile device including smartphones, tablet computing devices, or laptop computing devices, that is issued by an element of the intelligence community for official use.
(2)
Foreign commercial spyware; foreign company; spyware.— The terms “foreign commercial spyware”, “foreign company”, and “spyware” have the meanings given those terms in section 1102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as added by this section.
(b)
Statement of Policy.— It shall be the policy of the United States to act decisively against counterintelligence threats posed by foreign commercial spyware, as well as the individuals who lead entities selling foreign commercial spyware and who are reasonably believed to be involved, have been involved, or pose a significant risk to being or becoming involved, in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.
(c)
Measures to Mitigate Counterintelligence Threats.— Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 1102 the following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):

“SEC. 1102A. MEASURES TO MITIGATE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE THREATS FROM PROLIFERATION AND USE OF FOREIGN COMMERCIAL SPYWARE.

“(a) Definitions.—In this section:

“(1) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—

“(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and

“(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of Representatives.

“(2) Covered entity.—The term ‘covered entity’ means any foreign company that either directly or indirectly develops, maintains, owns, operates, brokers, markets, sells, leases, licenses, or otherwise makes available spyware.

“(3) Foreign commercial spyware.—The term ‘foreign commercial spyware’ means spyware that is developed (solely or in partnership with a foreign company), maintained, sold, leased, licensed, marketed, sourced (in whole or in part), or otherwise provided, either directly or indirectly, by a foreign company.

“(4) Foreign company.—The term ‘foreign company’ means a company that is incorporated or domiciled outside of the United States, including any subsidiaries or affiliates wherever such subsidiaries or affiliates are domiciled or incorporated.

“(5) Spyware.—The term ‘spyware’ means a tool or set of tools that operate as an end-to-end system of software to provide an unauthorized user remote access to information stored on or transiting through an electronic device connected to the Internet and not owned or operated by the unauthorized user, including end-to-end systems that—

“(A) allow an unauthorized user to remotely infect electronic devices with malicious software, including without any action required by the user of the device;

“(B) can record telecommunications or other audio captured on a device not owned by the unauthorized user;

“(C) undertake geolocation, collect cell site location information, or otherwise track the location of a device or person using the internal sensors of an electronic device not owned by the unauthorized user;

“(D) allow an unauthorized user access to and the ability to retrieve information on the electronic device, including text messages, files, e-mails, transcripts of chats, contacts, photos, and browsing history; or

“(E) any additional criteria described in publicly available documents published by the Director of National Intelligence, such as whether the end-to-end system is used outside the context of a codified lawful intercept system.

“(b) Annual Assessments of Counterintelligence Threats.—

“(1) Requirement.—Not later than 90 days after the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, and annually thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report with an accompanying classified annex containing an assessment of the counterintelligence threats and other risks to the national security of the United States posed by the proliferation of foreign commercial spyware. The assessment shall incorporate all credible data, including open-source information.

“(2) Elements.—Each report under paragraph (1) shall include the following, if known:

“(A) A list of the most significant covered entities.

“(B) A description of the foreign commercial spyware marketed by the covered entities identified under subparagraph (A) and an assessment by the intelligence community of the foreign commercial spyware.

“(C) An assessment of the counterintelligence risk to the intelligence community or personnel of the intelligence community posed by foreign commercial spyware.

“(D) For each covered entity identified in subparagraph (A), details of any subsidiaries, resellers, or other agents acting on behalf of the covered entity.

“(E) Details of where each covered entity identified under subparagraphs (A) and (D) is domiciled.

“(F) A description of how each covered entity identified under subparagraphs (A) and (D) is financed, where the covered entity acquired its capital, and the organizations and individuals having substantial investments or other equities in the covered entity.

“(G) An assessment by the intelligence community of any relationship between each covered entity identified in subparagraphs (A) and (D) and any foreign government, including any export controls and processes to which the covered entity is subject.

“(H) A list of the foreign customers of each covered entity identified in subparagraphs (A) and (D), including the understanding by the intelligence community of the organizations and end-users within any foreign government.

“(I) With respect to each foreign customer identified under subparagraph (H), an assessment by the intelligence community regarding how the foreign customer is using the spyware, including whether the foreign customer has targeted personnel of the intelligence community.

“(J) With respect to the first report required under paragraph (1), a mitigation plan to reduce the exposure of personnel of the intelligence community to foreign commercial spyware.

“(K) With respect to each report following the first report required under paragraph (1), details of steps taken by the intelligence community since the previous report to implement measures to reduce the exposure of personnel of the intelligence community to foreign commercial spyware.

“(3) Classified annex.—In submitting the report under subsection (2), the Director shall also include an accompanying but separate classified annex, providing a watchlist of companies selling, leasing, or otherwise providing foreign commercial spyware that the Director determines are engaged in activities that pose a counterintelligence risk to personnel of the intelligence community.

“(4) Form.—Each report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form.

“(5) Dissemination.—The Director of National Intelligence shall separately distribute each report under paragraph (1) and each annex under paragraph (3) to the President, the heads of all elements of the intelligence community, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the National Cyber Director, and the heads of any other departments or agencies the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate.

“(c) Authority to Prohibit Purchase or Use by Intelligence Community.—

“(1) Foreign commercial spyware.—

“(A) In general.—The Director of National Intelligence may prohibit any element of the intelligence community from procuring, leasing, or otherwise acquiring on the commercial market, or extending or renewing a contract to procure, lease, or otherwise acquire, foreign commercial spyware.

“(B) Considerations.—In determining whether and how to exercise the authority under subparagraph (A), the Director of National Intelligence shall consider—

“(i) the assessment of the intelligence community of the counterintelligence threats or other risks to the United States posed by foreign commercial spyware;

“(ii) the assessment of the intelligence community of whether the foreign commercial spyware has been used to target United States Government personnel.

“(iii) whether the original owner or developer retains any of the physical property or intellectual property associated with the foreign commercial spyware;

“(iv) whether the original owner or developer has verifiably destroyed all copies of the data collected by or associated with the foreign commercial spyware;

“(v) whether the personnel of the original owner or developer retain any access to data collected by or associated with the foreign commercial spyware;

“(vi) whether the use of the foreign commercial spyware requires the user to connect to an information system of the original owner or developer or information system of a foreign government; and

“(vii) whether the foreign commercial spyware poses a counterintelligence risk to the United States or any other threat to the national security of the United States.

“(2) Company that has acquired foreign commercial spyware.—

“(A) Authority.—The Director of National Intelligence may prohibit any element of the intelligence community from entering into any contract or other agreement for any purpose with a company that has acquired, in whole or in part, any foreign commercial spyware.

“(B) Considerations.—In considering whether and how to exercise the authority under subparagraph (A), the Director of National Intelligence shall consider—

“(i) whether the original owner or developer of the foreign commercial spyware retains any of the physical property or intellectual property associated with the spyware;

“(ii) whether the original owner or developer of the foreign commercial spyware has verifiably destroyed all data, and any copies thereof, collected by or associated with the spyware;

“(iii) whether the personnel of the original owner or developer of the foreign commercial spyware retain any access to data collected by or associated with the foreign commercial spyware;

“(iv) whether the use of the foreign commercial spyware requires the user to connect to an information system of the original owner or developer or information system of a foreign government; and

“(v) whether the foreign commercial spyware poses a counterintelligence risk to the United States or any other threat to the national security of the United States.

“(3) Notifications of prohibition.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence exercises the authority to issue a prohibition under subsection (c), the Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of such exercise of authority. Such notice shall include—

“(A) a description of the circumstances under which the prohibition was issued;

“(B) an identification of the company or product covered by the prohibition;

“(C) any information that contributed to the decision of the Director of National Intelligence to exercise the authority, including any information relating to counterintelligence or other risks to the national security of the United States posed by the company or product, as assessed by the intelligence community; and

“(D) an identification of each element of the intelligence community to which the prohibition has been applied.

“(4) Waiver authority.—

“(A) In general.—The head of an element of the intelligence community may request from the Director of National Intelligence the waiver of a prohibition made under paragraph (1) or (2).

“(B) Director of national intelligence determination.—The Director of National Intelligence, upon receiving the waiver request in subparagraph (A), may issue a waiver for a period not to exceed one year in response to the request from the head of an element of the intelligence community if such waiver is in the national security interest of the United States.

“(C) Notice.—Not later than 30 days after approving a waiver request pursuant to subparagraph (B), the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a written notification. The notification shall include—

“(i) an identification of the head of the element of the intelligence community that requested the waiver;

“(ii) the details of the waiver request, including the national security interests of the United States;

“(iii) the rationale and basis for the determination that the waiver is in the national security interests of the United States;

“(iv) the considerations that informed the ultimate determination of the Director of National Intelligence to issue the wavier; and

“(v) and any other considerations contributing to the determination, made by the Director of National Intelligence.

“(D) Waiver termination.—The Director of National Intelligence may revoke a previously granted waiver at any time. Upon revocation of a waiver, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit a written notification to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives not later than 30 days after making a revocation determination.

“(5) Termination of prohibition.—The Director of National Intelligence may terminate a prohibition made under paragraph (1) or (2) at any time. Upon termination of a prohibition, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit a notification of the termination to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives not later than 30 days after terminating a prohibition, detailing the basis for the termination, including any United States national security interests that may be affected by such termination.”

(d)
Protection of Covered Devices.—
(1)
Requirement.— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall—
(A)
issue standards, guidance, best practices, and policies for elements of the intelligence community to protect covered devices from being compromised by foreign commercial spyware;
(B)
survey elements of the intelligence community regarding the processes used by the elements to routinely monitor covered devices for indicators of compromise associated with foreign commercial spyware; and
(C)
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the sufficiency of the measures in place to routinely monitor covered devices for indicators of compromise associated with foreign commercial spyware.
(2)
Form.— The report under paragraph (1)(C) may be submitted in classified form.
(3)
Counterintelligence notifications.— Not later than 30 days after the date on which an element of the intelligence community becomes aware that a covered device was targeted or compromised by foreign commercial spyware, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall notify the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives of such determination, including—
(A)
the component of the element and the location of the personnel whose covered device was targeted or compromised;
(B)
the number of covered devices compromised or targeted;
(C)
an assessment by the intelligence community of the damage to national security of the United States resulting from any loss of data or sensitive information;
(D)
an assessment by the intelligence community of any foreign government, or foreign organization or entity, and, to the extent possible, the foreign individuals, who directed and benefitted from any information acquired from the targeting or compromise; and
(E)
as appropriate, an assessment by the intelligence community of the capacity and will of such governments or individuals to continue targeting personnel of the United States Government.
(4)
Private sector partnerships.— Section 904(d)(7) of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 3383(d)(7)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(E) Vulnerabilities from foreign commercial spyware.—

“(i) Consultation.—In carrying out efforts to secure covered devices, to consult with the private sector of the United States and reputable third-party researchers to identify vulnerabilities from foreign commercial spyware (as defined in section 1102A(a) of the National Security Act of 1947) and maintain effective security measures for such devices.

“(ii) Covered device defined.—In this subparagraph, the term ‘covered device’ means any electronic mobile device including smartphones, tablet computing devices, or laptop computing devices, that is issued by an element of the intelligence community for official use.”

(e)
No Enhanced Authorities.— Nothing in this section or an amendment made by this section shall be construed as enhancing, or otherwise changing, the authorities of the intelligence community to target, collect, process, or disseminate information regarding United States Government personnel.
(f)
Report on Harmonization Among Allied Countries.—
(1)
Requirement.— Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on the potential for the United States to lead an effort to devise and implement a common approach with allied countries as the Director determines appropriate, including the Five Eyes Partnership, to mitigate the counterintelligence risks posed by the proliferation of foreign commercial spyware, including by seeking commitments to implement measures similar to the requirements under this section and section 1102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as added by this section.
(2)
Form.— The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

SEC. 6319. Personnel Vetting Performance Measures.

(a)
Definitions of Continuing Vetting; Council; Security Executive Agent.— In this section, the terms “continuous vetting”, “Council”, and “Security Executive Agent” have the meanings given those terms in section 6601 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3352).
(b)
Measures.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and consistent with section 807 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–103), the Director of National Intelligence, acting as the Security Executive Agent, and in coordination with the Chair and other principals of the Council, shall develop performance measures to assess the vetting of personnel, including measures to assess continuous vetting and the quality of each phase of the personnel vetting process, including the initiation, investigation, and adjudication phases.
(c)
Report.—
(1)
Requirement.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report describing the performance measures developed under subsection (b).
(2)
Elements.— The report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A)
A description of how departments and agencies of the United States Government have implemented Security Executive Agent Directive 6 titled “Continuous Evaluation” and related personnel vetting performance measures to ensure that implementation is efficient and effective, including the resources expended by each department or agency for continuous vetting and whether departments and agencies are identifying security-relevant information in a timely manner.
(B)
A description of the performance measures the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense use to assess the quality of each phase of the personnel vetting process, including initiation, investigation, adjudication, reinvestigation, and continuous vetting.
(C)
How such performance measures meet key attributes for successful performance measures as described in the report of the Comptroller General of the United States titled “Personnel Vetting: Actions Needed to Implement Reforms, Address Challenges, and Improve Planning” (GAO–22–104093).
(D)
Any impediments or constraints relating to the implementation of Security Executive Agent Directive 6 or the development of such performance measures to assess the quality of the personnel vetting process.

SEC. 6320. Proactive Cybersecurity.

(a)
Survey of Elements.— Pursuant to section 103G(b)(1) of the National Security Act (50 U.S.C. 3032(b)(1)), not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall conduct a survey of each element of the intelligence community on the use by that element of proactive cybersecurity initiatives, continuous activity security testing, and active defense techniques.
(b)
Report by Chief Information Officer.—
(1)
Report.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the completion of the survey under subsection (a), the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on proactive cybersecurity initiatives, continuous activity security testing, and active defense techniques. Such report shall include the following:
(A)
The results of the survey of each element of the intelligence community conducted under subsection (a), including—
(i)
examples of any successes against attackers who breached an information system of an element of the intelligence community; and
(ii)
concerns, limitations, and associated recommendations relating to innovative uses of proactive cybersecurity initiatives.
(B)
An analysis of the feasibility, costs, and benefits of consolidating oversight and implementation of such methods within the intelligence community, including whether such consolidation would significantly enhance defense.
(C)
An analysis of any statutory or policy limitations on the ability of the Director of National Intelligence, or the head of any element of the intelligence community, to carry out such methods on behalf of an element of the intelligence community or multiple such elements.
(D)
An analysis of the relationships between and among the intelligence community, the Department of Defense, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency of the Department of Homeland Security, national laboratories, and the private sector, and whether such relationships should be enhanced to protect national security systems of the intelligence community through proactive cybersecurity measures.
(E)
With respect to active defense techniques, a discussion of the effectiveness of such techniques to protect the information systems of the elements of the intelligence community, any constraints that hinder such techniques, and associated recommendations.
(F)
With respect to continuous activity security testing, a discussion of—
(i)
how an information system operates under normal and intended use, compared to how such system operates under a variety of adverse conditions and scenarios; and
(ii)
the feasibility of the adoption of continuous activity security testing among the intelligence community.
(G)
Recommendations for legislative action and further resources relating to the successful use of proactive cybersecurity initiatives, deception environments, and continuous activity security testing.
(2)
Form.— The report under paragraph (1) may be submitted in classified form.
(c)
Definitions.— In this section:
(1)
Active defense technique.— The term “active defense technique” means an action taken on an information system of an element of the intelligence community to increase the security of such system against an attacker, including—
(A)
the use of a deception technology or other purposeful feeding of false or misleading information to an attacker accessing such system; or
(B)
proportional action taken in response to an unlawful breach.
(2)
Continuous activity security testing.— The term “continuous activity security testing” means continuous experimentation conducted by an element of the intelligence community on an information system of such element to evaluate the resilience of such system against a malicious attack or condition that could compromise such system for the purpose of improving design, resilience, and incident response with respect to such system.
(3)
Deception technology.— The term “deception technology” means an isolated digital environment, system, or platform containing a replication of an active information system with realistic data flows to attract, mislead, and observe an attacker.
(4)
Intelligence community information environment.— The term “intelligence community information environment” has the meaning given the term in Intelligence Community Directive 121, or any successor document.
(5)
National laboratory.— The term “national laboratory” has the meaning given that term in section 2 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801).
(6)
National manager for national security systems.— The term “National Manager for National Security Systems” means the Director of National Security, or successor official, serving as the National Manager for National Security Systems pursuant to National Security Directive 42, or any successor document.
(7)
National security system.— The term “national security system” has the meaning given that term in section 3552 of title 44, United States Code.
(8)
Proactive cybersecurity initiatives.— The term “proactive cybersecurity initiatives” means actions performed periodically and continuously within an organization, focused on identifying and eliminating vulnerabilities within the network infrastructure, preventing security breaches, and evaluating the effectiveness of the business security posture in real-time, including threat hunting, endpoint and network monitoring, and cybersecurity awareness and training.

TITLE LXIV Matters Relating to Elements of the Intelligence Community

Subtitle A Office of the Director of National Intelligence

SEC. 6401. Modifications to Responsibilities and Authorities of Director of National Intelligence.

Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024), as amended by section 6314, is further amended—
(1)
in subsection (c)(5)(C), by striking “ may” and inserting “ shall”;
(2)
in subsection (h)—
(A)
in paragraph (1)(A)—
(i)
by striking “ encourage” and inserting “ require”; and
(ii)
by inserting “ , independent of political considerations,” after “ tradecraft”; and
(B)
by amending paragraph (3) to read as follows;

“(3) ensure that substantial differences in analytic judgment are fully considered, brought to the attention of policymakers, and documented in analytic products; and”

(3)
in subsection (i)—
(A)
in paragraph (1), by inserting “ , and shall establish and enforce policies to protect,” after “ protect”;
(B)
in paragraph (2), by striking “ guidelines” and inserting “ requirements”; and
(C)
by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(4)

(A) Each head of an element of the intelligence community shall ensure that any congressionally mandated report submitted to Congress by the head, other than such a report submitted solely to the congressional intelligence committees, shall be consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods in accordance with the policies established by the Director under paragraph (1), regardless of whether the provision of law mandating the report explicitly requires such protection.

“(B) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to alter any congressional leadership’s or congressional committee’s jurisdiction or access to information from any element of the intelligence community under the rules of either chamber of Congress.”

; and

(4)
in subsection (x), in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking “ the head of each department of the Federal Government that contains an element of the intelligence community and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency” and inserting “ the heads of the elements of the intelligence community”.

SEC. 6402. Annual Submission to Congress of National Intelligence Priorities Framework.

Section 102A(p) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(p)) is amended by inserting at the end the following new paragraph:

“(3) Not later than October 1 of each year, the President, acting through the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a copy of the most recently updated National Intelligence Priorities Framework of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (or any such successor mechanism).”

SEC. 6403. Disposition of Records of Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Section 1096(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–458; 50 U.S.C. 3001 note) is amended—
(1)
by inserting “ (1)” before “ Upon”;
(2)
by adding at the end the following new sentence: “ Any records of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence that are maintained by the agency as a service for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence under section 1535 of title 31, United States Code, (popularly known as the ‘Economy Act’) may be treated as the records of the agency when dispositioned as required by law, and any disclosure of such records between the two agencies shall not be subject to any otherwise applicable legal consent requirements or disclosure accounting requirements.”; and
(3)
by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(2) The records of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence may not be dispositioned pursuant to paragraph (1) without the authorization of the Director of National Intelligence.”

Subtitle B Central Intelligence Agency

SEC. 6411. Clarification Regarding Protection of Central Intelligence Agency Functions.

Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3507) is amended by striking “ , functions” and inserting “ or functions of the Agency, or of the”.

SEC. 6412. Expansion of Reporting Requirements Relating to Authority to Pay Personnel of Central Intelligence Agency for Certain Injuries to the Brain.

Section 2(d)(1) of the Helping American Victims Afflicted by Neurological Attacks Act of 2021 (Public Law 117–46) is amended—
(1)
in subparagraph (A), by inserting “ and not less frequently than once each year thereafter for 5 years” after “ Not later than 365 days after the date of the enactment of this Act”;
(2)
in subparagraph (B), by adding at the end the following:

“(iv) Detailed information about the number of covered employees, covered individuals, and covered dependents who reported experiencing vestibular, neurological, or related injuries, including those broadly termed ‘anomalous health incidents’.

“(v) The number of individuals who have sought benefits under any provision of section 19A of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b).

“(vi) The number of covered employees, covered individuals, and covered dependents who are unable to perform all or part of their professional duties as a result of injuries described in clause (iv).

“(vii) An updated analytic assessment coordinated by the National Intelligence Council regarding the potential causes and perpetrators of anomalous health incidents, as well as any and all dissenting views within the intelligence community, which shall be included as appendices to the assessment.”

; and

(3)
in subparagraph (C), by striking “ The” and inserting “ Each”.

SEC. 6413. Historical Advisory Panel of Central Intelligence Agency.

(a)
Sense of Congress.— It is the sense of Congress that Congress expresses its appreciation—
(1)
to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for reconstituting the Historical Advisory Panel; and
(2)
for the important work of the Historical Advisory Panel, especially for—
(A)
the efforts of the Panel to aid with the declassification of materials that enrich the historical national security record; and
(B)
the assistance of the Panel in liaison with the scholarly community.
(b)
Reporting Requirement.— The Historical Advisory Panel shall report directly to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(c)
Historical Advisory Panel Defined.— The term “Historical Advisory Panel” means the panel of the Central Intelligence Agency, regardless of the name of the panel, that assists in conducting declassification reviews and providing other assistance with respect to matters of historical interest.

SEC. 6414. Authority of Central Intelligence Agency to Provide Protection for Certain Personnel.

(a)
Authority.— Paragraph (4) of section 5(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506(a)), as amended by section 6303, is further amended to read as follows:

“(4) Authorize personnel designated by the Director to carry firearms to the extent necessary for the performance of the Agency’s authorized functions, except that, within the United States, such authority shall be limited to the purposes of—

“(A) the training of Agency personnel and other authorized persons in the use of firearms;

“(B) the protection of classified materials and information;

“(C) the protection of installations and property of the Agency;

“(D) the protection of—

“(i) current and former Agency personnel and their immediate families;

“(ii) individuals nominated by the President to the position of Director (including with respect to an individual whom a President-elect (as defined in section 3(c) of the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C. 102 note) has declared an intent to nominate) and their immediate families; and

“(iii) defectors and their immediate families, and other persons in the United States under Agency auspices; and

“(E) with respect to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the protection of—

“(i) installations and property of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;

“(ii) the Director of National Intelligence and the immediate family of the Director;

“(iii) current and former personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and their immediate families as the Director of National Intelligence may designate; and

“(iv) individuals nominated by the President to the position of Director of National Intelligence (including with respect to an individual whom a President-elect has declared an intent to nominate) and their immediate families;”

(b)
Conforming Amendment.— Section 15(d)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3515(d)(1)) is amended by striking “ designated by the Director under section 5(a)(4) to carry firearms for the protection of current or former Agency personnel and their immediate families, defectors and their immediate families, and other persons in the United States under Agency auspices,” and inserting the following: “ designated by the Director to carry firearms under subparagraph (D) or (E) of section 5(a)(4),”.
(c)
Technical Amendment.— Paragraphs (7) and (8) of section 5(a) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3506(a)) are amended by adjusting the margins to conform with the other paragraphs in such section.

SEC. 6415. Notification of Use of Certain Expenditure Authorities.

(a)
CIA.— Section 8 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3510) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(c) Notification.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director makes a novel and significant expenditure pursuant to subsection (a), the Director shall notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives of such expenditure.”

(b)
Other Elements.— Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024), as amended by section 6402, is further amended—
(1)
in subsection (m)(1), by inserting before the period at the end the following: “ , including with respect to the notification requirement under section 8(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3510(c))”; and
(2)
in subsection (n), by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(5) Any authority provided to the Director of National Intelligence or the head of an element of the intelligence community pursuant to this subsection to make an expenditure referred to in subsection (a) of section 8 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3510) is subject to the notification requirement under subsection (c) of such section. If the Director of National Intelligence is required to make a notification for a specific expenditure pursuant to both this paragraph and paragraph (4)(G), the Director may make a single notification.”

SEC. 6416. Office Supporting Central Intelligence Agency Workforce Wellbeing.

(a)
Establishment.— The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“SEC. 29. OFFICE OF WELLNESS AND WORKFORCE SUPPORT.

“(a) Establishment.—The Director shall establish within the Agency an office (in this section referred to as the ‘Office’) to provide support for the physical health, mental health, and wellbeing of eligible individuals under subsection (d).

“(b) Chief Wellbeing Officer; Assigned Staff.—

“(1) Chief wellbeing officer.—The head of the Office is the Chief Wellbeing Officer, who shall provide to the Director regular updates on the operations of the Office.

“(2) Assigned staff.—To assist in performing the functions under subsection (c), the Director shall assign to the Office a sufficient number of individuals, who shall have no official duties other than duties related to the Office while so assigned.

“(c) Functions of Office.—

“(1) Functions.—The Director shall establish the functions and role of the Office, which shall include the following:

“(A) Providing to eligible individuals under subsection (d) advice and assistance on health and wellbeing, including with respect to—

“(i) physical health and access to physical health care;

“(ii) mental health and access to mental health care; and

“(iii) other related programs and benefits for which the individual may be eligible.

“(B) In providing advice and assistance to individuals under subparagraph (A), assisting such individuals who are applying for, and navigating the process to obtain, benefits furnished by the United States Government for which the individual is eligible, including, at a minimum—

“(i) health care and benefits described in such subparagraph; and

“(ii) benefits furnished pursuant to section 19A.

“(C) Maintaining, and making available to eligible individuals under subsection (d), the following:

“(i) A list of physicians and mental health care providers (including from the private sector, as applicable), who have experience with the physical and mental health care needs of the Agency workforce.

“(ii) A list of chaplains and religious counselors who have experience with the needs of the Agency workforce, including information regarding access to the Chaplain Corps established under section 26.

“(iii) Information regarding how to select and retain private attorneys who have experience with the legal needs of the Agency workforce, including detailed information on the process for the appropriate sharing of information with retained private attorneys.

“(D) Any other functions the Director determines appropriate.

“(2) Rule of construction.—The inclusion of any person on a list maintained or made available pursuant to paragraph (1)(C) shall not be construed as an endorsement of such person (or any service furnished by such person), and the Director shall not be liable, as a result of such inclusion, for any portion of compensable injury, loss, or damage attributable to such person or service.

“(3) Confidentiality.—

“(A) Requirement.—The Director shall ensure that, to the extent permitted by law, the advice and assistance provided by the Office to eligible individuals under subsection (d) is provided in a confidential manner.

“(B) Regulations.—The Director may prescribe regulations regarding the requirement for confidentiality under this paragraph. The Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives any such regulations not later than 30 days after prescribing such regulations.

“(d) Eligibility.—

“(1) In general.—An individual described in paragraph (2) may receive a service under the Office at the election of the individual.

“(2) Individuals described.—An individual described in this paragraph is—

“(A) a current or former officer or employee of the Agency; or

“(B) an individual affiliated with the Agency, as determined by the Director.”

(b)
Deadline for Establishment.— The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall establish the Office under section 29 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (as added by subsection (a)) (in this section referred to as the “Office”) by not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c)
Biannual Briefings.— On a biannual basis during the three-year period beginning on the date of the establishment of the Office, the Director shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a briefing on the status of the Office, including on—
(1)
the number of individuals assigned to the Office pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of section 29 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (as added by subsection (a)); and
(2)
the number of eligible individuals under subsection (d) of such section 29 who have received services under the Office, and the type of services so received.

Subtitle C Elements of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise

SEC. 6421. Inclusion of Space Force as Element of Intelligence Community.

Section 3(4)(H) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)(H)) is amended by inserting “ the Space Force,” after “ the Marine Corps,”.

SEC. 6422. Oversight of Defense Intelligence Agency Culture.

(a)
Definitions.— In this section:
(1)
Appropriate committees of congress.— The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(A)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(B)
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(C)
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(D)
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
(E)
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Workforce climate survey.— The term “workforce climate survey”—
(A)
means a workforce engagement or climate survey conducted at the agency, directorate, career field, or integrated intelligence center level, without regard to whether the survey is conducted on an annual or ad-hoc basis; and
(B)
does not include an exit survey specified in subsection (c).
(b)
Findings.— Congress finds that the Defense Intelligence Agency has committed to improving Agency culture and leadership; however, actions taken by the Agency as of the date of the enactment of this Act have not enabled a full assessment of the extent of workforce culture issues and potential management abuses, and require additional Congressional oversight to ensure concerns are both understood and addressed.
(c)
Mandatory Provision of Exit Survey or Interview.—
(1)
In general.— The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall ensure that each employee of such Agency who leaves employment with such Agency (but not including any detail assignment) completes an exit survey or exit interview prior to such departure, to the extent practicable.
(2)
Annual submissions to congress.— On an annual basis during the 3-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a written analysis of the results of the exit surveys or exit interviews completed pursuant to paragraph (1) during the year covered by the report together with a plan of the Director to address any issues identified pursuant to such results to improve retention and culture.
(d)
Congressional Oversight Relating to Workforce Climate Surveys.—
(1)
Notifications of ad-hoc workforce climate surveys.— Not later than 14 days after the date on which the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency conducts an ad-hoc workforce climate survey (including in response to a specific incident or concern), the Director shall notify the appropriate committees of Congress.
(2)
Reports on final results.— Not later than 90 days after the date on which the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency concludes the conduct of any workforce climate survey, the Director shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing the final results of such workforce climate survey. Such report shall include the following:
(A)
The topic of the workforce climate survey, and the workforce level surveyed.
(B)
The rationale for conducting the workforce climate survey.
(C)
The measures in place to ensure the accessibility of the workforce climate survey.
(D)
The lead official or entity conducting the workforce climate survey.
(E)
Any actions the Director intends to take, or is considering, in response to the results of the workforce climate survey.
(3)
Accessibility of workforce climate surveys.— The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall ensure that, to the extent practicable, and consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, workforce climate surveys are accessible to employees of such Agency on classified and unclassified systems.
(e)
Feasibility Report.— Not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing an analysis of the feasibility (including the anticipated cost, personnel requirements, necessary authorities, and such other matters as may be determined appropriate by the Director for purposes of analyzing feasibility) of—
(1)
conducting 360-degree performance reviews among employees of the Defense Intelligence Agency; and
(2)
including leadership suitability assessments (including personality evaluations, communication style assessments, and emotional intelligence aptitude assessments) for promotions of such employees to a position within grade GS–14 or above of the General Schedule.

Subtitle D Other Elements

SEC. 6431. Modification of Advisory Board in National Reconnaissance Office.

Section 106A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041a(d)) is amended—
(1)
in paragraph (3)(A)(i), by inserting “ , in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense,” after “ Director”; and
(2)
in paragraph (7), by striking “ the date that is 3 years after the date of the first meeting of the Board” and inserting “ September 30, 2024”.

SEC. 6432. Establishment of Advisory Board for National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

(a)
Establishment.— There is established in the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency an advisory board (in this section referred to as the “Board”).
(b)
Duties.— The Board shall—
(1)
study matters relating to the mission of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, including with respect to integration of commercial capabilities, promoting innovation, advice on next generation tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities, strengthening functional management, acquisition, and such other matters as the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency considers appropriate; and
(2)
advise and report directly to the Director with respect to such matters.
(c)
Members.—
(1)
Number and appointment.—
(A)
In general.— The Board shall be composed of 6 members appointed by the Director from among individuals with demonstrated academic, government, business, or other expertise relevant to the mission and functions of the Agency.
(B)
Notification.— Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director appoints a member to the Board, the Director shall notify the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code) of such appointment.
(C)
Initial appointments.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall appoint the initial 6 members to the Board.
(2)
Terms.— Each member shall be appointed for a term of 3 years.
(3)
Vacancy.— Any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring before the expiration of the term for which the member’s predecessor was appointed shall be appointed only for the remainder of that term.
(4)
Chair.— The Board shall have a Chair, who shall be appointed by the Director from among the members.
(5)
Travel expenses.— Each member shall receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with applicable provisions under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code.
(6)
Executive secretary.— The Director may appoint an executive secretary, who shall be an employee of the Agency, to support the Board.
(d)
Meetings.— The Board shall meet not less than quarterly, but may meet more frequently at the call of the Director.
(e)
Reports.— Not later than March 31 of each year, the Board shall submit to the Director and to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on the activities and significant findings of the Board during the preceding year.
(f)
Nonapplicability of Certain Requirements.— The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the Board.
(g)
Termination.— The Board shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of the first meeting of the Board.

SEC. 6433. Elevation of the Commercial and Business Operations Office of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

Beginning not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of the commercial and business operations office of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall report directly to the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

SEC. 6435. Study on Personnel under Strategic Intelligence Partnership Program.

(a)
Study.— The Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy, in consultation with the National Laboratories Directors’ Council and in coordination with such other entities, agencies, and departments as the Directors consider appropriate, shall jointly conduct a study of the skills, recruitment, and retention of the personnel at the national laboratories who carry out projects under the Strategic Intelligence Partnership Program.
(b)
Elements.— The study under subsection (a) shall address the following:
(1)
The degree to which the personnel at the national laboratories who carry out projects under the Strategic Intelligence Partnership Program have the requisite training, skillsets, or expertise in critical science, technology, and engineering areas to support ongoing and anticipated projects under such Program, and the sufficiency of such personnel.
(2)
Whether such personnel have compensation, benefits, and pay scales that are competitive with comparable roles in the private sector in the geographic market in which the relevant national laboratory is located.
(3)
Any challenges associated with the retention of such personnel.
(4)
The talent composition of such personnel, broken down by career phase and degree status, to include any relevant exit survey data.
(5)
A description of current or previous programs to enabling such personnel to rotate between elements of the intelligence community and the national laboratories, including the number of personnel on nonreimbursable or reimbursable assignment to an element of the intelligence community.
(6)
The degree to which such projects and personnel support or augment other ongoing mission areas and capacities at the national laboratories.
(c)
Recommendations.— Upon completing the study under subsection (a), the Directors shall jointly develop findings and recommendations based on the results of the study regarding the recruitment and retention of personnel at the national laboratories who carry out projects under the Strategic Intelligence Partnership Program, including with respect to the following:
(1)
New or alternative business models, sponsorship arrangements, or work scope agreements.
(2)
Extending eligibility for existing, or establishing new, recruitment, retention, or other career incentive programs, including student loan repayment and forgiveness programs, to such personnel.
(3)
Initiating geographically flexible or remote work arrangements for such personnel.
(4)
Enabling such personnel to participate in training at elements of the intelligence community, or obtain academic training at the National Intelligence University.
(5)
Establishing new, or enhancing existing, opportunities for detailee or rotational programs among the intelligence community and the national laboratories.
(6)
Using a compensation system modeled on the Cyber Talent Management System of the Department of Homeland Security for such personnel.
(7)
Any other recommendations the Directors determine relevant.
(d)
Report.—
(1)
Requirement.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Directors shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report containing the study under subsection (a) and the recommendations under subsection (c).
(2)
Form.— The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(e)
National Laboratories Defined.— In this section, the term “national laboratories” means—
(1)
each national security laboratory (as defined in section 3281(1) of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2471(1))); and
(2)
each national laboratory of the Department of Energy.

SEC. 6436. Briefing on Coordination Between Intelligence Community and Bureau of Industry and Security.

(a)
Definition of Appropriate Congressional Committees.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(1)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b)
Classified Briefing.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Commerce, or their designees, shall jointly provide a classified briefing to the appropriate congressional committees regarding—
(1)
coordination between the intelligence community and the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce;
(2)
existing processes of the Bureau for the access to, storage of, transmission of, and use of information provided to the Bureau by an element of the intelligence community; and
(3)
such recommendations as the Director and the Secretary may have to enhance such access, storage, transmission, and use.

TITLE LXV Matters Relating to Foreign Countries

Subtitle A Intelligence Matters Relating to the People’s Republic of China

SEC. 6501. Report on Wealth and Corrupt Activities of the Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall make available to the public an unclassified report on the wealth and corrupt activities of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, including the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and senior leadership officials in the Central Committee, the Politburo, the Politburo Standing Committee, and any other regional Party Secretaries.

SEC. 6502. Identification and Threat Assessment of Companies with Investments by the People’s Republic of China.

(a)
Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.— In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(1)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(2)
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3)
the Committee on Energy and Commerce and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b)
In General.— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with such heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, the Chairperson of the Federal Communication Commission, and the Administrator of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the risk to national security of the use of—
(1)
telecommunications companies with a 10% or greater direct or indirect foreign investment by an entity or person owned or controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of, the People’s Republic of China that is operating in the United States or providing services to affiliates and personnel of the intelligence community; and
(2)
hospitality and conveyance companies with substantial investment by the People’s Republic of China by affiliates and personnel of the intelligence community for travel on behalf of the United States Government.

SEC. 6503. Intelligence Community Working Group for Monitoring the Economic and Technological Capabilities of the People’s Republic of China.

(a)
In General.— The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with such heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall establish a cross-intelligence community analytical working group (in this section referred to as the “working group”) on the economic and technological capabilities of the People’s Republic of China.
(b)
Monitoring and Analysis.— The working group shall monitor and analyze—
(1)
the economic and technological capabilities of the People’s Republic of China;
(2)
the extent to which those capabilities rely on exports, financing, or services from the United States and other foreign countries;
(3)
the links of those capabilities to the military-industrial complex of the People’s Republic of China; and
(4)
the threats those capabilities pose to the national security and values of the United States.
(c)
Annual Assessment.—
(1)
Definition of appropriate committees of congress.— In this subsection, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(A)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(B)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2)
In general.— Not less frequently than once each year, the working group shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an assessment of the economic and technological strategy, efforts, and progress of the People’s Republic of China to become the dominant military, technological, and economic power in the world and undermine the rules-based world order.
(3)
Elements.— Each assessment required by paragraph (2) shall include the following:
(A)
An unclassified overview of the major goals, strategies, and policies of the People’s Republic of China to control, shape, or develop self-sufficiency in key technologies and control related supply chains and ecosystems, including—
(i)
efforts to acquire United States and other foreign technology and recruit foreign talent in technology sectors of the People’s Republic of China, including the extent to which those efforts relate to the military-industrial complex of the People’s Republic of China;
(ii)
efforts related to incentivizing offshoring of United States and foreign manufacturing to China, influencing global supply chains, and creating supply chain vulnerabilities for the United States, including China’s financing or potential financing in foreign countries to create monopolies in the processing and exporting of rare earth and other critical materials necessary for renewable energy, including cobalt, lithium, and nickel;
(iii)
related tools and market access restrictions or distortions imposed by the People’s Republic of China on foreign firms and laws and regulations of the People’s Republic of China that discriminate against United States and other foreign firms; and
(iv)
efforts of the People’s Republic of China to attract or restrict financing from the United States and other foreign countries to build self-sufficient national defense capabilities, an evaluation of the relative contribution of foreign financing to China’s economic support for such capabilities, and the type of capital flows from the United States into China’s national defense capabilities from the specific actions taken by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to attract or restrict financing to the outcome of such efforts for entities and persons of the People’s Republic of China.
(B)
An unclassified assessment of the progress of the People’s Republic of China to achieve its goals, disaggregated by economic sector.
(C)
An unclassified assessment of the impact of the transfer of capital, technology, data, talent, and technical expertise from the United States to China on the economic, technological, and military capabilities of the People’s Republic of China.
(D)
An unclassified list of the top 200 businesses, academic and research institutions, or other entities of the People’s Republic of China that are—
(i)
developing, producing, or exporting to other countries the technologies that are strategically important to the People’s Republic of China or supporting entities of the People’s Republic of China that are subject to sanctions imposed by the United States;
(ii)
supporting the military-civil fusion program or the military industrial complex of the People’s Republic of China; or
(iii)
otherwise supporting the goals and efforts of the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese government entities, including the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and the People’s Liberation Army.
(E)
An unclassified list of the top 100 development, infrastructure, or other strategic projects that the People’s Republic of China is financing abroad that—
(i)
advance the technology goals and strategies of the Chinese Communist Party; or
(ii)
evade financial sanctions, export controls, or import restrictions imposed by the United States.
(F)
An unclassified list of the top 100 businesses, research institutions, or other entities of the People’s Republic of China that are developing surveillance, smart cities, or related technologies that are—
(i)
exported to other countries, undermining democracy worldwide; or
(ii)
provided to the security services of the People’s Republic of China, enabling them to commit severe human rights abuses in China.
(G)
An unclassified list of the top 100 businesses or other entities of the People’s Republic of China that are—
(i)
operating in the genocide zone in Xinjiang; or
(ii)
supporting the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau, the Xinjiang Bureau of the Ministry of State Security, the People’s Armed Police, or the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps.
(H)
A list of investment funds, public companies, or private or early-stage firms of the People’s Republic of China that have received more than $100,000,000 in capital flows from the United States during the 10-year period preceding the date on which the assessment is submitted.
(4)
Preparation of assessments.— In preparing each assessment required by paragraph (2), the working group shall use open source documents in Chinese language and commercial databases.
(5)
Format.— An assessment required by paragraph (2) may be submitted in the format of a National Intelligence Estimate.
(6)
Form.— Each assessment required by paragraph (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(7)
Publication.— The unclassified portion of each assessment required by paragraph (2) shall be published on the publicly accessible website of the Director of National Intelligence.
(d)
Briefings to Congress.— Not less frequently than quarterly, the working group shall provide to Congress a classified briefing on the economic and technological goals, strategies, and progress of the People’s Republic of China, especially on the information that cannot be disclosed in the unclassified portion of an assessment required by subsection (c)(2).
(e)
Classified Analyses.— Each classified annex to an assessment required by subsection (c)(2) or corresponding briefing provided under subsection (d) shall include an analysis of—
(1)
the vulnerabilities of the People’s Republic of China, disaggregated by economic sector, industry, and entity; and
(2)
the technological or supply chain chokepoints of the People’s Republic of China that provide leverage to the United States.
(f)
Sunset.— This section shall cease to be effective on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 6504. Annual Report on Concentrated Reeducation Camps in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China.

(a)
Definitions.— In this section:
(1)
Appropriate committees of congress.— The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(A)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(B)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Covered camp.— The term “covered camp” means a detention camp, prison, forced labor camp, or forced labor factory located in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China, referred to by the Government of the People’s Republic of China as “concentrated reeducation camps” or “vocational training centers”.
(b)
Annual Report Required.— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with such heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the status of covered camps.
(c)
Elements.— Each report required by subsection (b) shall include the following:
(1)
An identification of the number and geographic location of covered camps and an estimate of the number of victims detained in covered camps.
(2)
A description of—
(A)
the types of personnel and equipment in covered camps;
(B)
the funding received by covered camps from the Government of the People’s Republic of China; and
(C)
the role of the security services of the People’s Republic of China and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps in enforcing atrocities at covered camps.
(3)
A comprehensive list of—
(A)
the entities of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, including subsidiaries and affiliated businesses, with respect to which sanctions have been imposed by the United States;
(B)
commercial activities of those entities outside of the People’s Republic of China; and
(C)
other Chinese businesses, including in the artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and surveillance technology sectors, that are involved with the atrocities in Xinjiang or supporting the policies of the People’s Republic of China in the region.
(d)
Form.— Each report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(e)
Publication.— The unclassified portion of each report required by subsection (b) shall be published on the publicly accessible website of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

SEC. 6505. Assessments of Production of Semiconductors by the People’s Republic of China.

(a)
Definitions.— In this section:
(1)
Appropriate committees of congress.— The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(A)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(B)
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C)
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Legacy semiconductor.— The term “legacy semiconductor” has the meaning given such term in section 9902(a)(6)(A) of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (15 U.S.C. 4652(a)(6)(A)).
(b)
In General.— Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an assessment of progress by the People’s Republic of China in global competitiveness in the production of semiconductors by Chinese firms, including any subsidiary, affiliate, or successor of such firms.
(c)
Consultation.— In carrying out subsection (b), the Director shall consult with the Secretary of Commerce and the heads of such other Federal agencies as the Director considers appropriate.
(d)
Elements.— Each assessment submitted under subsection (b) shall include the following:
(1)
The progress of the People’s Republic of China toward self-sufficiency in the supply of semiconductors, including globally competitive Chinese firms competing in the fields of artificial intelligence, cloud computing, autonomous vehicles, next-generation and renewable energy, advanced life sciences and biotechnology, and high-performance computing.
(2)
The progress of the People’s Republic of China in developing indigenously or accessing foreign sources of intellectual property critical to the design and manufacturing of leading edge process nodes, including electronic design automation technology.
(3)
Activity of Chinese firms with respect to the production of semiconductors that are not legacy semiconductors, including any identified export diversion to evade export controls.
(4)
Any observed stockpiling efforts by Chinese firms with respect to semiconductor manufacturing equipment, substrate materials, silicon wafers, or other necessary inputs for semiconductor production.
(5)
An analysis of the relative market share of different Chinese semiconductor manufacturers at different process nodes and the estimated increase or decrease of market share by that manufacturer in each product category during the preceding year.
(6)
A comprehensive summary of recruitment activity of the People’s Republic of China targeting semiconductor manufacturing engineers and managers from non-Chinese firms.
(7)
An analysis of the capability of the workforce of the People’s Republic of China to design, produce, and manufacture of semiconductors that are not legacy semiconductors and relevant equipment.
(e)
Form of Assessments.— Each assessment submitted under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form and include a classified annex.
(f)
Additional Reporting.— Each assessment submitted under subsection (b) shall also be transmitted to the Secretary of Commerce, to inform, among other activities of the Department of Commerce, implementation of section 103 of the CHIPS Act of 2022 (Public Law 117–167) and title XCIX of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (15 U.S.C. 4651 et seq.).

Subtitle B Miscellaneous Authorities, Requirements, and Limitations

SEC. 6511. Notice of Deployment or Transfer of Containerized Missile Systems by Russia, China, or Iran.

Section 501 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (division M of Public Law 114–113; 129 Stat. 2923) is amended—
(1)
by striking “ the Russian Federation” each place it appears and inserting “ a covered country”;
(2)
by striking “ Club–K container missile system” each place it appears and inserting “ missile launcher disguised as or concealed in a shipping container”;
(3)
in subsection (a)(1)—
(A)
by striking “ deploy, the” and inserting “ deploy, a”; and
(B)
by striking “ the Russian military” and inserting “ the military of the covered country”;
(4)
by striking subsection (c) and inserting the following new subsection:

“(c) Definitions.—In this section:

“(1) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means the following:

“(A) The congressional intelligence committees.

“(B) The Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate.

“(C) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

“(D) The Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

“(2) Covered country.—The term ‘covered country’ means the following:

“(A) Russia.

“(B) China.

“(C) Iran.

“(D) North Korea.”

; and

(5)
in the heading, by striking “ club–k container missile system by the russian federation” and inserting “ containerized missile system by russia or certain other countries”.

SEC. 6512. Intelligence Community Coordinator for Russian Atrocities Accountability.

(a)
Definitions.— In this section:
(1)
Appropriate committees of congress.— The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(A)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(B)
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C)
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Atrocity.— The term “atrocity” means a war crime, crime against humanity, or genocide.
(3)
Commit.— The term “commit”, with respect to an atrocity, includes the planning, committing, aiding, and abetting of such atrocity.
(4)
Foreign person.— The term “foreign person” means a person that is not a United States person.
(5)
Russian atrocity.— The term “Russian atrocity” means an atrocity that is committed by an individual who is—
(A)
a member of the armed forces, or the security or other defense services, of the Russian Federation;
(B)
an employee of any other element of the Russian Government; or
(C)
an agent or contractor of an individual specified in subparagraph (A) or (B).
(6)
United states person.— The term “United States person” has the meaning given that term in section 105A(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3039).
(b)
Intelligence Community Coordinator for Russian Atrocities Accountability.—
(1)
Designation.— Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall designate a senior official of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to serve as the intelligence community coordinator for Russian atrocities accountability (in this section referred to as the “Coordinator”).
(2)
Duties.— The Coordinator shall oversee the efforts of the intelligence community relating to the following:
(A)
Identifying, and (as appropriate) disseminating within the United States Government, intelligence relating to the identification, location, or activities of foreign persons suspected of playing a role in committing Russian atrocities in Ukraine.
(B)
Identifying analytic and other intelligence needs and priorities of the intelligence community with respect to the commitment of such Russian atrocities.
(C)
Addressing any gaps in intelligence collection relating to the commitment of such Russian atrocities and developing recommendations to address any gaps so identified, including by recommending the modification of the priorities of the intelligence community with respect to intelligence collection.
(D)
Collaborating with appropriate counterparts across the intelligence community to ensure appropriate coordination on, and integration of the analysis of, the commitment of such Russian atrocities.
(E)
Identifying intelligence and other information that may be relevant to preserve evidence of potential war crimes by Russia, consistent with the public commitments of the United States to support investigations into the conduct of Russia.
(F)
Ensuring the Atrocities Early Warning Task Force and other relevant departments and agencies of the United States Government receive appropriate support from the intelligence community with respect to the collection, analysis, preservation, and, as appropriate, dissemination, of intelligence related to Russian atrocities in Ukraine.
(3)
Plan required.— Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress—
(A)
the name of the official designated as the Coordinator pursuant to paragraph (1); and
(B)
the strategy of the intelligence community for the collection of intelligence related to Russian atrocities in Ukraine, including a detailed description of how the Coordinator shall support, and assist in facilitating the implementation of, such strategy.
(4)
Annual report to congress.—
(A)
Reports required.— Not later than May 1, 2023, and annually thereafter until May 1, 2026, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report detailing, for the year covered by the report—
(i)
the analytical findings and activities of the intelligence community with respect to Russian atrocities in Ukraine; and
(ii)
the recipients of information shared pursuant to this section for the purpose of ensuring accountability for such Russian atrocities, and the date of any such sharing.
(B)
Form.— Each report submitted under subparagraph (A) may be submitted in classified form, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.
(C)
Supplement.— The Director of National Intelligence may supplement an existing reporting requirement with the information required under subparagraph (A) on an annual basis to satisfy that requirement with prior notification of intent to do so to the appropriate committees of Congress.
(c)
Sunset.— This section shall cease to have effect on the date that is 4 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 6513. Lead Intelligence Community Coordinator for Countering and Neutralizing Proliferation of Iran-Origin Unmanned Aircraft Systems.

(a)
Definitions.— In this section:
(1)
Appropriate committees of congress.— The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(A)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(B)
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C)
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Five eyes partnership.— The term “Five Eyes Partnership” means the intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
(3)
Unmanned aircraft system.— The term “unmanned aircraft system” includes an unmanned powered aircraft (including communication links and the components that control the unmanned aircraft), that—
(A)
does not carry a human operator;
(B)
may fly autonomously or be piloted remotely;
(C)
may be expendable or recoverable; and
(D)
may carry a lethal payload or explode upon reaching a designated location.
(b)
Coordinator.—
(1)
Designation.— Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall designate an official from an element of the intelligence community to serve as the lead intelligence community coordinator for countering and neutralizing the proliferation of Iran-origin unmanned aircraft systems (in this section referred to as the “Coordinator”).
(2)
Plan.— Not later than 120 days after the date on which the Coordinator is designated under paragraph (1), the Coordinator shall—
(A)
develop a comprehensive plan of action, driven by intelligence information, for countering and neutralizing the threats posed by the proliferation of Iran-origin unmanned aircraft systems; and
(B)
provide to appropriate committees of Congress a briefing on such plan of action.
(3)
Final report.—
(A)
Submission.— Not later than January 1, 2024, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a final report on the activities and findings of the Coordinator.
(B)
Matters.— The report under subparagraph (A) shall include the following:
(i)
An assessment of the threats posed by Iran-origin unmanned aircraft systems, including the threat to facilities and personnel of the United States Government in the greater Middle East, particularly in the areas of such region that are located within the area of responsibility of the Commander of the United States Central Command.
(ii)
A detailed description of intelligence sharing efforts, as well as other joint efforts driven by intelligence information, with allies and partners of the United States, to assist in countering and neutralizing of such threats.
(iii)
Recommendations for any changes in United States policy or legislative authorities to improve the capacity of the intelligence community to assist in countering and neutralizing such threats.
(C)
Form.— The report under subparagraph (A) may be submitted in classified form.
(D)
Annex.— In submitting the report under subparagraph (A) to the congressional intelligence committees, the Director shall also include an accompanying annex, which shall be classified, that separately details all efforts supported exclusively by National Intelligence Program funds.
(c)
Collaboration With Five Eyes Partnership and Israel.— Taking into account the findings of the final report under subsection (b)(3), the Director of National Intelligence shall seek to—
(1)
develop and implement a common approach among the Five Eyes Partnership toward countering the threats posed by Iran-origin unmanned aircraft systems, including by leveraging the unique intelligence capabilities and information of the members of the Five Eyes Partnership; and
(2)
intensify cooperation with Israel for the purpose of countering Iran-origin unmanned aircraft systems, including by strengthening and expanding existing cooperative efforts conducted pursuant to section 1278 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 1702; 22 U.S.C. 8606 note).
(d)
Sunset.— This section shall cease to have effect on the date on which the final report is submitted under subsection (b)(3).

SEC. 6514. Collaboration Between Intelligence Community and Department of Commerce to Counter Foreign Commercial Threats.

(a)
Definitions.— In this section:
(1)
Appropriate congressional committees.— The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(A)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(B)
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C)
the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Foreign commercial threat.—
(A)
In general.— The term “foreign commercial threat” means a rare commercial item or service that is produced by, offered by, sold by, licensed by, or otherwise distributed under the control of a strategic competitor or foreign adversary in a manner that may provide the strategic competitor or foreign adversary leverage over an intended recipient.
(B)
Determinations by working group.— In determining whether an item or service is a foreign commercial threat, the Working Group shall consider whether the strategic competitor or foreign adversary could—
(i)
withhold, or threaten to withhold, the rare commercial item or service;
(ii)
create reliance on the rare commercial item or service as essential to the safety, health, or economic wellbeing of the intended recipient; or
(iii)
have its rare commercial item or service easily replaced by a United States entity or an entity of an ally or partner of the United States.
(3)
Rare commercial item or service.— The term “rare commercial item or service” means a good, service, or intellectual property that is not widely available for distribution.
(b)
Working Group.—
(1)
Establishment.— Unless the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Commerce make the joint determination specified in subsection (c), the Director and the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall jointly establish a working group to counter foreign commercial threats (in this section referred to as the “Working Group”).
(2)
Membership.— The composition of the Working Group may include any officer or employee of a department or agency of the United States Government determined appropriate by the Director or the Secretary.
(3)
Duties.— The duties of the Working Group shall be the following:
(A)
To identify current foreign commercial threats.
(B)
To identify probable future foreign commercial threats.
(C)
To identify goods, services, or intellectual property that, if produced by entities within the United States, or allies or partners of the United States, would mitigate foreign commercial threats.
(4)
Meetings.— Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and on a regular basis that is not less frequently than quarterly thereafter until the date of termination under paragraph (5), the Working Group shall meet.
(5)
Termination.— Beginning on the date that is 2 years after the date of the establishment under paragraph (1), the Working Group may be terminated upon the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Commerce jointly—
(A)
determining that termination of the Working Group is appropriate; and
(B)
submitting to the appropriate congressional committees a notification of such determination (including a description of the justification for such determination).
(6)
Reports.—
(A)
Submission to congress.— Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and biannually thereafter until the date of termination under paragraph (5), the Working Group shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the activities of the Working Group.
(B)
Matters.— Each report under subparagraph (A) shall include a description of the following:
(i)
Any current or future foreign commercial threats identified by the Working Group.
(ii)
The strategy of the United States Government, if any, to mitigate any current foreign commercial threats or future foreign commercial threats so identified.
(iii)
The plan of the intelligence community to provide to the Department of Commerce and other nontraditional customers of the intelligence community support in addressing foreign commercial threats.
(iv)
Any other significant activity of the Working Group.
(c)
Option to Discharge Obligation Through Other Means.— If the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Commerce make a joint determination that the requirements of the Working Group under subsection (b) (including the duties under paragraph (3) and the reporting requirement under paragraph (6) of such subsection) may be appropriately filled by an existing entity or structure, and submit to the congressional intelligence committees a notification of such determination (including a description of the justification for such determination), the Director and Secretary may task such entity or structure with such requirements in lieu of establishing the Working Group.

SEC. 6515. Intelligence Assessment on Foreign Weaponization of Advertisement Technology Data.

(a)
Definitions.— In this section:
(1)
Advertisement technology data.— The term “advertisement technology data” means commercially available data derived from advertisement technology that is used, or can be used, to geolocate individuals or gain other targeting information on individuals.
(2)
Appropriate committees of congress.— The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(A)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(B)
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(C)
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(D)
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
(E)
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b)
Assessment.— The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct an intelligence assessment of the counterintelligence risks of, and the exposure of intelligence community and Department of Defense personnel and activities to, tracking by foreign adversaries through advertisement technology data.
(c)
Report.— Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the intelligence assessment under subsection (b).

SEC. 6516. Intelligence Community Assessment Regarding Russian Gray Zone Assets.

(a)
Definitions.— In this section:
(1)
Appropriate committees of congress.— The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(A)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(B)
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(C)
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(D)
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
(E)
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Gray zone activity.— The term “gray zone activity” has the meaning given that term in section 825 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–103).
(3)
Gray zone asset.— The term “gray zone asset”—
(A)
means an entity or proxy that is controlled, in whole or in part, by a foreign adversary of the United States and is used by such foreign adversary in connection with a gray zone activity; and
(B)
includes a state-owned enterprise of a foreign adversary that is so used.
(b)
Intelligence Community Assessment Regarding Russian Gray Zone Assets.—
(1)
Intelligence community assessment.— The Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall produce an intelligence community assessment that contains—
(A)
a description of the gray zone assets of Russia;
(B)
an identification of any opportunities to hold such gray zone assets at risk, as a method of influencing the behavior of Russia; and
(C)
an assessment of the risks and potential benefits, with respect to the interests of the United States, that may result from the seizure of such gray zone assets to hold the assets at risk.
(2)
Considerations.— In identifying opportunities to hold a gray zone asset of Russia at risk under paragraph (1)(B), the National Intelligence Council shall consider the following:
(A)
The effect on civilians of holding the gray zone asset at risk.
(B)
The extent to which the gray zone asset is substantially state-owned or substantially controlled by Russia.
(C)
The likelihood that holding the gray zone asset at risk will influence the behavior of Russia.
(D)
The likelihood that holding the gray asset at risk, or degrading the asset, will affect any attempt of Russia to use force to change existing borders or undermine the political independence or territorial integrity of any state, including Ukraine.
(E)
Such other factors as the National Intelligence Council may determine appropriate.
(3)
Appendix.— The intelligence community assessment under paragraph (1) shall include an appendix that contains a list of the categories of gray zone assets of Russia, with specific examples of—
(A)
gray zone assets in each category; and
(B)
for each such gray zone asset listed, the ways in which Russia uses the asset to advance its gray zone activities.
(4)
Submission.— The Director, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress the intelligence community assessment under paragraph (1).
(5)
Form.— The intelligence community assessment under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

Subtitle C Reports and Other Matters

SEC. 6521. Report on Assessing Will to Fight.

(a)
Definitions.— In this section:
(1)
Appropriate congressional committees.— The term “appropriate congressional committees” means the following:
(A)
The congressional intelligence committees.
(B)
The Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
(C)
The Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Military will to fight.— The term “military will to fight” means, with respect to the military of a country, the disposition and decision to fight, act, or persevere as needed.
(3)
National will to fight.— The term “national will to fight” means, with respect to the government of a country, the resolve to conduct sustained military and other operations for an objective even when the expectation of success decreases or the need for significant political, economic, and military sacrifices increases.
(b)
Findings.— Congress finds the following:
(1)
According to a study by the RAND corporation, “will to fight” is poorly analyzed and the least understood aspect of war.
(2)
In testimony before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate in May 2022, top intelligence officials of the United States indicated that although the intelligence community accurately anticipated Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the intelligence community did not accurately assess the will of Ukrainian forces to fight in opposition to a Russian invasion or that the Ukrainian forces would succeed in averting a rapid Russian military occupation of Kyiv.
(3)
According to the RAND corporation, the intelligence community estimated that the Afghan government’s forces could hold out against the Taliban for as long as 2 years if all ground forces of the United States were withdrawn. This estimate was revised in June 2021 to reflect an intelligence community view that Afghanistan’s military collapse could come in 6 to 12 months. In August 2021, the Afghan government fell within days after the ground forces of the United States were withdrawn.
(4)
Similarly, the rapid advance of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and near-total collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces in 2014 appeared to take the policymakers of the United States by surprise.
(5)
The apparent gaps in these analyses had important implications for policy decisions of the United States toward Russia and Afghanistan, and suggest a need for further examination of how the intelligence community assesses a foreign military’s will to fight.
(c)
Report.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council and in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community that the Director determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report examining the extent to which analyses of the military will to fight and the national will to fight informed the all-source analyses of the intelligence community regarding how the armed forces and governments of Ukraine, Afghanistan, and Iraq would perform at key junctures.
(d)
Elements.— The report under subsection (c) shall include the following:
(1)
The methodology of the intelligence community for measuring the military will to fight and the national will to fight of a foreign country.
(2)
The extent to which analysts of the intelligence community applied such methodology when assessing the military will to fight and the national will to fight of—
(A)
Afghanistan following the April 2021 announcement of the full withdrawal of the United States Armed Forces;
(B)
Iraq in the face of the rapid emergence and advancement in 2014 of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria; and
(C)
Ukraine and Russia during the initial phase of the invasion and march toward Kyiv by Russia in February 2022.
(3)
The extent to which—
(A)
the assessments described in paragraph (2) depended on the observations of personnel of the United States Armed Forces who had trained Afghan, Iraqi, and Ukrainian armed forces; and
(B)
such observations reflected any standardized, objective methodology.
(4)
Whether shortcomings in assessing the military will to fight and the national will to fight may have affected the capacity of the intelligence community to provide “early warning” about the collapse of government forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
(5)
The extent to which “red teaming” was used to test the assessments described in paragraph (2).
(6)
The extent to which dissenting opinions of intelligence analysts were highlighted in final written products presented to senior policymakers of the United States.
(7)
The extent to which analysts and supervisors adhered to the policies, procedures, directives, and best practices of the intelligence community.
(8)
Recommendations for analyses by the intelligence community going forward to incorporate lessons learned and enhance the quality of future analytical products to more accurately reflect the military will to fight and the national will to fight and improve the capacity of the intelligence community to accurately predict the success or failure of the armed forces of a foreign country.
(e)
Annex.— In submitting the report under subsection (c) to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, the Director shall also include an accompanying annex, which shall be classified, providing an inventory of the following:
(1)
Collection gaps and challenges that may have affected the analysis of the collapse of government forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
(2)
Actions that the Director of National Intelligence has taken to mitigate such gaps and challenges.
(f)
Form.— The report under subsection (c) may be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall include an unclassified summary of key findings, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

SEC. 6522. Report on Threat from Hypersonic Weapons.

(a)
Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.— In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(1)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(2)
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3)
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b)
Report.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing an assessment of the threat to the United States, and to allies and partners of the United States, from hypersonic weapons in light of the use of such weapons by Russia in Ukraine.
(c)
Elements.— The assessment under subsection (b) shall include the following:
(1)
The information learned by the United States regarding the hypersonic weapons capabilities of Russia.
(2)
Insights into the doctrine of Russia regarding the use of hypersonic weapons.
(3)
An assessment of how allies and partners of the United States view the threat of hypersonic weapons.
(4)
An assessment of the degree to which the development of missiles with similar capabilities as hypersonic weapons used by Russia would enhance or reduce the ability of the United States to deter Russia from threatening the national security of the United States.
(d)
Form.— The report under subsection (b) may be submitted in classified form.

SEC. 6523. Report on Ordnance of Russia and China.

(a)
Requirement.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees a report on ordnance of Russia and China, including the technical specificity required for the safe handling and disposal of such ordnance.
(b)
Coordination.— The Director shall carry out subsection (a) in coordination with the head of any element of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise that the Director determines appropriate.
(c)
Definitions.— In this section:
(1)
Congressional defense committees.— The term “congressional defense committees” has the meaning given that term in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code.
(2)
Defense intelligence enterprise.— The term “Defense Intelligence Enterprise” has the meaning given that term in section 426(b) of title 10, United States Code.

SEC. 6524. Report on Activities of China and Russia Targeting Latin America and the Caribbean.

(a)
Definitions.— In this section:
(1)
Appropriate committees of congress.— The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(A)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(B)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(C)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Foreign malign influence.— The term “foreign malign influence” means any hostile effort undertaken by, at the direction of, or on behalf of or with the substantial support of, the government of a foreign country with the objective of influencing, through overt or covert means—
(A)
the political, military, economic, or other policies or activities of the government of the country that is the target of the hostile effort, including any election within such target country; or
(B)
the public opinion within such target country.
(3)
Latin america and the caribbean.— The term “Latin America and the Caribbean” means the countries and non-United States territories of South America, Central America, the Caribbean, and Mexico.
(b)
Report.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council and in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on activities undertaken by China and Russia in Latin America and the Caribbean that are intended to increase the influence of China and Russia, respectively, therein. Such report shall include a description of the following:
(1)
Foreign malign influence campaigns by China and Russia targeting Latin America and the Caribbean.
(2)
Financial investments intended to increase Chinese or Russian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean.
(3)
Efforts by China and Russia to expand diplomatic, military, or other ties to Latin America and the Caribbean.
(4)
Any other activities determined appropriate by the Director.
(c)
Matters.— With respect to the description of foreign malign influence campaigns under subsection (b), the report shall include an assessment of the following:
(1)
The objectives of any such campaign.
(2)
The themes and messaging used in any such campaign.
(3)
The scale and nature of the threat posed by any such campaign.
(4)
The effect of such threat on the national security, diplomatic, military, or economic interests of the United States.
(d)
Form.— The report under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 6525. Report on Support Provided by China to Russia.

(a)
Definition of Appropriate Congressional Committees.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(1)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b)
Requirement.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of elements of the intelligence community that the Director determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on whether and how China, including with respect to the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, any Chinese state-owned enterprise, and any other Chinese entity, has provided support to Russia with respect to the unprovoked invasion of and full-scale war by Russia against Ukraine.
(c)
Matters Included.— The report under subsection (b) shall include a discussion of support provided by China to Russia with respect to—
(1)
helping the Government of Russia or Russian entities evade or circumvent sanctions by the United States or multilateral sanctions and export controls;
(2)
deliberately inhibiting onsite United States Government export control end-use checks, including interviews and investigations, in China;
(3)
providing Russia with any technology, including semiconductors classified as EAR99, that supports Russian intelligence or military capabilities;
(4)
establishing economic or financial arrangements that will have the effect of alleviating the effect of sanctions by the United States or multilateral sanctions; and
(5)
providing any material, technical, or logistical support, including to Russian military or intelligence agencies and state-owned or state-linked enterprises.
(d)
Form.— The report under subsection (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
(e)
Sunset.— The requirement to submit the report under subsection (b) shall terminate on the earlier of—
(1)
the date on which the Director of National Intelligence determines the conflict in Ukraine has ended; or
(2)
the date that is 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 6526. Report on Global Ccp Financing of Port Infrastructure.

(a)
Definition of Appropriate Congressional Committees.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(1)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(2)
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3)
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b)
In General.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report documenting all Chinese financing of port infrastructure globally, during the period beginning on January 1, 2012, and ending on the date of the submission of the report, and the commercial and economic implications of such investments. The report shall also include the following:
(1)
A review of existing and potential or planned future Chinese financing, including financing by government entities, and state-owned enterprises, in port infrastructure at such ports.
(2)
Any known Chinese interest in establishing a military or intelligence presence at or near such ports.
(3)
An assessment of China’s current and potential future ability to leverage commercial ports for military or intelligence collection purposes and the implications of such ability for the national security of the United States and allies and partners of the United States.
(4)
A description of activities undertaken by the United States and allies and partners of the United States to help identify and provide alternatives to Chinese investments in port infrastructure.
(c)
Form.— The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex produced consistent with the protection of sources and methods.

SEC. 6527. Sense of Congress on Provision of Support by Intelligence Community for Atrocity Prevention and Accountability.

(a)
Definitions.— In this section:
(1)
Atrocities.— The term “atrocities” has the meaning given that term in section 6 of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 132 Stat. 5586).
(2)
Atrocity crime scene.— The term “atrocity crime scene” means 1 or more locations that are relevant to the investigation of an atrocity, including buildings or locations (including bodies of water) where physical evidence may be collected relating to the perpetrators, victims, and events of the atrocity, such as mass graves and other sites containing deceased individuals.
(b)
Sense of Congress.— It is the sense of Congress that the efforts of the United States Government regarding atrocity prevention and response through interagency coordination, such as the Atrocity Warning Task Force, are critically important and that the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense should, as appropriate and in compliance with the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7421 et seq.), do the following:
(1)
Require each element of the intelligence community to support the Atrocity Warning Task Force in its mission to prevent genocide and atrocities through policy formulation and program development by—
(A)
collecting and analyzing intelligence identified as an atrocity, as defined in the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 132 Stat. 5586);
(B)
preparing unclassified intelligence data and geospatial imagery products for coordination with appropriate domestic, foreign, and international courts and tribunals prosecuting persons responsible for crimes for which such imagery and intelligence may provide evidence (including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, including with respect to missing persons and suspected atrocity crime scenes); and
(C)
reassessing archived geospatial imagery containing indicators of war crimes, other atrocities, forced disappearances, and atrocity crime scenes.
(2)
Continue to make available inputs to the Atrocity Warning Task Force for the development of the Department of State Atrocity Early Warning Assessment and share open-source data to support pre-atrocity and genocide indicators and warnings to the Atrocity Warning Task Force.
(3)
Provide the President and Congress with recommendations to improve policies, programs, resources, and tools relating to atrocity intelligence collection and interagency coordination.
(4)
Regularly consult and participate with designated interagency representatives of relevant agencies and departments of the United States Government.
(5)
Ensure resources are made available for the policies, programs, and tools relating to atrocity intelligence collection and coordination with the Atrocity Warning Task Force.

TITLE LXVI Intelligence Community Workforce Matters

SEC. 6601. Improving Onboarding of Personnel in Intelligence Community.

(a)
Definition of Onboard Period.— In this section, the term “onboard period” means the period beginning on the date on which an individual submits an application for employment and ending on—
(1)
the date on which the individual is offered one or more entrance on duty dates; or
(2)
the date on which the individual enters on duty.
(b)
Policy Guidance.— The Director of National Intelligence shall establish policy guidance appropriate for all elements of the intelligence community that can be used to measure, consistently and reliably, the onboard period.
(c)
Report.—
(1)
In general.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on the time it takes to onboard personnel in the intelligence community.
(2)
Elements.— The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall cover the mean and median time it takes to onboard personnel in the intelligence community, disaggregated by mode of onboarding and element of the intelligence community.
(d)
Plan.—
(1)
In general.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director, in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a plan to reduce the onboard period for personnel in the intelligence community, for elements of the intelligence community that currently have median onboarding times that exceed 180 days.
(2)
Elements.— The plan submitted under paragraph (1) shall include milestones to achieve certain specific goals with respect to the mean, median, and mode time it takes to onboard personnel in the elements of the intelligence community described in such paragraph, disaggregated by element of the intelligence community.
(e)
Implementation.— The heads of the elements of the intelligence community, including the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall implement the plan submitted under subsection (d) and take all such actions each head considers appropriate and necessary to ensure that by December 31, 2023, the median duration of the onboard period for new employees at each element of the intelligence community is equal to less than 180 days.

SEC. 6602. Report on Legislative Action Required to Implement Trusted Workforce 2.0 Initiative.

(a)
Report Required.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Deputy Director for Management of the Office of Management and Budget shall, in the Deputy Director’s capacity as the Chair of the Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council pursuant to section 2.4 of Executive Order 13467 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to reforming processes related to suitability for Government employment, fitness for contractor employees, and eligibility for access to classified national security information), submit to Congress a report on the legislative action required to implement the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative.
(b)
Contents.— The report submitted under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1)
Specification of the statutes that require amendment in order to implement the initiative described in subsection (a).
(2)
For each statute specified under paragraph (1), an indication of the priority for enactment of an amendment.
(3)
For each statute specified under paragraph (1), a description of the consequences if the statute is not amended.

SEC. 6603. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community Assessment of Administration of Polygraphs in Intelligence Community.

(a)
Assessment Required.— The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall conduct an assessment of the administration of polygraph evaluations that are needed in the intelligence community to meet current annual personnel hiring requirements.
(b)
Elements.— The assessment completed under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1)
Identification of the number of polygraphers currently available at each element of the intelligence community to meet the requirements described in subsection (a).
(2)
If the demand described in subsection (a) cannot be met, an identification of the number of polygraphers that would need to be hired and certified to meet it.
(3)
A review of the effectiveness of alternatives to the polygraph, including methods being researched by the National Center for Credibility Assessment.
(c)
Briefing.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall brief the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives on the preliminary findings of the Inspector General with respect to the assessment conducted pursuant to subsection (a).
(d)
Report.— Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the committees described in subsection (c) a report on the findings of the Inspector General with respect to the assessment conducted pursuant to subsection (a).

SEC. 6604. Timeliness in the Administration of Polygraphs.

(a)
Standards Required.—
(1)
In general.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in the Director’s capacity as the Security Executive Agent pursuant to section 803(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3162a(a)), issue standards for timeliness for Federal agencies to administer polygraphs conducted for the purpose of—
(A)
adjudicating decisions regarding eligibility for access to classified information (as defined in the procedures established pursuant to section 801(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3161(a))); and
(B)
granting reciprocity pursuant to Security Executive Agent Directive 2, or successor directive.
(2)
Publication.— The Director shall publish the standards issued under paragraph (1) in the Federal Register or such other venue as the Director considers appropriate.
(b)
Report Required.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to Congress a report on how Federal agencies will comply with the standards issued under subsection (a). Such plan shall specify the resources required by Federal agencies to comply with such standards and the timeline for doing so.

SEC. 6605. Policy on Submittal of Applications for Access to Classified Information for Certain Personnel.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in the Director’s capacity as the Security Executive Agent pursuant to section 803(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3162a(a)), issue a policy that allows a private person to submit a certain number or proportion of applications, on a nonreimbursable basis, for employee access to classified information for personnel who perform key management and oversight functions who may not merit an application due to their work under any one contract.

SEC. 6606. Technical Correction Regarding Federal Policy on Sharing of Covered Insider Threat Information.

Section 806(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–103) is amended by striking “ contracting agency” and inserting “ contractor that employs the contractor employee”.

SEC. 6607. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community Report on Use of Space Certified as Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the utilization of space owned or sponsored by an element of the intelligence community, located in the continental United States, that is certified as a sensitive compartmented information facility under intelligence community or Department of Defense policy.

SEC. 6608. Improving Prohibition of Certain Personnel Practices in Intelligence Community with Respect to Contractor Employees.

Section 1104(c)(1)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234(c)(1)(A)) is amended—
(1)
by striking “ a supervisor of the contracting agency” and inserting “ a supervisor of the employing or contracting agency or employing contractor”;
(2)
by striking “ contracting agency (or an employee designated by the head of that agency for such purpose)” and inserting “ employing or contracting agency (or an employee designated by the head of that agency for that purpose) or employing contractor”; and
(3)
by striking “ appropriate inspector general of the contracting agency” and inserting “ appropriate inspector general of the employing or contracting agency”.

SEC. 6609. Definitions Regarding Whistleblower Complaints and Information of Urgent Concern Received by Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community.

(a)
National Security Act of 1947.— Section 103H(k)(5)(G)(i)(I) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)(G)(i)(I)) is amended by striking “ within the” and all that follows through “ policy matters.” and inserting the following:

“(aa) a matter of national security; and

“(bb) not a difference of opinion concerning public policy matters.”

(b)
Inspector General Act of 1978.— Section 8H(h)(1)(A)(i) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking “ involving” and all that follows through “ policy matters.” and inserting the following:

“(I) a matter of national security; and

“(II) not a difference of opinion concerning public policy matters.”

(c)
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.— Section 17(d)(5)(G)(i)(I)(aa) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)(G)(i)(I)(aa)) is amended by striking “ involving” and all that follows through “ policy matters.” and inserting the following:

“(AA) a matter of national security; and

“(BB) not a difference of opinion concerning public policy matters.”

TITLE LXVII Matters Relating to Emerging Technologies

Subtitle A General Matters

SEC. 6701. Definitions.

In this title:
(1)
Artificial intelligence.— The term “artificial intelligence” has the meaning given that term in section 5002 of the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 (15 U.S.C. 9401).
(2)
Authorization to operate.— The term “authorization to operate” has the meaning given that term in Circular Number A-130 of the Office of Management and Budget, “Managing Information as a Strategic Resource”, or any successor document.
(3)
Code-free artificial intelligence enablement tools.— The term “code-free artificial intelligence enablement tools” means software that provides an environment in which visual drag-and-drop applications, or similar tools, allow one or more individuals to program applications without linear coding.
(4)
Commercial product.— The term “commercial product” has the meaning given that term in section 103 of title 41, United States Code.
(5)
Commercial service.— The term “commercial service” has the meaning given that term in section 103a of title 41, United States Code.
(6)
Covered item or service.— The term “covered item or service” means a product, system, or service that is not a commercially available off-the-shelf item, a commercial service, or a nondevelopmental item, as those terms are defined in title 41, United States Code.
(7)
Covered product.— The term “covered product” means a commercial software product that involves emerging technologies or artificial intelligence.
(8)
Emerging technology.— The term “emerging technology” means—
(A)
technology that is in a developmental stage or that may be developed during the 10-year period beginning on January 1, 2022; or
(B)
any technology included in the Critical and Emerging Technologies List published by the White House in February 2022, or any successor document.

SEC. 6702. Additional Responsibilities of Director of National Intelligence for Artificial Intelligence Policies, Standards, and Guidance for the Intelligence Community.

(a)
Responsibilities of Director of National Intelligence.— The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community or the officials designated under subsection (b), shall—
(1)
establish, and periodically conduct reviews of, policies, standards, and procedures relating to the acquisition, adoption, development, use, coordination, and maintenance of artificial intelligence capabilities and associated data, frameworks, computing environments, and other enablers by the intelligence community (including by incorporating and updating such policies based on emerging technology capabilities), to accelerate and increase the adoption of artificial intelligence capabilities within the intelligence community;
(2)
ensure policies established or updated pursuant to paragraph (1) are consistent with—
(A)
the principles outlined in the guidance of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence titled “Principles of Artificial Intelligence Ethics for the Intelligence Community and its Artificial Intelligence Ethics Framework for the Intelligence Community”, or any successor guidance; and
(B)
any other principles developed by the Director relating to the governance, documentation, auditability, or evaluation of artificial intelligence systems or the accurate, secure, ethical, and reliable adoption or use of artificial intelligence; and
(3)
provide to the heads of the elements of the intelligence community guidance for developing the National Intelligence Program budget pertaining to such elements to facilitate the acquisition, adoption, development, use, and maintenance of element-specific artificial intelligence capabilities, and to ensure the associated data, frameworks, computing environments, and other enablers are appropriately prioritized.
(b)
Designated Leads Within Each Element of the Intelligence Community.— Each head of an element of the intelligence community, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall identify a senior official within the element to serve as the designated element lead responsible for overseeing and coordinating efforts relating to artificial intelligence, including through the integration of the acquisition, technology, human capital, and financial management aspects necessary for the adoption of artificial intelligence solutions. Such designated element leads shall meet regularly to consult and coordinate with the Director of National Intelligence regarding the implementation of this section and this title.

SEC. 6703. Director of Science and Technology.

(a)
Emerging Technology Adoption.— The Director of Science and Technology may—
(1)
conduct reviews of the policies, standards, and procedures of the intelligence community that relate to emerging technologies and, as appropriate, recommend to the Director of National Intelligence changes to such policies, standards, and procedures, to accelerate and increase the adoption of emerging technologies by the intelligence community;
(2)
make recommendations, in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, to the Director of National Intelligence with respect to the budgets of such elements, to accelerate and increase the adoption of emerging technologies by such elements; and
(3)
coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering on initiatives, policies, and programs carried out jointly between the intelligence community and the Department of Defense to accelerate and increase the adoption of emerging technologies.
(b)
Appointment Criteria.— Section 103E(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3030(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following: “ In making such appointment, the Director of National Intelligence may give preference to an individual with experience outside of the United States Government.”.

SEC. 6704. Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer.

Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 103J the following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):

“SEC. 103K. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CHIEF DATA OFFICER.

“(a) Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer.—There is an Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.

“(b) Requirement Relating to Appointment.—An individual appointed as the Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer shall have a professional background and experience appropriate for the duties of the Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer. In making such appointment, the Director of National Intelligence may give preference to an individual with experience outside of the United States Government.

“(c) Duties.—The Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer shall—

“(1) act as the chief representative of the Director of National Intelligence for data issues within the intelligence community;

“(2) coordinate, to the extent practicable and advisable, with the Chief Data Officer of the Department of Defense to ensure consistent data policies, standards, and procedures between the intelligence community and the Department of Defense;

“(3) assist the Director of National Intelligence regarding data elements of the budget of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and

“(4) perform other such duties as may be prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence or specified in law.”

Subtitle B Improvements Relating to Procurement

SEC. 6711. Additional Transaction Authority.

(a)
Annual Reports; Feasibility and Advisability Study.—
(1)
Reports.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on the use of the authority under paragraph (5) of section 102A(n) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(n)), as added by subsection (b).
(2)
Feasibility and advisability study.—
(A)
Study.— The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct a feasibility and advisability study on whether to provide to the heads of the elements of the intelligence community an additional transaction authority that is not restricted only to basic, applied, and advanced research projects and prototype projects (similar to such less restrictive additional transaction authorities of the Transportation Security Administration and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration).
(B)
Submission.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives the findings of the study conducted under subparagraph (A), including, if the Director determines a less restrictive additional transaction authority is advisable pursuant to such study, an identification of any legislative solutions or other actions necessary to implement such authority.
(b)
Additional Transaction Authority.— Section 102A(n) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(n)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(5) Other Transaction Authority.—

“(A) In general.—In addition to other acquisition authorities, the Director of National Intelligence may exercise the acquisition authorities referred to in sections 4021 and 4022 of title 10, United States Code, subject to the provisions of this paragraph.

“(B) Delegation.—

(i) The Director shall delegate the authorities provided by subparagraph (A) to the heads of elements of the intelligence community.

“(ii) The heads of elements of the intelligence community shall, to the maximum extent practicable, delegate the authority delegated under clause (i) to the official of the respective element of the intelligence community responsible for decisions with respect to basic, applied, or advanced research activities or the adoption of such activities within such element.

“(C) Intelligence community authority.—

(i) For purposes of this paragraph, the limitation in section 4022(a)(1) of title 10, United States Code, shall not apply to elements of the intelligence community.

“(ii) Subject to section 4022(a)(2) of such title, the Director may enter into transactions and agreements (other than contracts, cooperative agreements, and grants) of amounts not to exceed $75,000,000 under this paragraph to carry out basic, applied, and advanced research projects and prototype projects in support of intelligence activities.

“(iii) For purposes of this paragraph, the limitations specified in section 4022(a)(2) of such title shall apply to the intelligence community in lieu of the Department of Defense, and the Director shall—

“(I) identify appropriate officials who can make the determinations required in subparagraph (B)(i) of such section for the intelligence community; and

“(II) brief the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives in lieu of the congressional defense committees, as specified in subparagraph (B)(ii) of such section.

“(iv) For purposes of this paragraph, the limitation in section 4022(a)(3) of such title shall not apply to elements of the intelligence community.

“(v) In carrying out this paragraph, section 4022(d)(1) of such title shall be applied by substituting ‘Director of National Intelligence’ for ‘Secretary of Defense’.

“(vi) For purposes of this paragraph, the limitations in section 4022(d)(2) of such title shall not apply to elements of the intelligence community.

“(vii) In addition to the follow-on production contract criteria in section 4022(f)(2) of such title, the following additional criteria shall apply:

“(I) The authorizing official of the relevant element of the intelligence community determines that Government users of the proposed production product or production service have been consulted.

“(II) In the case of a proposed production product that is software, there are mechanisms in place for Government users to provide ongoing feedback to participants to the follow-on production contract.

“(III) In the case of a proposed production product that is software, there are mechanisms in place to promote the interoperability and accessibility with and between Government and commercial software providers, including by the promotion of open application programming interfaces and requirement of appropriate software documentation.

“(IV) The award follows a documented market analysis as mandated by the Federal Acquisition Regulations surveying available and comparable products.

“(V) In the case of a proposed production product that is software, the follow-on production contract includes a requirement that, for the duration of such contract (or such other period of time as may be agreed to as a term of such contract)—

“(aa) the participants provide the most up-to-date version of the product that is available in the commercial marketplace and is consistent with security requirements;

“(bb) there are mechanisms in place for the participants to provide timely updates to the production product; and

“(cc) the authority specified in section 4022(f)(5) of such title shall be exercised by the Director in lieu of the Secretary of Defense.

“(D) Implementation policy.—The Director, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall—

“(i) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, establish and implement an intelligence community-wide policy prescribing the use and limitations of the authority under this paragraph, particularly with respect to the application of subparagraphs (B) and (C);

“(ii) periodically review and update the policy established under clause (i); and

“(iii) submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives the policy when established under clause (i) or updated under clause (ii).

“(E) Annual report.—

“(i) In general.—Not less frequently than annually, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report detailing the use by the intelligence community of the authority provided by this paragraph.

“(ii) Elements.—

“(I) Required elements.—Each report required by clause (i) shall detail the following:

“(aa) The number of transactions.

“(bb) The participants to such transactions.

“(cc) The purpose of the transaction.

“(dd) The amount of each transaction.

“(ee) Concerns with the efficiency of the policy.

“(ff) Any recommendations for how to improve the process.

“(II) Other elements.—Each report required by clause (i) may describe such transactions which have been awarded follow-on production contracts either pursuant to the authority provided by this paragraph or another acquisition authority available to the intelligence community.”

SEC. 6712. Implementation Plan and Advisability Study for Offices of Commercial Integration.

(a)
Plan and Study.—
(1)
Submission.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives—
(A)
a plan for the establishment of a centralized office or offices within each appropriate element of the intelligence community, to be known as the “Office of Commercial Integration”, for the purpose of—
(i)
assisting persons desiring to submit an offer for a contract with the intelligence community; and
(ii)
assisting with the procurement of commercial products and commercial services; and
(B)
the findings of a study conducted by the Director into the advisability of implementing such plan, including an assessment of—
(i)
whether there should be a single Office of Commercial Integration for the intelligence community or whether each element of the intelligence community shall establish such an Office;
(ii)
the costs and benefits of the implementation of such plan; and
(iii)
whether there is within any element of the intelligence community an existing office or program similar to the proposed Office of Commercial Integration.
(2)
Elements.— The materials submitted under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A)
A recommendation by the Director, based on the findings of the study under paragraph (1)(B), on—
(i)
how the plan under paragraph (1)(A) compares to specific alternative actions of the intelligence community that could be taken to assist persons desiring to submit an offer for a contract with the intelligence community and assist with the procurement of commercial products and commercial services; and
(ii)
whether to implement such plan.
(B)
A proposal for the designation of a senior official of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence who would be responsible for the coordination across the intelligence community or across the Offices of Commercial Integration, depending on the findings of the study under paragraph (1)(B).
(C)
Draft guidelines that would require the coordination and sharing of best practices and other information across the intelligence community.
(D)
A timeline of the steps that would be necessary to establish each Office of Commercial Integration by the date that is not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(E)
An assessment of the personnel requirements, and any other resource requirements, that would be necessary to establish the Office or Offices of Commercial Integration by such date, including—
(i)
the amount of personnel necessary for the establishment of the Office or Offices of Commercial Integration; and
(ii)
the necessary qualifications of any such personnel.
(F)
Policies regarding the types of assistance that, if an Office or Offices of Commercial Integration were to be established, could be provided to contractors by the Director of such Office, taking into account the role of such assistance as an incentive for emerging technology companies to enter into contracts with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community.
(G)
Eligibility criteria for determining the types of offerors or contractors that would be eligible to receive assistance provided by each Office of Commercial Integration.
(H)
Policies regarding outreach efforts that would be required to be conducted by the Office or Offices of Commercial Integration with respect to eligible contractors.
(I)
Policies regarding how the intelligence community would coordinate with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to provide proactive counterintelligence risk analysis and assistance to entities in the private sector.
(J)
Draft guidelines that would require the Office or Offices of Commercial Integration to appoint and assign personnel with expertise in a range of disciplines necessary for the accelerated integration of commercial technologies into the intelligence community (as determined by the Office or Offices of Commercial Integration), including expertise in the following:
(i)
Authorizations to operate.
(ii)
Contracting.
(iii)
Facility clearances.
(iv)
Security clearances.
(K)
Such other intelligence community-wide policies as the Director of National Intelligence may prescribe relating to the improvement of commercial integration (and the coordination of such improvements) by and among the elements of the intelligence community.
(b)
Public Website on Commercial Integration.—
(1)
Establishment.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the head of the relevant elements of the intelligence community (as determined by the Director) and the designated element leads under section 6702(b), shall establish a publicly accessible website that includes relevant information necessary for offerors or contractors to conduct business with each element of the intelligence community.
(2)
Inclusion of certain information.— If there is established an Office or Offices of Commercial Integration in accordance with subsection (a), the website under paragraph (1) shall include—
(A)
information, as appropriate, on the elements under subsection (a)(2) relating to that Office; and
(B)
contact information for the relevant senior officers of the Office or Offices.

SEC. 6713. Pilot Program on Designated Emerging Technology Transition Projects.

(a)
Pilot Program.— The Director of National Intelligence shall carry out a pilot program to more effectively transition promising prototypes or products in a developmental stage to a production stage, through designating eligible projects as “Emerging Technology Transition Projects”.
(b)
Designation.—
(1)
In general.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall issue guidelines to implement the pilot program under subsection (a).
(2)
Requirements.— The guidelines issued pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include the following requirements:
(A)
Each head of an element of the intelligence community shall submit to the Director of National Intelligence a prioritized list of not more than 10 eligible projects per year to be considered for designation by the Director of National Intelligence as Emerging Technology Transition Projects during the budget formulation process.
(B)
The Director of National Intelligence shall designate not more than 10 eligible projects per year as Emerging Technology Transition Projects.
(C)
No eligible project may be designated by the Director of National Intelligence as an Emerging Technology Transition Project unless the head of an element of the intelligence community includes the project in the prioritized list under subparagraph (A) and submits to the Director of National Intelligence, with respect to the project, each of the following:
(i)
A justification of why the product was nominated for transition, including a description of the importance of the proposed product to the mission of the intelligence community and the nominating agency.
(ii)
A certification that the project provides new technologies or processes, or new applications of existing technologies, that shall enable more effective alternatives to existing programs, systems, or initiatives of the intelligence community.
(iii)
A certification that the project provides future cost savings, significantly reduces the time to deliver capabilities to the intelligence community, or significantly improves a capability of the intelligence community.
(iv)
A certification that funding is not proposed for the project in the budget request of the respective covered element for the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the project is submitted for consideration.
(v)
A certification in writing by the nominating head that the project meets all applicable criteria and requirements of the respective covered element for transition to production and that the nominating head would fund the project if additional funds were made available for such purpose.
(vi)
A description of the means by which the proposed production product shall be incorporated into the activities and long-term budget of the respective covered element following such transition.
(vii)
A description of steps taken to ensure that the use of the product shall reflect commercial best practices, as applicable.
(D)
A clear description of the selection of eligible projects, including specific criteria, that shall include, at a minimum, the requirements specified in subparagraph (C).
(E)
The designation of an official responsible for implementing this section and coordinating with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community with respect to the guidelines issued pursuant to paragraph (1) and overseeing the awards of funds to Emerging Technology Transition Projects with respect to that element.
(3)
Revocation of designation.— The designation of an Emerging Technology Transition Project under subsection (b) may be revoked at any time by—
(A)
the Director of National Intelligence; or
(B)
the relevant head of a covered element of the intelligence community that previously submitted a project under subsection (b), in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence.
(c)
Benefits of Designation.—
(1)
Inclusion in multiyear national intelligence program plan.— The Director of National Intelligence shall include in the relevant multiyear national intelligence program plan submitted to Congress under section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 3301) the planned expenditures, if any, of each designated project during the period of its designation.
(2)
Inclusion under separate exhibit.— The heads of elements of the intelligence community shall ensure that each designated project is included in a separate budget exhibit in the relevant multiyear national intelligence program plan submitted to Congress under such section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 3301) for the period of the designation of such project.
(3)
Consideration in programming and budgeting.— Each designated project shall be taken into consideration by the nominating head in the programming and budgeting phases of the intelligence planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation process during the period of its designation.
(d)
Reports to Congress.—
(1)
Annual reports.— On an annual basis for each fiscal year during which the pilot program under subsection (a) is carried out, concurrently with the submission of the budget of the President for that fiscal year under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report that includes the following:
(A)
A description of each designated project.
(B)
A summary of the potential of each designated project, as specified in subsection (b)(2)(C).
(C)
For each designated project, a description of the progress made toward delivering on such potential.
(D)
A description of any funding proposed for the designated project in the future-years intelligence program, including by program, appropriation account, expenditure center, and project.
(E)
Such other information on the status of such pilot program as the Director considers appropriate.
(2)
Final report.— In the final report submitted under paragraph (1) prior to the date of termination under subsection (e), the Director of National Intelligence shall include a recommendation on whether to extend the pilot program under subsection (a) and the appropriate duration of such extension, if any.
(e)
Termination Date.— The authority to carry out the pilot program under subsection (a) shall terminate on December 31, 2027.
(f)
Definition of Covered Element of the Intelligence Community.— In this section, the term “covered element of the intelligence community” means the following:
(1)
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2)
The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3)
The National Security Agency.
(4)
The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(5)
The National Reconnaissance Office.
(6)
The Defense Intelligence Agency.

SEC. 6714. Harmonization of Authorizations to Operate.

(a)
Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.— In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(1)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(2)
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(3)
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(4)
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
(5)
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b)
Protocol.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall develop and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a single protocol setting forth policies and procedures relating to authorizations to operate for Department of Defense or intelligence community systems held by industry providers.
(c)
Limitation.— The protocol under subsection (b) shall be limited to authorizations to operate for Department of Defense and intelligence community systems.
(d)
Elements.— The protocol under subsection (b) shall include, at a minimum, the following:
(1)
A policy for reciprocal recognition, as appropriate, among the elements of the intelligence community and the Department of Defense of authorizations to operate held by commercial providers. Such reciprocal recognition shall be limited to authorizations to operate for systems that collect, process, maintain, use, share, disseminate, or dispose of data classified at an equal or lower classification level than the original authorization.
(2)
Procedures under which, subject to such criteria as may be prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence jointly with the Secretary of Defense, a provider that holds an authorization to operate for a Department of Defense or intelligence community system may provide to the head of an element of the intelligence community or the Department of Defense the most recently updated version of any software, data, or application for use on such system without being required to submit an application for new or renewed authorization.
(3)
Procedures for the review, renewal, and revocation of authorizations to operate held by commercial providers, including procedures for maintaining continuous authorizations to operate, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense. Such procedures may encourage greater use of modern security practices already being adopted by the Department of Defense and other Federal agencies, such as continuous authorization with system security focused on continuous monitoring of risk and security controls, active system defense, and the use of an approved mechanism for secure and continuous delivery of software (commonly referred to as “DevSecOps”).
(4)
A policy for the harmonization of documentation requirements for commercial providers submitting applications for authorizations to operate, with the goal of a uniform requirement across the Department of Defense and the elements of the intelligence community (subject to exceptions established by the Director and the Secretary). Such policy shall include the following requirements:
(A)
A requirement for the full disclosure of evidence in the reciprocity process across the Department of Defense and the elements of the intelligence community.
(B)
With respect to a system with an existing authorization to operate, a requirement for approval by the Chief Information Officer or a designated official (as the head of the respective element of the intelligence community determines appropriate) for such system to operate at an equal or higher level classification level, to be granted prior to the performance of an additional security assessment with respect to such system, and regardless of which element of the intelligence community or Department of Defense granted the original authorization.
(5)
A requirement to establish a joint secure portal of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Defense for the maintenance of records, applications, and system requirements for authorizations to operate.
(6)
A plan to examine, and if necessary, address, the shortage of intelligence community and Department of Defense personnel authorized to support and grant an authorization to operate. Such plan shall include—
(A)
a report on the current average wait times for authorizations to operate and backlogs, disaggregated by each element of the intelligence community and the Department of Defense;
(B)
appropriate recommendations to increase pay or implement other incentives to recruit and retain such personnel; and
(C)
a plan to leverage independent third-party assessment organizations to support assessments of applications for authorizations to operate.
(7)
Procedures to ensure data security and safety with respect to the implementation of the protocol.
(8)
A proposed timeline for the implementation of the protocol by the deadline specified in subsection (g).
(e)
Coordinating Officials.— Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act—
(1)
the Director of National Intelligence shall designate an official of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence responsible for implementing this section on behalf of the Director and leading coordination across the intelligence community for such implementation;
(2)
the Secretary of Defense shall designate an official of the Department of Defense responsible for implementing this section on behalf of the Secretary and leading coordination across the Department of Defense for such implementation; and
(3)
each head of an element of the intelligence community shall designate an official of that element responsible for implementing this section and overseeing implementation of the protocol under subsection (b) with respect to the element.
(f)
Documentation Requirements.— Under the protocol under subsection (b), no head of a Federal agency may commence the operation of a system using an authorization to operate granted by another Federal agency without possessing documentation of the original authorization to operate.
(g)
Implementation Required.— The protocol under subsection (b) shall be implemented not later than January 1, 2025.

SEC. 6715. Plan to Expand Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility Access by Certain Contractors; Reports on Expansion of Security Clearances for Certain Contractors.

(a)
Plan; Briefing.—
(1)
In general.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of such other elements of the intelligence community as the Director of National Intelligence may determine appropriate, shall—
(A)
develop a plan to expand access by contractors of small emerging technology companies to sensitive compartmented information facilities for the purpose of providing such contractors with a facility to securely perform work; and
(B)
provide to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a briefing on such plan.
(2)
Matters.— The plan under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A)
An overview of the existing sensitive compartmented information facilities, if any, that may be available for the purpose specified in paragraph (1).
(B)
An assessment of the feasibility of building additional sensitive compartmented information facilities for such purpose.
(C)
An assessment of the relative costs and benefits of repurposing existing, or building additional, sensitive compartmented information facilities for such purpose.
(D)
The eligibility criteria for determining which contractors under this section may be granted access to sensitive compartmented information facilities for such purpose.
(E)
An estimate of the maximum number of contractors that may be provided access to sensitive compartmented information facilities for such purpose, taking into account the matters specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B).
(F)
Policies to ensure the efficient and narrow use of sensitive compartmented information facilities for such purpose, including a timeline for the length of such use by a contractor under this section and a detailed description of the process to terminate access to the sensitive compartmented information facility by such contractor upon—
(i)
the expiration of the contract or agreement of the contractor; or
(ii)
a determination that the contractor no longer has a need for such access to fulfill the terms of such contract or agreement.
(G)
Pricing structures for the use of sensitive compartmented information facilities by contractors for the purpose specified in paragraph (1). Such pricing structures—
(i)
may include free use (for the purpose of incentivizing future contracts), with the potential for pricing to increase dependent on the length of the contract or agreement, the size of the contractor, and the need for such use; and
(ii)
shall ensure that the cumulative cost for a contractor to rent and independently certify a sensitive compartmented information facility for such purpose does not exceed the market average for the Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense to build, certify, and maintain a sensitive compartmented information facility.
(H)
A security plan for vetting each contractor prior to the access of a sensitive compartmented information facility by the contractor for the purpose specified in paragraph (1), and an assessment of potential security concerns regarding such access.
(I)
A proposed timeline for the expansion of access to sensitive compartmented information facilities in accordance with paragraph (1).
(J)
Such other matters as the Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense considers relevant to such expansion.
(b)
Eligibility Criteria for Contractors.— Unless the Director of National Intelligence determines the source of the financing of a contractor poses a national security risk, such source of financing may not be taken into consideration in making a determination as to the eligibility of the contractor in accordance with subsection (a)(2)(D).
(c)
Reports on Expansion of Security Clearances for Certain Contractors.—
(1)
Reports.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a report on the extent to which security clearance requirements delay, limit, or otherwise disincentivize emerging technology companies from entering into contracts with the United States Government.
(2)
Matters.— Each report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A)
Statistics on the periods of time between the submission of applications for security clearances by employees of emerging technology companies and the grant of such security clearances, disaggregated by the size of the respective company.
(B)
The number of security clearances granted to employees of small emerging technology companies during the period covered by the report.
(C)
The number of applications for security clearances submitted by employees of emerging technology companies that have yet to be adjudicated as of the date on which the report is submitted.
(D)
A projection, for the year following the date on which the report is submitted, of the number of security clearances necessary for employees of emerging technology companies to perform work on behalf of the intelligence community during such year, and an assessment of the capacity of the intelligence community to meet such demand.
(E)
An identification of each occurrence, during the period covered by the report, in which an emerging technology company withdrew from or declined to accept a contract with the United States Government on the sole basis of delays, limitations, or other issues involving security clearances, and a description of the types of business the United States Government has lost as a result of such occurrences.
(F)
Recommendations for expediting the grant of security clearances to employees of emerging technology companies, including with respect to any additional resources, authorities, or personnel that the Director of National Intelligence determines may be necessary for such expedition.
(3)
Form.— Each report under paragraph (1) may be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted shall include an unclassified executive summary.
(d)
Proposal Concurrent With Budget Submission.— At the time that the President submits to Congress the budget for fiscal year 2024 pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a proposal to improve the capacity of the workforce responsible for the investigation and adjudication of security clearances, with the goal of reducing the period of time specified in subsection (c)(2)(A) to fewer than 60 days. Such proposal shall include an identification of any resources the Director of National Intelligence determines necessary to expand the number of individuals authorized to conduct polygraphs on behalf of the intelligence community, including by furnishing necessary training to such individuals.
(e)
Applicability.— The plan, briefing, reports, and proposal required by this section shall apply only with respect to the intelligence community and the Department of Defense.

SEC. 6716. Compliance by Intelligence Community with Requirements of Federal Acquisition Regulation Relating to Commercially Available Off-The-Shelf Items and Commercial Services.

(a)
Compliance Policy.—
(1)
Requirement.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall implement a policy to ensure that each element of the intelligence community complies with parts 10 and 12 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation with respect to any Federal Acquisition Regulation-based procurements.
(2)
Elements.— The policy under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A)
Written criteria for an element of the intelligence community to evaluate when a procurement of a covered item or service is permissible, including—
(i)
requiring the element to conduct an independent market analysis to determine whether a commercially available off-the-shelf item, nondevelopmental item, or commercial service is viable; and
(ii)
a description of the offeror for such covered item or service and how the covered item or service to be acquired will be integrated into existing systems of the intelligence community.
(B)
A detailed set of performance measures for the acquisition personnel of the intelligence community that—
(i)
prioritizes adherence to parts 10 and 12 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation;
(ii)
encourages acquisition of commercially available off-the-shelf items, nondevelopmental items, or commercial services; and
(iii)
incentivizes such personnel of the intelligence community that enter into contracts for covered items or services only when necessary.
(3)
Submission.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives—
(A)
the policy developed pursuant to paragraph (1); and
(B)
the plan to implement such policy by not later than 1 year after the date of such enactment.
(4)
Market analysis.— In carrying out the independent market analysis pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)(i), the Director may enter into a contract with an independent market research group with qualifications and expertise to find available commercial products or commercial services to meet the needs of the intelligence community.
(b)
Annual Reports.—
(1)
Requirement.— Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the Director, in consultation with the head of each element of the intelligence community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on the policy developed under subsection (a).
(2)
Elements.— Each report under paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to the period covered by the report, the following:
(A)
An evaluation of the success of the policy, including with respect to the progress the elements have made in complying with parts 10 and 12 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation.
(B)
A description of how any market analyses are conducted pursuant to subsection (a)(2)(A)(i).
(C)
Any recommendations to improve compliance with such parts 10 and 12.

SEC. 6717. Policy on Required User Adoption Metrics in Certain Contracts for Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technology Software Products.

(a)
Policy.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall establish a policy regarding user adoption metrics for contracts and other agreements for the procurement of covered products as follows:
(1)
With respect to a contract or other agreement entered into between the head of an element of the intelligence community and a commercial provider for the procurement of a covered product for users within the intelligence community, a requirement that each such contract or other agreement include, as a term of the contract or agreement, an understanding of the anticipated use of the covered product with a clear metric for success and for collecting user adoption metrics, as appropriate, for assessing the adoption of the covered product by such users.
(2)
Such exceptions to the requirements under paragraph (1) as may be determined appropriate pursuant to guidance established by the Director of National Intelligence.
(3)
A requirement that prior to the procurement of, or the continuation of the use of, any covered product procured by the head of an element of the intelligence community, the head has determined a method for assessing the success of the covered product from user adoption metrics.
(b)
Submission.— Not later than 60 days after the date on which the policy under subsection (a) is established, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives such policy.

SEC. 6718. Certification Relating to Information Technology and Software Systems.

(a)
Certifications Required.— Prior to the date on which the head of an element of the intelligence community enters into, renews, or extends a contract for the acquisition of an information technology or software system, the head shall certify to the Director of National Intelligence the following:
(1)
That the information technology or software system is the most up-to-date version of the system available or, if it is not, why a more out of date version was chosen.
(2)
That the information technology or software system is compatible with integrating new and emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence.
(3)
That the information technology or software system was thoroughly reviewed and alternative products are not superior to meet the requirements of the element.
(b)
Exemption.— The Director of National Intelligence may exempt elements of the intelligence community, as appropriate, from the requirements under (a) if meeting such requirements may pose security or operational risks.
(c)
Guidance.— The Director shall issue to the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, and submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, guidance to—
(1)
establish guidelines that the heads of the relevant elements of the intelligence community shall use to evaluate the criteria required for the certifications under subsection (a);
(2)
incentivize each such head to adopt and integrate new and emerging technology within information technology and software systems of the element and to decommission and replace outdated systems, including through potential funding enhancements; and
(3)
incentivize, and hold accountable, personnel of the intelligence community with respect to the integration of new and emerging technology within such systems, including through the provision of appropriate training programs and evaluations.

Subtitle C Reports

SEC. 6721. Reports on Integration of Artificial Intelligence Within Intelligence Community.

(a)
Reports by Elements of Intelligence Community.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, each senior official within an element of the intelligence community identified as a designated element lead pursuant to section 6702(b) shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on the efforts of that element to develop, acquire, adopt, and maintain artificial intelligence to improve intelligence collection and analysis and optimize internal work flows. Each such report shall include the following:
(1)
A description of the authorities of the element relating to the use of artificial intelligence.
(2)
A list of any resource or authority necessary to accelerate the adoption by the element of artificial intelligence solutions, including commercial products, or personnel authorities.
(3)
A description of the element’s roles, responsibilities, and authorities for accelerating the adoption by the element of artificial intelligence solutions.
(4)
The application of the policies and principles described in section 6702(a)(2) to paragraphs (1), (2), and (3).
(b)
Audits by Inspectors General.—
(1)
Audits.— Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, each inspector general with oversight responsibility for an element of the intelligence community shall conduct and audit, and brief congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives the findings of the audit, to evaluate the following:
(A)
The efforts of such element to develop, acquire, adopt, and maintain artificial intelligence capabilities for the purpose of improving intelligence collection and analysis in a timely manner and the extent to which such efforts are consistent with the policies and principles described in section 6702(a)(2);
(B)
The degree to which the element has implemented each of the provisions of this title.
(C)
Any administrative or technical barriers to the accelerated adoption of artificial intelligence by such element.
(2)
Input required.— The results of each audit under paragraph (1) shall be disaggregated by, and include input from, organizational units of the respective element of the intelligence community that focus on the following:
(A)
Acquisitions and contracting.
(B)
Personnel and workforce matters.
(C)
Financial management and budgeting.
(D)
Operations and capabilities.
(3)
Audit of office of director of national intelligence.— With respect to the audit of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence conducted by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community under paragraph (1), the Inspector General shall also audit the extent to which the Director of National Intelligence coordinates across the intelligence community for the purpose of ensuring the adoption of best practices, the use of shared contracting vehicles for products and services that meet common requirements, the sharing of information, and the efficient use of resources, relating to artificial intelligence.
(c)
Annual Report by Director of National Intelligence.—
(1)
Reports.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on the progress of the adoption of artificial intelligence within the intelligence community.
(2)
Matters.— Each report under paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to the year covered by the report, the following:
(A)
A detailed description of the progress of each element of the intelligence community in the adoption and maintenance of artificial intelligence during such year, including a detailed description of any—
(i)
artificial intelligence programs or systems adopted by the element;
(ii)
contracts entered into by the head of the element with small- or medium-sized emerging technology companies for commercial products involving artificial intelligence; and
(iii)
relevant positions established or filled within the element.
(B)
A description of any policies of the intelligence community issued during such year that relate to the adoption of artificial intelligence within the intelligence community, including an assessment of the compliance with such policies by the elements of the intelligence community.
(C)
A list of recommendations for the efficient, accelerated, and comprehensive adoption of artificial intelligence across the intelligence community during the year following the year covered by the report, including any technological advances in artificial intelligence that the intelligence community should leverage from industry actors.
(D)
An overview of the advances of foreign adversaries in the field of artificial intelligence, and steps that may be taken to ensure the United States Government outpaces foreign adversaries in such field.
(E)
Any gaps in resource or authorities, or other administrative or technical barriers, to the adoption of artificial intelligence by the intelligence community.
(F)
Such other matters as the Director may determine appropriate.
(3)
Form.— Each report under paragraph (1) may be submitted in classified form.
(4)
Entry by chief data officer.— Each report under paragraph (1) shall include an entry by the Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer that addresses each of the matters specified in paragraph (2) with respect to the organization of data for the accelerated adoption of artificial intelligence solutions.

SEC. 6722. Report on Potential Benefits of Establishment of Icwerx.

(a)
Report.— Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the National Security Agency, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives an assessment of whether the intelligence community would benefit from the establishment of a new organization to be known as “ICWERX”, the mission and activities of which would incorporate lessons learned from AFWERX of the Air Force (or such successor program), the Defense Innovation Unit of the Department of Defense, In-Q-Tel, and other programs sponsored by the Federal Government with a focus on accelerating the adoption of emerging technologies for mission-relevant applications or innovation.
(b)
Elements.— The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1)
A review of the existing avenues for small- and medium-sized emerging technology companies to provide to the intelligence community artificial intelligence or other technology solutions, including an identification, for each of the 5 years preceding the year in which the report is submitted, of the annual number of such companies that have provided the intelligence community with such solutions.
(2)
A review of the existing processes by which the heads of the elements of the intelligence community acquire and transition commercial research of small- and medium-sized emerging technology companies in a prototype or other early developmental stage.
(3)
An assessment of—
(A)
whether the intelligence community is currently postured to incorporate the technological innovations of emerging technology companies, including in software and hardware; and
(B)
any areas in which the intelligence community lacks resources, authorities, personnel, expertise, or institutional mechanisms necessary for such incorporation.
(4)
An assessment of whether a potential ICWERX would be positioned to—
(A)
assist small emerging technology companies, and potentially medium-sized emerging technology companies, in accelerating the procurement and fielding of innovative technologies; and
(B)
provide the intelligence community with greater access to innovative companies at the forefront of emerging technologies.
(5)
An assessment of the potential costs and benefits associated with the establishment of ICWERX in accordance with subsection (a).

SEC. 6723. Requirements and Report on Workforce Needs of Intelligence Community Relating to Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math, and Related Areas.

(a)
Requirements.— The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of human capital from each element of the intelligence community, shall—
(1)
develop a plan for the recruitment and retention of personnel to positions the primary duties of which involve the integration, maintenance, or use of artificial intelligence (and the retention and training of personnel serving in such positions), including with respect to the authorities and requirements under section 6732(b);
(2)
develop a plan for the review and evaluation, on a continuous basis, of the expertise necessary to accelerate the adoption of artificial intelligence and other emerging technology solutions; and
(3)
coordinate and share information and best practices relating to such recruitment and retention within the element and across the intelligence community.
(b)
Report.—
(1)
Submission.— Not later than January 1, 2024, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with heads of human capital from each element of the intelligence community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a single report on the workforce needs of each element of the intelligence community relating to emerging technologies, with a specific focus on artificial intelligence.
(2)
Elements.— The report under paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to each element of the intelligence community, the following:
(A)
A description of the number and types of personnel in work roles whose primary official duties include artificial intelligence responsibilities.
(B)
A detailed description of the plans for each element developed pursuant to subsection (a).
(3)
Other matters.— The report under paragraph (1) shall also include an assessment of the quality and sustainability of the talent pipeline of the intelligence community with respect to talent in emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. Such assessment shall include the following:
(A)
A description of the education, recruitment, and retention programs (including skills-based training and career and technical educational programs) available to personnel of the intelligence community, regardless of whether such programs are administered by the head of an element of the intelligence community or the head of another Federal department or agency, and an analysis of how such programs support the quality and sustainability of such talent pipeline.
(B)
A description of the relevant authorities available to the heads of the elements of the intelligence community to promote the quality and sustainability of such talent pipeline.
(C)
An assessment of any gaps in authorities, resources, recruitment or retention incentives, skills-based training, or educational programs, that may negatively affect the quality or sustainability of such talent pipeline.
(4)
Form.— The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as appropriate.
(c)
Information Access.— The heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall furnish to the Director of National Intelligence such information as may be necessary for the development of the report under subsection (b).

Subtitle D Talent, Education, and Training

SEC. 6731. Report on Establishment of Technology Acquisition Cadre.

(a)
Report.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report containing a feasibility and advisability study on establishing a cadre of personnel who are experts in emerging technologies, software development, systems integration, and acquisition, to improve the adoption of commercial solutions for emerging technologies across the intelligence community, particularly as the technologies relate to artificial intelligence.
(b)
Elements.— The study under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1)
An examination regarding whether a cadre of personnel described in subsection (a) would be an effective and efficient means to substantially improve and accelerate the adoption of commercial artificial intelligence and other emerging technology products and services in support of the missions of the intelligence community if the cadre has the capacity and relevant expertise to—
(A)
accelerate the adoption of emerging technologies, including with respect to artificial intelligence;
(B)
assist with software development and acquisition; and
(C)
develop training requirements for acquisition professionals within the elements of the intelligence community.
(2)
An assessment of—
(A)
whether the establishment of the cadre would require additional statutory authorities or resources, including to recruit, hire, and retain the talent and expertise needed to establish the cadre;
(B)
the benefits, costs, and risks associated with the establishment of a cadre;
(C)
a recommendation on whether to establish the cadre; and
(D)
if a recommendation to establish the cadre is made, a plan for implementation of the cadre, including the proposed size of the cadre, how the cadre would be resourced, managed, and organized, and whether the cadre should be centrally managed or reside at individual elements of the intelligence community.

SEC. 6732. Emerging Technology Education and Training.

(a)
Training Curriculum.—
(1)
Requirement.— No later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the President of the Defense Acquisition University and the heads of the elements of the intelligence community that the Director and Secretary determine appropriate, shall jointly establish a training curriculum for members of the acquisition workforce in the Department of Defense (as defined in section 101 of title 10, United States Code) and the acquisition officials within the intelligence community focused on improving the understanding and awareness of contracting authorities and procedures for the acquisition of emerging technologies.
(2)
Provision of training.— The Director shall ensure that the training curriculum under paragraph (1) is made available to each element of the intelligence community not later than 60 days after the completion of the curriculum.
(3)
Report.— Not later than January 1, 2024, the Director and Secretary shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report containing an update on the status of the curriculum under paragraph (1).
(b)
Agreements Officers.— Not later than October 1, 2024, the Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that at least 75 percent of the contracting staff within the intelligence community whose primary responsibilities include the acquisition of emerging technologies shall have received the appropriate training to become warranted as agreements officers who are given authority to execute and administer the transactions authorized by paragraph (5) of section 102A(n) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(n)), as added by section 6711. The training shall include—
(1)
the appropriate courses offered by the Defense Acquisition University;
(2)
the training curriculum established under subsection (a); and
(3)
best practices for monitoring, identifying, and procuring emerging technologies with potential benefit to the intelligence community, including commercial services and products.
(c)
Establishment of Emerging Technology Training Activities.—
(1)
Requirement.— Not later than January 1, 2024, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community that the Director determines relevant, shall establish and implement training activities designed for appropriate mid-career and senior managers across the intelligence community to train the managers on how to identify, acquire, implement, and manage emerging technologies as such technologies may be applied to the intelligence community.
(2)
Certification.— Not later than 2 years after the date on which the Director establishes the training activities under paragraph (1), each head of an element of the intelligence community shall certify to the Director whether the managers of the element described in paragraph (1) have successfully completed the education activities.
(3)
Briefing.— Not later than January 1, 2024, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a briefing regarding the training activities established under paragraph (1), including—
(A)
an overview of—
(i)
the managers described in paragraph (1) who participated in the training activities; and
(ii)
what technologies were included in the training activities; and
(B)
an identification of other incentives, activities, resources, or programs the Director determines may be necessary to ensure the managers are generally trained in the most emerging technologies and able to retain and incorporate such technologies across the intelligence community.

Subtitle E Other Matters

SEC. 6741. Improvements to Use of Commercial Software Products.

(a)
Policy Regarding Procurement of Commercial Software Products.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community and appropriate nongovernmental experts that the Director determines relevant, shall issue an intelligence community-wide policy to ensure the procurement of commercial software products by the intelligence community is carried out—
(1)
using, to the extent practicable, standardized terminology; and
(2)
in accordance with acquisition and operation best practices reflecting modern software as a service capabilities.
(b)
Elements.— The policy issued under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1)
Guidelines for the heads of the elements of the intelligence community to determine which contracts for commercial software products are covered by the policy, including with respect to agreements, authorizations to operate, and other acquisition activities.
(2)
Guidelines for using standardized terms in such contracts, modeled after commercial best practices, including common procedures and language regarding—
(A)
terms for the responsible party and timelines for system integration under the contract;
(B)
a mechanism included in each contract to ensure the ability of the vendor to provide, and the United States Government to receive, continuous updates and version control for the software, subject to appropriate security considerations;
(C)
automatic technological mechanisms for security and data validation, including security protocols that are predicated on commercial best practices; and
(D)
procedures to provide incentives, and a technical framework, for system integration for new commercial software solutions to fit within existing workflows and information technology infrastructure.
(3)
Guidelines and a timeline for enforcing the policy.
(c)
Report.— Not later than January 1, 2025, and annually thereafter through 2028, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on the policy issued under subsection (a), including the following with respect to the period covered by the report:
(1)
An evaluation of compliance with such policy by each of the elements of the intelligence community.
(2)
Additional recommendations to better coordinate system integration throughout the intelligence community using best practices.

SEC. 6742. Code-Free Artificial Intelligence Enablement Tools Policy.

(a)
Draft Policy.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and any additional heads of the elements of the intelligence community that the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate, shall draft a potential policy to promote the intelligence community-wide use of code-free artificial intelligence enablement tools.
(b)
Elements.— The draft policy under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1)
The objective for the use by the intelligence community of code-free artificial intelligence enablement tools.
(2)
A detailed set of incentives for using code-free artificial intelligence enablement tools.
(3)
A plan to ensure coordination throughout the intelligence community, including consideration of designating an official of each element of the intelligence community to oversee implementation of the policy and such coordination.
(c)
Submission.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives the following:
(1)
The draft policy under subsection (a).
(2)
A recommendation regarding the feasibility and advisability of implementing the draft policy, including an assessment of the costs and advantages and disadvantages of such implementation.
(3)
An assessment of whether any element of the intelligence community already has a similar existing policy.
(4)
A specific plan and timeline of the steps that would be necessary to implement the draft policy.
(5)
An assessment of the personnel requirements, budget requirements, and any other resource requirements, that would be necessary to implement the draft policy in the timeline identified in paragraph (4).

TITLE LXVIII Other Matters

SEC. 6801. Improvements Relating to Continuity of Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board Membership.

Paragraph (4) of section 1061(h) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee(h)) is amended to read as follows:

“(4) Term.—

“(A) Commencement.—Each member of the Board shall serve a term of 6 years, commencing on the date of the appointment of the member to the Board.

“(B) Reappointment.—A member may be reappointed to one or more additional terms.

“(C) Vacancy.—A vacancy on the Board shall be filled in the manner in which the original appointment was made.

“(D) Extension.—Upon the expiration of the term of office of a member, the member may continue to serve for up to one year after the date of expiration, at the election of the member—

“(i) during the period preceding the reappointment of the member pursuant to subparagraph (B); or

“(ii) until the member’s successor has been appointed and qualified.”

SEC. 6802. Modification of Requirement for Office to Address Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena.

(a)
In General.— Section 1683 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373), as amended by title XVI of this Act, is amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 1683. ESTABLISHMENT OF ALL-DOMAIN ANOMALY RESOLUTION OFFICE.

“(a) Establishment of Office.—

“(1) In general.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish an office within a component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or within a joint organization of the Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to carry out the duties of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force, as in effect on December 26, 2021, and such other duties as are required by this section, including those pertaining to unidentified anomalous phenomena.

“(2) Designation.—The office established under paragraph (1) shall be known as the ‘All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office’ (in this section referred to as the ‘Office’).

“(b) Director and Deputy Director of the Office.—

“(1) Appointment of director.—The head of the Office shall be the Director of the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (in this section referred to as the ‘Director of the Office’), who shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence.

“(2) Appointment of deputy director.—The Deputy Director of the Office shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence in coordination with the Secretary of Defense.

“(3) Reporting.—

“(A) In general.—The Director of the Office shall report directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.

“(B) Administrative and operational and security matters.—The Director of the Office shall report—

“(i) to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security on all administrative matters of the Office; and

“(ii) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence on all operational and security matters of the Office.

“(c) Duties.—The duties of the Office shall include the following:

“(1) Developing procedures to synchronize and standardize the collection, reporting, and analysis of incidents, including adverse physiological effects, regarding unidentified anomalous phenomena across the Department of Defense and the intelligence community, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, which shall be provided to the congressional defense committees, the congressional intelligence committees, and congressional leadership.

“(2) Developing processes and procedures to ensure that such incidents from each component of the Department and each element of the intelligence community are reported and stored in an appropriate manner that allows for the integration of analysis of such information.

“(3) Establishing procedures to require the timely and consistent reporting of such incidents.

“(4) Evaluating links between unidentified anomalous phenomena and adversarial foreign governments, other foreign governments, or nonstate actors.

“(5) Evaluating the threat that such incidents present to the United States.

“(6) Coordinating with other departments and agencies of the Federal Government, as appropriate, including the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Energy.

“(7) As appropriate, and in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence, consulting with allies and partners of the United States to better assess the nature and extent of unidentified anomalous phenomena.

“(8) Preparing reports for Congress, in both classified and unclassified form, including under subsection (j).

“(d) Response to and Field Investigations of Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena.—

“(1) Designation.—The Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence shall jointly designate from within their respective organizations an official, to be under the direction of the Director of the Office, responsible for ensuring the appropriate expertise, authorities, accesses, data, systems, platforms, and capabilities are available for the rapid response to, and support for, the conduct of field investigations of incidents involving unidentified anomalous phenomena.

“(2) Ability to respond.—The Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence shall ensure field investigations are supported by personnel with the requisite expertise, equipment, transportation, and other resources necessary to respond rapidly to incidents or patterns of observations involving unidentified anomalous phenomena.

“(e) Scientific, Technological, and Operational Analyses of Data on Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena.—

“(1) Designation.—The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall designate one or more line organizations that will be primarily responsible for scientific, technical, and operational analysis of data gathered by field investigations conducted pursuant to subsection (d) and data from other sources, including with respect to the testing of materials, medical studies, and development of theoretical models, to better understand and explain unidentified anomalous phenomena.

“(2) Authority.—The Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence shall each issue such directives as are necessary to ensure that each line organization designated under paragraph (1) has authority to draw on the special expertise of persons outside the Federal Government with appropriate security clearances.

“(f) Data; Intelligence Collection.—

“(1) Availability of data and reporting on unidentified anomalous phenomena.—

“(A) Availability of data.—The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall ensure that each element of the intelligence community with data relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena makes such data available immediately to the Office.

“(B) Reporting.—The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall each, in coordination with one another, ensure that military and civilian personnel of the Department of Defense or an element of the intelligence community, and contractor personnel of the Department or such an element, have access to procedures by which the personnel shall report incidents or information, including adverse physiological effects, involving or associated with unidentified anomalous phenomena directly to the Office.

“(2) Intelligence collection and analysis plan.—The Director of the Office, acting in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall supervise the development and execution of an intelligence collection and analysis plan to gain as much knowledge as possible regarding the technical and operational characteristics, origins, and intentions of unidentified anomalous phenomena, including with respect to the development, acquisition, deployment, and operation of technical collection capabilities necessary to detect, identify, and scientifically characterize unidentified anomalous phenomena.

“(3) Use of resources and capabilities.—In developing the plan under paragraph (2), the Director of the Office shall consider and propose, as appropriate, the use of any resource, capability, asset, or process of the Department and the intelligence community.

“(g) Science Plan.—The Director of the Office, on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall supervise the development and execution of a science plan to develop and test, as practicable, scientific theories to—

“(1) account for characteristics and performance of unidentified anomalous phenomena that exceed the known state of the art in science or technology, including in the areas of propulsion, aerodynamic control, signatures, structures, materials, sensors, countermeasures, weapons, electronics, and power generation; and

“(2) provide the foundation for potential future investments to replicate or otherwise better understand any such advanced characteristics and performance.

“(h) Assignment of Priority.—The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with and with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, shall assign an appropriate level of priority within the National Intelligence Priorities Framework to the requirement to understand, characterize, and respond to unidentified anomalous phenomena.

“(i) Detailees From Elements of the Intelligence Community.—The heads of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Department of Energy, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security, and such other elements of the intelligence community as the Director of the Office considers appropriate may provide to the Office a detailee of the element to be physically located at the Office.

“(j) Historical Record Report.—

“(1) Report required.—

“(A) In general.—Not later than 540 days after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, the Director of the Office shall submit to the congressional defense committees, the congressional intelligence committees, and congressional leadership a written report detailing the historical record of the United States Government relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena, including—

“(i) the records and documents of the intelligence community;

“(ii) oral history interviews;

“(iii) open source analysis;

“(iv) interviews of current and former Government officials;

“(v) classified and unclassified national archives including any records any third party obtained pursuant to section 552 of title 5, United States Code; and

“(vi) such other relevant historical sources as the Director of the Office considers appropriate.

“(B) Other requirements.—The report submitted under subparagraph (A) shall—

“(i) focus on the period beginning on January 1, 1945, and ending on the date on which the Director of the Office completes activities under this subsection; and

“(ii) include a compilation and itemization of the key historical record of the involvement of the intelligence community with unidentified anomalous phenomena, including—

“(I) any program or activity that was protected by restricted access that has not been explicitly and clearly reported to Congress;

“(II) successful or unsuccessful efforts to identify and track unidentified anomalous phenomena; and

“(III) any efforts to obfuscate, manipulate public opinion, hide, or otherwise provide incorrect unclassified or classified information about unidentified anomalous phenomena or related activities.

“(2) Access to records of the national archives and records administration.—The Archivist of the United States shall make available to the Office such information maintained by the National Archives and Records Administration, including classified information, as the Director of the Office considers necessary to carry out paragraph (1).

“(k) Annual Reports.—

“(1) Reports from director of national intelligence and secretary of defense.—

“(A) Requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, and annually thereafter for four years, the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on unidentified anomalous phenomena.

“(B) Elements.—Each report submitted under subparagraph (A) shall include, with respect to the year covered by the report, the following information:

“(i) All reported unidentified anomalous phenomena-related events that occurred during the one-year period.

“(ii) All reported unidentified anomalous phenomena-related events that occurred during a period other than that one-year period but were not included in an earlier report.

“(iii) An analysis of data and intelligence received through each reported unidentified anomalous phenomena-related event.

“(iv) An analysis of data relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena collected through—

“(I) geospatial intelligence;

“(II) signals intelligence;

“(III) human intelligence; and

“(IV) measurement and signature intelligence.

“(v) The number of reported incidents of unidentified anomalous phenomena over restricted airspace of the United States during the one-year period.

“(vi) An analysis of such incidents identified under clause (v).

“(vii) Identification of potential aerospace or other threats posed by unidentified anomalous phenomena to the national security of the United States.

“(viii) An assessment of any activity regarding unidentified anomalous phenomena that can be attributed to one or more adversarial foreign governments.

“(ix) Identification of any incidents or patterns regarding unidentified anomalous phenomena that indicate a potential adversarial foreign government may have achieved a breakthrough aerospace capability.

“(x) An update on the coordination by the United States with allies and partners on efforts to track, understand, and address unidentified anomalous phenomena.

“(xi) An update on any efforts underway on the ability to capture or exploit discovered unidentified anomalous phenomena.

“(xii) An assessment of any health-related effects for individuals that have encountered unidentified anomalous phenomena.

“(xiii) The number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified anomalous phenomena associated with military nuclear assets, including strategic nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered ships and submarines.

“(xiv) In consultation with the Administrator for Nuclear Security, the number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified anomalous phenomena associated with facilities or assets associated with the production, transportation, or storage of nuclear weapons or components thereof.

“(xv) In consultation with the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified anomalous phenomena or drones of unknown origin associated with nuclear power generating stations, nuclear fuel storage sites, or other sites or facilities regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

“(xvi) The names of the line organizations that have been designated to perform the specific functions under subsections (d) and (e), and the specific functions for which each such line organization has been assigned primary responsibility.

“(xvii) A summary of the reports received using the mechanism for authorized reporting established under section 1673 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023.

“(2) Form.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

“(l) Semiannual Briefings.—

“(1) Requirement.—Not later than December 31, 2022, and not less frequently than semiannually thereafter until December 31, 2026, the Director of the Office shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees classified briefings on unidentified anomalous phenomena.

“(2) First briefing.—The first briefing provided under paragraph (1) shall include all incidents involving unidentified anomalous phenomena that were reported to the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force or to the Office established under subsection (a) after June 24, 2021, regardless of the date of occurrence of the incident.

“(3) Subsequent briefings.—Each briefing provided subsequent to the first briefing described in paragraph (2) shall include, at a minimum, all events relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena that occurred during the previous 180 days, and events relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena that were not included in an earlier briefing.

“(4) Instances in which data was not shared.—For each briefing period, the Director of the Office shall jointly provide to the chairman or chair and the ranking member or vice chairman of the congressional committees specified in subparagraphs (A) and (D) of subsection (n)(1) an enumeration of any instances in which data relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena was not provided to the Office because of classification restrictions on that data or for any other reason.

“(m) Task Force Termination.—Not later than the date on which the Secretary of Defense establishes the Office under subsection (a), the Secretary shall terminate the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force.

“(n) Definitions.—In this section:

“(1) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means the following:

“(A) The Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

“(B) The Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

“(C) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

“(D) The Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

“(E) The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.

“(F) The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of the House of Representatives.

“(2) Congressional defense committees.—The term ‘congressional defense committees’ has the meaning given such term in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code.

“(3) Congressional intelligence committees.—The term ‘congressional intelligence committees’ has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

“(4) Congressional leadership.—The term ‘congressional leadership’ means—

“(A) the majority leader of the Senate;

“(B) the minority leader of the Senate;

“(C) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and

“(D) the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

“(5) Intelligence community.—The term ‘intelligence community’ has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

“(6) Line organization.—The term ‘line organization’ means, with respect to a department or agency of the Federal Government, an organization that executes programs and activities to directly advance the core functions and missions of the department or agency to which the organization is subordinate, but, with respect to the Department of Defense, does not include a component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

“(7) Transmedium objects or devices.—The term ‘transmedium objects or devices’ means objects or devices that are—

“(A) observed to transition between space and the atmosphere, or between the atmosphere and bodies of water; and

“(B) not immediately identifiable.

“(8) Unidentified anomalous phenomena.—The term ‘unidentified anomalous phenomena’ means—

“(A) airborne objects that are not immediately identifiable;

“(B) transmedium objects or devices; and

“(C) submerged objects or devices that are not immediately identifiable and that display behavior or performance characteristics suggesting that the objects or devices may be related to the objects described in subparagraph (A).”

(b)
Clerical Amendment.— The table of contents in section 2(b) of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 1683 of division A and inserting the following new item:

“Sec. 1683. Establishment of All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office.”.

SEC. 6803. Comptroller General of the United States Audits and Briefings on Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena Historical Record Report.

(a)
Definitions.— In this section, the terms “congressional leadership” and “Office” have the meanings given such terms in section 1683 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373), as amended by section 6802.
(b)
Audit.—
(1)
In general.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall identify appropriately cleared personnel of the Government Accountability Office to audit the historical record report process described in section 1683 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373), as amended by section 6802, including personnel to conduct work on-site as appropriate.
(2)
Provision of information.— On a quarterly basis, and as appropriate and consistent with Government Auditing Standards, the Comptroller General of the United States shall provide the Office with information on the findings of any audits conducted by the personnel identified under paragraph (1).
(c)
Verbal Briefings.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter, the Comptroller General of the United States shall verbally brief the congressional intelligence committees, the congressional defense committees, and congressional leadership on the progress of the Office with respect to the historical record report described in section 1683 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373), as amended by section 6802, and compliance with legislative requirements.
(d)
Rule of Construction.— Nothing in this section shall be construed to restrict access of a committee of Congress under section 719(f) of title 31, United States Code, to an audit under subsection (b).

SEC. 6804. Report on Precursor Chemicals Used in the Production of Synthetic Opioids.

(a)
Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.— In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(1)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(2)
the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3)
the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b)
In General.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on licit precursor chemicals originating abroad, including in the People’s Republic of China and any other country the Director considers appropriate, that are bound for use in the illicit production of synthetic opioids intended for distribution in the United States.
(c)
Form of Report.— The report submitted under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex produced consistent with the protection of sources and methods.

SEC. 6805. Assessment and Report on Mass Migration in the Western Hemisphere.

(a)
Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.— In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(1)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b)
In General.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall assess, and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on—
(1)
the threats to the interests of the United States created or enhanced by, or associated with, the mass migration of people within the Western Hemisphere, particularly to the southern border of the United States; and
(2)
the use of or the threat of using mass migration in the Western Hemisphere by the regimes of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, and the regime of Miguel Díaz-Canel and Raúl Castro in Cuba—
(A)
to effectively curate populations so that people who remain in those countries are powerless to meaningfully dissent; and
(B)
to enable the increase of remittances from migrants residing in the United States as a result of the mass migration to help finance the regimes in Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba.
(c)
Form of Report.— The report submitted under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 6806. Report on International Norms, Rules, and Principles Applicable in Space.

(a)
Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.— In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(1)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(2)
the congressional defense committees;
(3)
the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate; and
(4)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.
(b)
In General.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chair of the National Space Council, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the heads of any other agencies as the Chair considers necessary, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on voluntary, non-legally binding responsible international norms, rules, and principles applicable in space.
(c)
Elements.— The report submitted under subsection (b) shall—
(1)
identify threats to the interests of the United States in space that may be mitigated by voluntary, non-legally binding responsible international norms, rules, and principles;
(2)
identify opportunities for the United States to influence voluntary, non-legally binding responsible international norms, rules, and principles applicable in space, including through bilateral and multilateral engagement;
(3)
assess the willingness of space faring foreign nations to adhere to voluntary, non-legally-binding responsible international norms, rules, or principles applicable in space;
(4)
include a list and description of known or suspected adversary offensive weapon systems that could be used to degrade or destroy satellites in orbit during the previous five years;
(5)
include a list and description of known or suspected adversary offensive weapon systems in development that could be used to degrade or destroy satellites that are anticipated to be put operational during the course of the next five years; and
(6)
include an analysis of the extent to which adversary space faring foreign nations use civilian and commercial space assets, and civilian and commercial space relationship, to advance military and intelligence programs and activities.
(d)
Input From Commercial Space Sector.— In identifying threats under subsection (c)(1), the Chair of the National Space Council shall obtain input from the commercial space sector.
(e)
Form.— The report submitted under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 6807. Assessments of the Effects of Sanctions Imposed with Respect to the Russian Federation’s Invasion of Ukraine.

(a)
Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.— In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(1)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b)
In General.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for 2 years, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of such other government agencies as the Director considers appropriate, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an assessment of the cumulative and material effects of the sanctions imposed by the United States, European countries, and the international community with respect to the Russian Federation in response to the February 24, 2022, full-scale invasion of Ukraine and subsequent actions by the Russian Federation.
(c)
Elements.— Each assessment submitted under subsection (b) shall include the following:
(1)
A description of efforts by the Russian Federation to evade or circumvent sanctions imposed by the United States, European countries, or the international community through direct or indirect engagement or direct or indirect assistance from—
(A)
the regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua and the regime of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela;
(B)
the People’s Republic of China;
(C)
the Islamic Republic of Iran; and
(D)
any other country the Director considers appropriate.
(2)
An assessment of the cumulative effect of the efforts described in paragraph (1), including on the Russian Federation’s strategic relationship with the regimes and countries described in such paragraph.
(3)
A description of the material effect of the sanctions described in subsection (b), including the effect of those sanctions on individual sectors of the economy of Russia, senior leadership, senior military officers, state-sponsored actors, and other state-affiliated actors in the Russian Federation that are either directly or incidentally subject to such sanctions. Such description shall include a discussion of those sanctions that had significant effects, as well as those that had no observed effects.
(4)
Methodologies for assessing the effects of different categories of financial and economic sanctions on the targets of such action, including with respect to specific industries, entities, individuals, and transactions.
(5)
A description of evasion techniques, including the use of digital assets, used by the Government of Russia, entities and persons covered by the sanctions, and by other governments, entities, and persons who have assisted in the use of such techniques, in response to the sanctions.
(6)
A description of any developments by other countries in creating alternative payment systems as a result of the invasion of Ukraine.
(7)
An assessment of how countries have assessed the risk of holding reserves in United States dollars since the February 24, 2022, invasion of Ukraine.
(8)
If sufficient collection allows, an assessment of the impact of any general licenses issued in relation to the sanctions described in subsection (b), including—
(A)
the extent to which authorizations for internet-based communications have enabled continued monetization by Russian influence actors, while not silencing human-right activists and independent media; and
(B)
the extent to which licenses authorizing energy-related transactions have affected the Russian Federation’s ability to earn hard currency.
(d)
Form of Assessments.— Each assessment submitted under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form and include a classified annex.

SEC. 6808. Assessment of Impact of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine on Food Security.

(a)
Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.— In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(1)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b)
Assessment.—
(1)
In general.— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and such other heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director determines appropriate, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an assessment of the current and potential impact of the invasion by Russia of Ukraine on global food security.
(2)
Elements.— The assessment under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A)
An assessment of the current and potential impact of the invasion by Russia of Ukraine on food security, disaggregated by region.
(B)
An analysis of the potential for political instability and security crises to occur as a result of such food insecurity, disaggregated by region.
(C)
A description of the factors that could reduce or increase the effects of such food insecurity on political stability and security, disaggregated by region.
(D)
An assessment of the efforts of Russia to steal grain from illegally occupied territories in Ukraine and a list of customers who have purchased such stolen grain.
(E)
An assessment of whether Russia has taken intentional steps to cause a global food shortage.
(3)
Form.— The assessment under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(c)
Briefing.— Not later than 30 days after the date on which the assessment prepared under subsection (b)(1) is completed, the Director of National Intelligence shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the findings of the Director with respect to the assessment.

SEC. 6809. Pilot Program for Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation to Undertake an Effort to Identify International Mobile Subscriber Identity-Catchers.

Section 5725 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3024 note; Public Law 116–92) is amended—
(1)
in subsection (a), in the matter before paragraph (1)—
(A)
by striking “ The Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation” and inserting “ The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation”;
(B)
by inserting “ the Director of National Intelligence,” before “ the Under Secretary”; and
(C)
by striking “ Directors determine” and inserting “ Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation determines”;
(2)
by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (d) and (e), respectively;
(3)
by inserting after subsection (a) the following:

“(b) Pilot Program.—

“(1) In general.—The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in collaboration with the Director of National Intelligence, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, and the heads of such other Federal, State, or local agencies as the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation determines appropriate, and in accordance with applicable law and policy, shall conduct a pilot program designed to implement subsection (a)(1)(A) with respect to the National Capital Region.

“(2) Commencement; completion.—The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall—

“(A) commence carrying out the pilot program required by paragraph (1) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023; and

“(B) complete the pilot program not later than 2 years after the date on which the Director commences carrying out the pilot program under subparagraph (A).

“(c) Notifications Required.—The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall notify the majority leader of the Senate, the minority leader of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the minority leader of the House of Representatives, and the Capitol Police Board of—

“(1) the placement of sensors designed to identify International Mobile Subscriber Identity-catchers capable of conducting surveillance against the United States Capitol or associated buildings and facilities; and

“(2) the discovery of any International Mobile Subscriber Identity-catchers capable of conducting surveillance against the United States Capitol or associated buildings and facilities and any countermeasures against such International Mobile Subscriber Identity-catchers.”

; and

(4)
in subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (2)—
(A)
in the matter before paragraph (1), by striking “ Prior” and all that follows through “ Investigation” and inserting “ Not later than 180 days after the date on which the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation determines that the pilot program required by subsection (b)(1) is operational, the Director”;
(B)
in paragraph (1), by striking “ within the United States”; and
(C)
in paragraph (2), by striking “ by the intelligence community” and inserting “ deployed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation”.

SEC. 6810. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research Assessment of Anomalous Health Incidents.

(a)
Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(1)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(2)
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3)
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b)
Assessment Required.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an assessment of the findings relating to the events that have been collectively labeled as “anomalous health incidents”.
(c)
Contents.— The assessment submitted under subsection (b) shall include the following:
(1)
Any diplomatic reporting or other relevant information on the causation of anomalous health incidents.
(2)
Any diplomatic reporting or other relevant information on any person or entity who may be responsible for such incidents.
(3)
Detailed plans, including metrics, timelines, and measurable goals, for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to understand anomalous health incidents and share findings with other elements of the intelligence community.

SEC. 6811. Repeal and Modification of Certain Reporting and Briefing Requirements.

(a)
Reports on Security Services of the People’s Republic of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.— Section 1107A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3237a) is repealed.
(b)
Annual Update to Report on Foreign Weaponization of Deepfakes and Deepfake Technology.— Section 5709 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3369a) is amended—
(1)
by striking subsection (d); and
(2)
by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (d).
(c)
Information Sharing Performance Management Reports.—
(1)
In general.— Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485) is amended—
(A)
by striking subsection (h); and
(B)
by redesignating subsections (i) through (l) as subsections (h) through (k), respectively.
(2)
Conforming amendment.— Section 210(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124g(b)) is amended by striking “ section 1016(i) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(i))” and inserting “ section 1016(h) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(h))”.
(d)
Periodic Reports on Activities of Privacy Officers and Civil Liberties Officers.— Section 1062(f)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee–1(f)(1)) is amended, in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking “ semiannually” and inserting “ annually”.
(e)
Briefing on Hizballah’s Assets and Activities Related to Fundraising, Financing, and Money Laundering World-wide.— Section 204(b) of the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015 (Public Law 114–102; 129 Stat. 2212) is amended by striking “ every 180 days” and inserting “ annually”.
(f)
Inspectors General Reports on Classification.— Section 6721(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 2231) is amended by striking “ per year in each of the three” and inserting “ every two years in each of the six”.
(g)
Report on Efforts of State Sponsors of Terrorism, Other Foreign Countries, or Entities to Illicitly Acquire Satellites and Related Items.— Section 1261(e)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112–239; 126 Stat. 2019) is amended by striking “ annually” and inserting “ once every two years”.
(h)
Reports and Briefings on Director of National Intelligence Program on Use of Intelligence Resources in Efforts to Sanction Foreign Opioid Traffickers.— Section 7231(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (21 U.S.C. 2331(c)) is amended—
(1)
in the subsection heading, by inserting “ and Briefings” after “ Reports”; and
(2)
in paragraph (1)—
(A)
by striking “ (1) Quarterly reports on program.—Not later than” and inserting the following:

“(1) Reports and briefings on program.—

“(A) Annual reports.—Not later than”

(B)
in subparagraph (A), as designated by subparagraph (A) of this paragraph—
(i)
by striking “ every 90 days” and inserting “ annually”;
(ii)
by striking “ 90-day period” and inserting “ year”; and
(iii)
by striking “ under this paragraph” and inserting “ under this subparagraph”; and
(C)
by adding at the end the following:

“(B) Semiannual briefings.—On a semiannual basis, the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy shall jointly brief the appropriate congressional committees and leadership on the status and accomplishments of the program required by subsection (a).”

SEC. 6812. Increased Intelligence-Related Engineering, Research, and Development Capabilities of Minority Institutions.

(a)
Plan.—
(1)
Requirement.— The Director of National Intelligence shall develop a plan to promote intelligence-related engineering, research, and development activities at covered institutions for the purpose of contributing toward the research necessary to achieve the intelligence advantage of the United States.
(2)
Elements.— The plan under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A)
An assessment of opportunities to support engineering, research, and development at covered institutions in computer sciences, including artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and machine learning, and synthetic biology and an assessment of opportunities to support the associated workforce and physical research infrastructure of such institutions.
(B)
An assessment of opportunities to enhance the ability of covered institutions—
(i)
to participate in intelligence-related engineering, research, and development activities; and
(ii)
to effectively compete for intelligence-related engineering, research and development contracts in support of the most urgent research requirements of the intelligence community.
(C)
An assessment of the activities and investments the Director determines necessary—
(i)
to expand opportunities for covered institutions to partner with other research organizations and educational institutions that the intelligence community frequently partners with to conduct research; and
(ii)
to increase participation of covered institutions in intelligence-related engineering, research, and development activities.
(D)
Recommendations identifying actions that may be taken by the Director, Congress, covered institutions, and other organizations to increase participation of such institutions in intelligence-related engineering, research, and development activities and contracts.
(E)
Specific goals, incentives, and metrics to increase and measure the capacity of covered institutions to address the engineering, research, and development needs of the intelligence community.
(3)
Consultation.— In developing the plan under paragraph (1), the Director shall consult with covered institutions and other departments or agencies of the United States Government or private sector organizations that the Director determines appropriate.
(4)
Report.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and make publicly available on the internet website of the Director, a report containing the plan under paragraph (1).
(b)
Activities to Support Research and Engineering Capacity.— Subject to the availability of appropriations for such purpose, the Director may establish a program to award contracts, grants, or other agreements, on a competitive basis, and to perform other appropriate activities, for any of the following purposes:
(1)
Developing the capability, including the workforce and the research infrastructure, for covered institutions to more effectively compete for intelligence-related engineering, research, and development activities and contracts.
(2)
Any other purposes the Director determines appropriate to enhance the capabilities of covered institutions to carry out intelligence-related engineering, research, and development activities and contracts.
(c)
Increased Partnerships Between IARPA and Covered Institutions.— The Director shall establish goals and incentives to encourage the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity to—
(1)
partner with covered institutions to advance the research and development needs of the intelligence community through partnerships and collaborations with the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity; and
(2)
if the Director determines appropriate, foster the establishment of similar relationships between such institutions and other organizations that have partnerships with the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity.
(d)
Covered Institution Defined.— In this section, the term “covered institution” means the following:
(1)
A part B institution (as defined in section 322 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1061)).
(2)
An institution of higher education (as defined in section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965(20 U.S.C. 1001)) not covered by paragraph (1) at which not less than 50 percent of the total student enrollment consists of students from ethnic groups that are underrepresented in the fields of science and engineering, as determined by the Director of National Intelligence.

SEC. 6813. Reports on Personnel Vetting Processes and Progress under Trusted Workforce 2.0 Initiative.

(a)
Definitions.— In this section:
(1)
Authorized adjudicative agency; authorized investigative agency; personnel security investigation; periodic reinvestigation.— The terms “authorized adjudicative agency”, “authorized investigative agency”, “personnel security investigation”, and “periodic reinvestigation” have the meanings given those terms in section 3001(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(a)).
(2)
Continuous vetting; council; security executive agent.— The terms “continuous vetting”, “Council”, and “Security Executive Agent” have the meanings given those terms in section 6601 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3352).
(b)
Reports.— Not later than September 30, 2023, and annually thereafter until September 30, 2027, the Security Executive Agent, in coordination with the Chair and other Principals of the Council, shall submit to Congress a report on the personnel vetting processes of the United States Government.
(c)
Elements.— Each report under subsection (b) shall include, with respect to the preceding fiscal year, the following:
(1)
An analysis of the timeliness, costs, and other related information for the initiations, investigations (including initial investigations and any required periodic reinvestigations), and adjudications for personnel vetting purposes. Such analysis shall include the following:
(A)
The average periods of time taken (from the date of an agency’s receipt of a completed security clearance application to the date of the ultimate disposition and notification to the subject and the employer of the subject) by each authorized investigative agency and authorized adjudicative agency, to the greatest extent practicable, to initiate investigations, conduct investigations, and adjudicate security clearances, as compared with established timeliness objectives.
(B)
The number of initial investigations and periodic reinvestigations initiated and adjudicated by each authorized investigative agency and authorized adjudicative agency, to the extent practicable.
(C)
The number of initial investigations and periodic reinvestigations carried over to the fiscal year covered by the report from a prior fiscal year by each authorized investigative agency and authorized adjudicative agency, to the greatest extent practicable.
(D)
The number of initial investigations and periodic reinvestigations that resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance by each authorized adjudicative agency.
(E)
The costs to the executive branch relating to personnel security clearance initiations, investigations, adjudications, revocations, and continuous vetting with respect to such clearances.
(F)
A discussion of any impediments, including with respect to resources, personnel, or authorities, to the timely processing of personnel security clearances.
(G)
The number of individuals who hold a personnel security clearance and are enrolled in a program of continuous vetting with respect to such clearance, and the numbers and types of adverse actions taken by each authorized adjudicative agency as a result of such continuous vetting.
(H)
The number of personnel security clearances awaiting or under investigation (including initial investigation and periodic reinvestigation) by the Director of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency and each authorized investigative agency.
(I)
Such other information as the Security Executive Agent may determine appropriate, including any recommendations to improve the effectiveness, timeliness, and efficiency of personnel security clearance initiations, investigations, and adjudications.
(2)
An analysis of the status of the implementation of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative sponsored by the Council, including the following:
(A)
A list of the policies issued by the Council for the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative, and a list of expected issuance dates for planned policies of the Council for such initiative.
(B)
A list of the departments and agencies of the executive branch that have identified a senior implementation official to be accountable for the implementation of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative, in accordance with the memorandum on transforming Federal personnel vetting issued by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on December 14, 2021, including an identification of the position of such senior implementation official within the respective department or agency.
(C)
A list of the departments and agencies of the executive branch that have submitted implementation plans, and subsequent progress reports, with respect to the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative, as required by the memorandum specified in subparagraph (B).
(D)
A summary of the progress that the departments and agencies of the executive branch have made implementing the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative.
(3)
An analysis of the transfers between, and reciprocal recognition among, the heads of the departments and agencies of the executive branch of security clearance background investigations and determinations and other investigations and determinations relating to personnel vetting (including with respect to trust, suitability, fitness, credentialing, and access). Such analysis shall include, with respect to such investigations and determinations, the following:
(A)
The number of employees for whom a prior such investigation or determination was recognized and accepted by the head of a department or agency without the head requiring additional investigative or adjudicative steps, disaggregated by department or agency, to the greatest extent practicable.
(B)
The number of employees for whom a prior such investigation or determination was not recognized or accepted by the head of a department or agency without the head requiring additional investigative or adjudicative steps, disaggregated by department or agency, to the greatest extent practicable.
(C)
The reasons most frequently cited by such heads for the failure to recognize or accept a prior such investigation or determination, disaggregated by department or agency.
(D)
The average number of days for the head of a department or agency to recognize and accept a prior such investigation or determination (from the date the head initiates the process to consider the prior investigation or determination for recognition and acceptance, to the date the head makes a final determination on such recognition and acceptance), disaggregated by agency, to the greatest extent practicable.
(4)
A discussion of any impediments, constraints, and opportunities relating to—
(A)
the timeliness of the personnel security clearance process across the United States Government;
(B)
the implementation of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative;
(C)
the transfer and reciprocal recognition of determinations relating to personnel vetting between and among departments and agencies; and
(D)
the completeness and provision of data from elements of the intelligence community, pursuant to paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this subsection.

SEC. 6814. Reports Relating to Programs of Record of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

(a)
Findings.— Congress finds the following:
(1)
The comprehensive identification of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency programs and activities, to include significant, enduring programs determined by the Agency to be “programs of record”, is a critical element for enabling budget auditability and oversight by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Office of Management and Budget, and the congressional intelligence committees.
(2)
In order to improve how the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency justifies and oversees resources in support of core missions and authorities, the Agency has committed to establish a deliberate acquisition structure, modeled after Department of Defense best practices, with programs and activities aligned under a Program Executive Office structure.
(3)
Establishing an effective Program Executive Office structure at the National Geospatial-intelligence Agency will ensure clearly articulated acquisition efforts that have defined requirements and program scope with traceability from capabilities to deliverables to Programs of Record to budget materials.
(b)
Reports Required.—
(1)
Reports to congressional intelligence committees and defense subcommittees of congressional appropriations committees.— Not later than February 1, 2023, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives reports on the programs and activities of the Agency. Such reports shall include, at a minimum, the following:
(A)
An identification of any definition for the term “program of record” used by the Agency during the period beginning October 1, 2017, and ending on the date of the submission of the report.
(B)
A detailed description of each current program and activity of the Agency, including each current program of record of the Agency.
(C)
A detailed explanation of how funding and other information relating to each such program of record or other program or activity may be located within the budget justification materials submitted to Congress.
(D)
An in-process review of the program element office planning and implementation efforts.
(E)
Identification of limitations and additional support required by the Agency to implement program element offices and related changes to financial management systems.
(2)
Report to congressional intelligence and defense committees.—
(A)
Definition of appropriate congressional committees.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(i)
the congressional intelligence committees; and
(ii)
the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(iii)
the Committee on Armed Services and Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(B)
Report required.— Not later than February 1, 2023, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the programs and activities of the Agency that are funded in full or in part under the Military Intelligence Program. Such report shall include, at a minimum, the following:
(i)
An identification of any definition for the term “program of record” used by the Agency during the period beginning October 1, 2017 and ending on the date of the submission of the report.
(ii)
A detailed description of each current program and activity of the Agency funded in full or in part under the Military Intelligence Program, including each current program of record of the Agency funded in full or in part under the Military Intelligence Program.
(iii)
A detailed explanation of how funding and other information relating to each such program of record or other program or activity funded in full or in part under the Military Intelligence Program may be located within the budget justification materials submitted to Congress.
(3)
Form.— Each report under this subsection may be submitted in classified form.

SEC. 6815. Plan Regarding Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center.

(a)
Definition of Appropriate Congressional Committees.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” has the meaning given that term in section 5323(h) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3369(h)).
(b)
Plan.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan to operationalize the Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center in accordance with section 5323 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3369).
(c)
Elements.— The plan under subsection (b) shall include a description of how the Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center shall—
(1)
coordinate with social media companies, independent organizations and researchers, and other public-facing internet-based platforms to determine—
(A)
what categories of data and metadata are useful indicators of internet-based foreign malign influence activities; and
(B)
how such data and metadata may be shared effectively with the Center and with independent organizations and researchers while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of United States users of social media platforms and other public-facing internet-based platforms; and
(2)
develop criteria under which social media companies and other public-facing internet-based platforms share indicators of internet-based foreign malign influence activities with the Center and independent organizations and researchers, including a description of—
(A)
the timeliness and consistency of such sharing of indicators;
(B)
the categories of indicators to be shared; and
(C)
the protection, in consultation with the head of the Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency as may be appropriate, of privacy, civil liberties, and constitutionally protected activities of users of social media platforms and other public-facing internet-based platforms.

SEC. 6816. Report on Use of Publicly Available Social Media Information in Personnel Vetting Determinations.

(a)
Definitions of Continuous Vetting, Council, and Security Executive Agent.— In this section, the terms “continuous vetting”, “Council”, and “Security Executive Agent” have the meanings given those terms in section 6601 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3352).
(b)
Report.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with other heads of the elements of the intelligence community that the Director determines appropriate, and in consultation with the other principal members of the Council, shall submit to Congress a report regarding the current and planned use of publicly available social media information in the personnel vetting and security clearance processes.
(c)
Elements.— The report under subsection (b) shall include the following:
(1)
A description of how departments and agencies of the United States Government have implemented Security Executive Agent Directive 5 titled “Collection, Use, and Retention of Publicly Available Social Media Information in Personnel Security Background Investigations and Adjudications”, and relevant agency implementing guidance, including Department of Defense Instruction 1325.06 titled “Handling Protest, Extremist, and Criminal Gang Activities among Members of the Armed Forces”.
(2)
A description of how the use of publicly available social media in personnel vetting determinations and security clearance investigations and adjudications is, or will be, captured in the National Background Investigation Services system and other information technology systems used in the personnel vetting process.
(3)
A description of how publicly available social media information is used, and will be used, in continuous vetting and security clearances processes and insider threat programs.
(4)
A description of any privacy or civil liberties concerns with the use of publicly available social media information in personnel vetting or security clearance determinations, including a discussion of the risks, benefits, and drawbacks of allowing for the voluntary provision of, or voluntary access to, nonpublicly available social media information in the regular course of personnel vetting and security clearance processes.
(5)
A discussion of the extent to which officials and entities of the United States Government responsible for privacy and civil liberties matters, including the Chief of the Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the civil liberties officers of departments and agencies of the United States Government, are involved in the development and operation of programs to use social media information in personnel vetting and security clearance processes.
(6)
A discussion of any impediments, constraints, risks, or drawbacks relating to the use of publicly available social media information in personnel vetting and security clearance processes, including—
(A)
challenges associated with implementation of Security Executive Agent Directive 5, Department of Defense Instruction 1325.06, and other relevant guidance;
(B)
the resources required, including with respect to personnel, funding, and information systems, to gather, assess, and make use of such information; and
(C)
an analysis of the costs and benefits of the use of publicly available social media information.
(7)
An implementation plan for the future use of publicly available social media information, based on relevant findings under paragraphs (1) through (6).

SEC. 6817. Report on Strengthening Workforce Diversity Planning and Oversight.

(a)
Report.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report discussing steps to enhance the strategic planning for, measure the progress of, and assess barriers to workforce diversity in the intelligence community.
(b)
Elements.— The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1)
A discussion of existing, updated, or new guidance requiring all elements of the intelligence community to maintain current and complete diversity strategic plans that contain specific objectives, timeframes, and responsibilities.
(2)
A discussion of progress made by individual elements toward maintaining such plans.
(3)
A discussion of existing, updated, or new guidance to ensure individual elements develop performance measures to assess the contribution of activities toward achieving diversity goals and overall progress.
(4)
A discussion of progress made by individual elements toward developing measures to assess progress toward achieving diversity management efforts.
(5)
A discussion of existing, updated, or new guidance ensuring that each element routinely identifies and takes steps toward eliminating barriers to workforce diversity.
(6)
A discussion of steps taken by the Director to ensure that individual elements are routinely completing required assessments to identify and eliminate barriers to diversity.
(7)
A discussion of steps taken by the Director to establish specific implementation objectives and timeframes for the elements that support intelligence community-wide diversity goals to ensure the elements are held accountable for making progress.

SEC. 6818. Report on Transition of National Reconnaissance Office to Digital Engineering Environment.

(a)
Findings.— Congress finds the following:
(1)
Potential foreign adversaries are outpacing the United States in the fielding of new generations of space systems that dull the edge the United States has enjoyed in space.
(2)
A digital engineering environment, also known as digital systems engineering, reduces the time to field new space systems.
(3)
Digital engineering environment tools enable the rapid iterations of requirements and architectures into digital system depictions capable of use by private industry to further the design and development of space systems.
(b)
Sense of Congress.— It is the sense of Congress that, to maintain a competitive advantage in space, the National Reconnaissance Office should transition to a digital engineering environment by not later than 3 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c)
Report.—
(1)
Submission.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains the following:
(A)
A plan for the transition of the National Reconnaissance Office to a digital engineering environment.
(B)
An identification of the date by which such transition shall be completed.
(C)
A description of the metrics the Director plans to use to measure progress made with respect to such transition and resulting efficiencies gained.
(D)
A description of the initial pilot programs of the National Reconnaissance Office relating to digital engineering and the plans to expand such pilot programs in scale and scope with respect to acquisition carried out under such pilot programs.
(E)
A description of any training requirements or certifications necessary to advance a digital engineering environment within the National Reconnaissance Office.
(F)
A description of how the Director plans to incorporate input and best practices from private industry to facilitate and accelerate the transition of the National Reconnaissance Office to a digital engineering environment.
(2)
Form.— The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d)
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(1)
the congressional intelligence committees; and
(2)
the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code).

SEC. 6819. Briefing on Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Activities.

(a)
Definitions.— In this section:
(1)
Appropriate congressional committees.— The term “appropriate congressional committees” means the following:
(A)
The congressional intelligence committees.
(B)
The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
(C)
The Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Component of the department of homeland security.— The term “component of the Department of Homeland Security” means the following components of the Department of Homeland Security:
(A)
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Threat Management Division.
(B)
The Federal Emergency Management Agency Protection and National Preparedness, Office of Counterterrorism and Security Preparedness.
(C)
The Transportation Security Administration Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
(D)
The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate, Field Operations Directorate, and Collateral Duty Intelligence.
(E)
The United States Customs and Border Protection Office of Intelligence.
(F)
The United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations, Office of Intelligence, and Special Agent in Charge Intelligence Program.
(3)
Intelligence activity.— The term “intelligence activity” shall be interpreted consistent with how such term is used in section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3092).
(b)
Briefing on Intelligence Activities.— Consistent with section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091), not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department of Homeland Security shall provide the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the intelligence activities of elements of the Department of Homeland Security that are not elements of the intelligence community. Such briefing shall include the following:
(1)
A comprehensive description of all intelligence activities conducted during the period beginning on January 1, 2018, and ending on the date of the briefing, by any component of the Department of Homeland Security that conducts intelligence activities.
(2)
With respect to each such intelligence activity, a description of the activity, including, at a minimum—
(A)
the nature of the activity;
(B)
the component undertaking the activity;
(C)
the legal authority for such activity; and
(D)
the source of funding for such activity.
(3)
A description and the quantity of any types of finished intelligence products, or intelligence information reports, produced or contributed to by a component of the Department of Homeland Security that conducts intelligence activities during the period specified in paragraph (1).
(4)
An identification of any external or internal guidelines, policies, processes, practices, or programs governing the collection, retention, analysis, or dissemination by such a component of information regarding United States citizens, lawful permanent residents of the United States, or individuals located within the United States.
(c)
Form.— The briefing under subsection (b) may be provided in classified form.
(d)
Additional Briefings.— Not later than 1 year after the date on which the Chief Intelligence Officer provides the briefing under subsection (b) and not less frequently than once each year thereafter, the Chief Intelligence Officer shall provide the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on any new intelligence activities commenced by any component of the Department of Homeland Security and any that have been terminated.

SEC. 6820. Report on Declassification Efforts of Central Intelligence Agency.

Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on the declassification efforts of the Central Intelligence Agency. Such report shall include—
(1)
an identification of the resources that are dedicated to such efforts; and
(2)
an assessment as to whether such resources are sufficient.

SEC. 6821. Report on National Space Intelligence Center.

(a)
Report.— Not later than March 1, 2023, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the National Space Intelligence Center.
(b)
Matters Included.— The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1)
A description of the status of the National Space Intelligence Center since the activation of the Center and the implications of the Center being aligned under a Field Command rather than a field operating agency aligned to the Director of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance of the Space Force.
(2)
A review of the ability of the Center to address the full set of national space intelligence analytical demands (including with respect to acquisition and operational mission requirements of the Space Force, the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and other national customers) while being assigned as a subordinate to Space Operations Command, a Field Command, including—
(A)
an assessment of the ability of the Center to respond to the broadest space intelligence requirements as compared to a service specific need; and
(B)
a review specifically addressing any perceived mission misalignment, potential mitigating measures, or other structural organization concerns.
(3)
An assessment of—
(A)
the current resourcing posture, including any additional personnel required as a result of subordination to a Field Command; and
(B)
the resourcing posture if the Center were aligned to the Director of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance of the Space Force as described in paragraph (1).
(4)
Lessons learned since unit activation, including with respect to—
(A)
organizational efficiencies and inefficiencies;
(B)
financial implications;
(C)
organizational redundancy;
(D)
parity mismatch and synergies with other service intelligence centers; and
(E)
lessons learned through comparisons to other service intelligence centers organized as a field operating agency and aligned under the senior intelligence officer of the respective Armed Force.
(c)
Form.— The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d)
Appropriate Congressional Committees.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the following:
(1)
The congressional intelligence committees.
(2)
The congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code).

SEC. 6822. Report on Implementation of Executive Order 13556, Regarding Controlled Unclassified Information.

(a)
Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.— In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(1)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(2)
the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3)
the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b)
Report.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, in coordination with the heads of other elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the implementation by the intelligence community of Executive Order 13556 (44 U.S.C. 3501 note; relating to controlled unclassified information).
(c)
Sense of Congress.— It is the sense of Congress that the National Security Council should accelerate the process of revising or replacing Executive Order 13556.

SEC. 6823. National Museum of Intelligence and Special Operations.

(a)
Recognition.— The privately-funded museum to honor the intelligence community and special operations forces that is planned to be constructed in Ashburn, Virginia, may be recognized, upon completion, as the “National Museum of Intelligence and Special Operations”.
(b)
Purposes.— The purpose of recognizing the National Museum of Intelligence and Special Operations under subsection (a) are to—
(1)
commemorate the members of the intelligence community and special operations forces who have been critical to securing the Nation against enemies of the United States for nearly a century;
(2)
preserve and support the historic role that the intelligence community and special operations forces have played, and continue to play, both in secrecy as well as openly, to keep the United States and its values and way of life secure; and
(3)
foster a greater understanding of the intelligence community and special operations forces to ensure a common understanding, dispel myths, recognize those who are not otherwise able to be publicly recognized, and increase science, technology, engineering, and math education through museum programs designed to promote more interest and greater diversity in recruiting with respect to the intelligence and special operations career field.

SEC. 6824. Technical Corrections.

(a)
National Security Act of 1947.— The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.), as amended by this Act, is further amended as follows:
(1)
In section 105(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 3038(a)(1)), by striking “ chairman” and inserting “ Chairman”.
(2)
In section 113B(b) (50 U.S.C. 3049a(b))—
(A)
in paragraph (1)(A), by striking “ Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence” and inserting “ Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security”; and
(B)
in paragraph (4), by striking “ section 226 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 147)” and inserting “ section 2208 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 658)”.
(3)
In section 118(a) (50 U.S.C. 3055(a)), by striking “ a annual” and inserting “ an annual”.
(4)
In section 301(j) (50 U.S.C. 3071(j)), by striking “ and includes” and inserting “ and including”.
(5)
In section 506G(c) (50 U.S.C. 3103(c)), by striking “ pursuant section” and inserting “ pursuant to section”.
(6)
In section 507(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 3106(a)(1)), by striking “ Generals” and inserting “ General”.
(7)
In section 1024(g)(7)(A) (50 U.S.C. 3224(g)(7)(A)), by striking “ places” and inserting “ place”.
(8)
In section 1104(b)(1)(B) (50 U.S.C. 3234(b)(1)(B)), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon.
(b)
Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020.— The Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (division E of Public Law 116–92) is amended—
(1)
in section 5704(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 3334b(b)(1)), by striking “ , and subject to paragraph (3)”;
(2)
in section 6316 (50 U.S.C. 3334b note), by striking “ congressional committees” and inserting “ congressional intelligence committees”; and
(3)
in section 6604 (50 U.S.C. 3352c), by striking “ subsections (b) and (c)” both places it appears and inserting “ subsections (a) and (b)”.
(c)
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.— Section 309(a)(5) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (50 U.S.C. 3334e) is amended by striking “ section 3542(b)” and inserting “ section 3552”.
(d)
Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000.— The Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000 (50 U.S.C. 3355 et seq.) is amended—
(1)
in section 703(a)(2) (50 U.S.C. 3355a(a)(2)), by striking “ Executive Order 12958” and inserting “ Executive Order 13526”;
(2)
in section 704(e)(3) (50 U.S.C. 3355b(e)(3)), by striking the comma before “ shall”;
(3)
in section 705(c) (50 U.S.C. 3355c(c)), by striking “ section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–3(c)(6))” and inserting “ section 102A(i) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(i))”; and
(4)
in section 706 (50 U.S.C. 3355d), by striking “ Executive Order No. 12958” both places it appears and inserting “ Executive Order 13526”.