US Codex
Pub. L.
Notes

Division W — Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021

116th Congress · Approved Dec 27, 2020 · 134 Stat. 1182

DIVISION W Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021

SEC. 1. Short Title; Table of Contents.

(a)
Short Title.— This division may be cited as the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021”.
(b)
Table of Contents.— The table of contents for this division is as follows:

DIVISION W— INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Definitions.

Sec. 3. Explanatory statement.

TITLE I— INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.

Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.

Sec. 103. Intelligence Community Management Account.

TITLE II— CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE III— INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Subtitle A— General Intelligence Community Matters

Sec. 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.

Sec. 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.

Sec. 303. Continuity of operations plans for certain elements of the intelligence community in the case of a national emergency.

Sec. 304. Application of Executive Schedule level III to position of Director of National Reconnaissance Office.

Sec. 305. National Intelligence University.

Sec. 306. Data collection on attrition in intelligence community.

Sec. 307. Limitation on delegation of responsibility for program management of information-sharing environment.

Sec. 308. Requirement to buy certain satellite component from American sources.

Sec. 309. Limitation on construction of facilities to be used primarily by intelligence community.

Sec. 310. Intelligence community student loan repayment programs.

Subtitle B— Reports and Assessments Pertaining to the Intelligence Community

Sec. 321. Assessment by the Comptroller General of the United States on efforts of the intelligence community and the Department of Defense to identify and mitigate risks posed to the intelligence community and the Department by the use of direct-to-consumer genetic testing by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

Sec. 322. Report on use by intelligence community of hiring flexibilities and expedited human resources practices to assure quality and diversity in the workforce of the intelligence community.

Sec. 323. Report on signals intelligence priorities and requirements.

Sec. 324. Assessment of demand for student loan repayment program benefit.

Sec. 325. Assessment of intelligence community demand for child care.

Sec. 326. Open source intelligence strategies and plans for the intelligence community.

TITLE IV— MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Sec. 401. Establishment of Office of the Ombudsman for Analytic Objectivity.

Sec. 402. Expansion of personnel management authority to attract experts in science and engineering.

Sec. 403. Senior Chief Petty Officer Shannon Kent Award for distinguished female personnel of the National Security Agency.

Sec. 404. Department of Homeland Security intelligence and cybersecurity diversity fellowship program.

Sec. 405. Climate Security Advisory Council.

TITLE V— MATTERS RELATING TO EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

Sec. 501. Requirements and authorities for Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to improve education in science, technology, engineering, arts, and mathematics.

Sec. 502. Seedling investment in next-generation microelectronics in support of artificial intelligence.

TITLE VI— REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 601. Report on attempts by foreign adversaries to build telecommunications and cybersecurity equipment and services for, or to provide such equipment and services to, certain allies of the United States.

Sec. 602. Report on threats posed by use by foreign governments and entities of commercially available cyber intrusion and surveillance technology.

Sec. 603. Reports on recommendations of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission.

Sec. 604. Assessment of critical technology trends relating to artificial intelligence, microchips, and semiconductors and related supply chains.

Sec. 605. Combating Chinese influence operations in the United States and strengthening civil liberties protections.

Sec. 606. Annual report on corrupt activities of senior officials of the Chinese Communist Party.

Sec. 607. Report on corrupt activities of Russian and other Eastern European oligarchs.

Sec. 608. Report on biosecurity risk and disinformation by the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

Sec. 609. Report on effect of lifting of United Nations arms embargo on Islamic Republic of Iran.

Sec. 610. Report on Iranian activities relating to nuclear nonproliferation.

Sec. 611. Annual reports on security services of the People’s Republic of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Sec. 612. Research partnership on activities of People’s Republic of China.

Sec. 613. Report on the pharmaceutical and personal protective equipment regulatory practices of the People’s Republic of China.

Sec. 614. National Intelligence Estimate on situation in Afghanistan.

Sec. 615. Assessment regarding tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Sec. 616. Sense of Congress on Third Option Foundation.

Sec. 617. Annual reports on worldwide threats.

Sec. 618. Annual report on Climate Security Advisory Council.

Sec. 619. Improvements to funding for National Security Education program.

Sec. 620. Report on best practices to protect privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of Chinese Americans.

Sec. 621. National Intelligence Estimate on threat of global pandemic disease.

Sec. 622. Modification of requirement for briefings on national security effects of emerging infectious disease and pandemics.

Sec. 623. Independent study on open-source intelligence.

Sec. 624. Survey on Open Source Enterprise.

Sec. 625. Sense of Congress on report on murder of Jamal Khashoggi.

SEC. 2. Definitions.

In this division:
(1)
Congressional intelligence committees.— The term “congressional intelligence committees” means—
(A)
the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B)
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Intelligence community.— The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

SEC. 3. Explanatory Statement.

The explanatory statement regarding this division, printed in the House section of the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and in the Senate section of the Congressional Record by the Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation of this division as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of conference.

TITLE I Intelligence Activities

SEC. 101. Authorization of Appropriations.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2021 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1)
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2)
The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3)
The Department of Defense.
(4)
The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5)
The National Security Agency.
(6)
The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
(7)
The Coast Guard.
(8)
The Department of State.
(9)
The Department of the Treasury.
(10)
The Department of Energy.
(11)
The Department of Justice.
(12)
The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13)
The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14)
The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15)
The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16)
The Department of Homeland Security.

SEC. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.

(a)
Specifications of Amounts.— The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this division.
(b)
Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.—
(1)
Availability.— The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.
(2)
Distribution by the president.— Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the executive branch of the Federal Government.
(3)
Limits on disclosure.— The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—
(A)
as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));
(B)
to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C)
as otherwise required by law.

SEC. 103. Intelligence Community Management Account.

(a)
Authorization of Appropriations.— There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2021 the sum of $759,000,000.
(b)
Classified Authorization of Appropriations.— In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2021 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

TITLE II Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System

SEC. 201. Authorization of Appropriations.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year 2021.

TITLE III Intelligence Community Matters

Subtitle A General Intelligence Community Matters

SEC. 301. Restriction on Conduct of Intelligence Activities.

The authorization of appropriations by this division shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

SEC. 302. Increase in Employee Compensation and Benefits Authorized by Law.

Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 303. Continuity of Operations Plans for Certain Elements of the Intelligence Community in the Case of a National Emergency.

(a)
Definition of Covered National Emergency.— In this section, the term “covered national emergency” means the following:
(1)
A major disaster declared by the President under section 401 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5170).
(2)
An emergency declared by the President under section 501 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5191).
(3)
A national emergency declared by the President under the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.).
(4)
A public health emergency declared under section 319 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d).
(b)
In General.— The Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall each establish continuity of operations plans for use in the case of covered national emergencies for the element of the intelligence community concerned.
(c)
Submission to Congress.—
(1)
Director of national intelligence and director of the central intelligence agency.— Not later than 7 days after the date on which a covered national emergency is declared, the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall each submit to the congressional intelligence committees the plan established under subsection (b) for that emergency for the element of the intelligence community concerned.
(2)
Director of national reconnaissance office, director of defense intelligence agency, director of national security agency, and director of national geospatial-intelligence agency.— Not later than 7 days after the date on which a covered national emergency is declared, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall each submit the plan established under subsection (b) for that emergency for the element of the intelligence community concerned to the following:
(A)
The congressional intelligence committees.
(B)
The Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.
(C)
The Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
(d)
Updates.— During a covered national emergency, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall each submit any updates to the plans submitted under subsection (c)—
(1)
in accordance with that subsection; and
(2)
in a timely manner consistent with section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091).

SEC. 304. Application of Executive Schedule Level Iii to Position of Director of National Reconnaissance Office.

Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: “Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.”.

SEC. 305. National Intelligence University.

(a)
In General.— Title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“Subtitle D— National Intelligence University

“SEC. 1031. TRANSFER DATE.

“In this subtitle, the term ‘transfer date’ means the date on which the National Intelligence University is transferred from the Defense Intelligence Agency to the Director of National Intelligence under section 5324(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92).

“SEC. 1032. DEGREE-GRANTING AUTHORITY.

“(a) In General.—Beginning on the transfer date, under regulations prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence, the President of the National Intelligence University may, upon the recommendation of the faculty of the University, confer appropriate degrees upon graduates who meet the degree requirements.

“(b) Limitation.—A degree may not be conferred under this section unless—

“(1) the Secretary of Education has recommended approval of the degree in accordance with the Federal Policy Governing Granting of Academic Degrees by Federal Agencies; and

“(2) the University is accredited by the appropriate academic accrediting agency or organization to award the degree, as determined by the Secretary of Education.

“(c) Congressional Notification Requirements.—

“(1) Actions on nonaccreditation.—Beginning on the transfer date, the Director shall promptly—

“(A) notify the congressional intelligence committees of any action by the Middle States Commission on Higher Education, or other appropriate academic accrediting agency or organization, to not accredit the University to award any new or existing degree; and

“(B) submit to such committees a report containing an explanation of any such action.

“(2) Modification or redesignation of degree-granting authority.—Beginning on the transfer date, upon any modification or redesignation of existing degree-granting authority, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing—

“(A) the rationale for the proposed modification or redesignation; and

“(B) any subsequent recommendation of the Secretary of Education with respect to the proposed modification or redesignation.

“SEC. 1033. REPORTING.

“(a) In General.—Not less frequently than once each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan for employing professors, instructors, and lecturers at the National Intelligence University.

“(b) Elements.—Each plan submitted under subsection (a) shall include the following:

“(1) The total number of proposed personnel to be employed at the National Intelligence University.

“(2) The total annual compensation to be provided the personnel described in paragraph (1).

“(3) Such other matters as the Director considers appropriate.

“(c) Form of Submittal.—Each plan submitted by the Director to the congressional intelligence committees under subsection (a) shall be submitted as part of another annual submission from the Director to the congressional intelligence committees.

“SEC. 1034. CONTINUED APPLICABILITY OF THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT TO THE BOARD OF VISITORS.

“The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall continue to apply to the Board of Visitors of the National Intelligence University on and after the transfer date.”

(b)
Plan Regarding Personnel at National Intelligence University.—
(1)
Initial submission.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the first submission required by section 1033(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).
(2)
Certain requirement not applicable.— Subsection (c) of section 1033 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), shall not apply to the submittal under paragraph (1) of this subsection.
(c)
Conforming Amendments.— Section 5324 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92) is amended—
(1)
in subsection (b)(1)(C), by striking “ subsection (e)(2)” and inserting “ section 1032(b) of the National Security Act of 1947”;
(2)
by striking subsections (e) and (f); and
(3)
by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as subsections (e) and (f), respectively.
(d)
Clerical Amendment.— The table of contents of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1024 the following:

“Subtitle D— National Intelligence University

“Sec. 1031. Transfer date.

“Sec. 1032. Degree-granting authority.

“Sec. 1033. Reporting.

“Sec. 1034. Continued applicability of the Federal Advisory Committee Act to the Board of Visitors.”.

SEC. 306. Data Collection on Attrition in Intelligence Community.

(a)
Standards for Data Collection.—
(1)
In general.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall establish standards for collecting data relating to attrition in the intelligence community workforce across demographics, specialities, and length of service.
(2)
Inclusion of certain candidates.— The Director shall include, in the standards established under paragraph (1), standards for collecting data from candidates who accepted conditional offers of employment but chose to withdraw from the hiring process before entering into service, including data with respect to the reasons such candidates chose to withdraw.
(b)
Collection of Data.— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, each element of the intelligence community shall begin collecting data on workforce and candidate attrition in accordance with the standards established under subsection (a).
(c)
Annual Report.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on workforce and candidate attrition in the intelligence community that includes—
(1)
the findings of the Director based on the data collected under subsection (b);
(2)
recommendations for addressing any issues identified in those findings; and
(3)
an assessment of timeliness in processing hiring applications of individuals previously employed by an element of the intelligence community, consistent with the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative sponsored by the Security Clearance, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council.

SEC. 307. Limitation on Delegation of Responsibility for Program Management of Information-Sharing Environment.

Section 1016(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(b)), as amended by section 6402(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92), is further amended—
(1)
in paragraph (1), in the matter before subparagraph (A), by striking “ Director of National Intelligence” and inserting “ President”;
(2)
in paragraph (2), by striking “ Director of National Intelligence” both places it appears and inserting “ President”; and
(3)
by adding at the end the following:

“(3) Delegation.—

“(A) In general.—Subject to subparagraph (B), the President may delegate responsibility for carrying out this subsection.

“(B) Limitation.—The President may not delegate responsibility for carrying out this subsection to the Director of National Intelligence.”

SEC. 308. Requirement to Buy Certain Satellite Component from American Sources.

(a)
In General.— Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“SEC. 1109. REQUIREMENT TO BUY CERTAIN SATELLITE COMPONENT FROM AMERICAN SOURCES.

“(a) Definitions.—In this section:

“(1) Covered element of the intelligence community.—The term ‘covered element of the intelligence community’ means an element of the intelligence community that is not an element of the Department of Defense.

“(2) National security satellite.—The term ‘national security satellite’ means a satellite weighing over 400 pounds whose principle purpose is to support the national security or intelligence needs of the United States Government.

“(3) United states.—The term ‘United States’ means the several States, the District of Columbia, and the territories and possessions of the United States.

“(b) Requirement.—Beginning January 1, 2021, except as provided in subsection (c), a covered element of the intelligence community may not award a contract for a national security satellite if the satellite uses a star tracker that is not produced in the United States, including with respect to both the software and the hardware of the star tracker.

“(c) Exception.—The head of a covered element of the intelligence community may waive the requirement under subsection (b) if, on a case-by-case basis, the head certifies in writing to the congressional intelligence committees that—

“(1) there is no available star tracker produced in the United States that meets the mission and design requirements of the national security satellite for which the star tracker will be used;

“(2) the cost of a star tracker produced in the United States is unreasonable, based on a market survey; or

“(3) such waiver is necessary for the national security interests of the United States based on an urgent and compelling need.”

(b)
Clerical Amendment.— The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1108 the following new item:

“Sec. 1109. Requirement to buy certain satellite component from American sources.”.

SEC. 309. Limitation on Construction of Facilities to Be Used Primarily by Intelligence Community.

Section 602(a)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. 3304(a)(2)) is amended—
(1)
by striking “ $1,000,000” both places it appears and inserting “ $2,000,000”; and
(2)
by striking “ the Director of National Intelligence shall submit a notification” and inserting “ the head of such component, in coordination with and subject to the approval of the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit a notification”.

SEC. 310. Intelligence Community Student Loan Repayment Programs.

(a)
Sense of Congress.— It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)
student loan repayment programs are a crucial tool in attracting and retaining talented individuals to the intelligence community, particularly individuals from diverse backgrounds;
(2)
generous student loan repayment programs help the intelligence community compete with the private sector for talented employees;
(3)
departments and agencies containing elements of the intelligence community have authority to establish student loan repayment programs either under section 5379 of title 5, United States Code, or under the delegable authority of the Director of National Intelligence under section 102A(n)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(n)(1));
(4)
although the Director should use the authority under such section 102A(n)(1) sparingly, and should be exceedingly sparing in delegating such authority to an element of the intelligence community, the Director should approve well-predicated requests for such authority in the student loan repayment context if an element of the intelligence community can articulate an impediment to establishing or enhancing a program under section 5379 of title 5, United States Code; and
(5)
student loan repayment programs established by an element of the intelligence community should provide flexibility to intelligence community employees, including employees who pursue loan-financed education in the middle of their careers or after the day on which they first become intelligence community employees.
(b)
Student Loan Repayment Program Standards.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, or a designee of the Director who is an employee of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish minimum standards for the repayment of student loans of employees of elements of the intelligence community by such elements of the intelligence community.
(c)
Report.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the standards established under subsection (b). Such report shall include—
(1)
an explanation of why such minimum standards were established; and
(2)
how such standards advance the goals of—
(A)
attracting and retaining a talented intelligence community workforce;
(B)
competing with private sector companies for talented employees; and
(C)
promoting the development of a diverse workforce.
(d)
Failure To Meet Standards.— Not later than 180 days after the date on which the standards required under subsection (b) are established, the head of an element of the intelligence community that does not meet such standards shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing an explanation for why such element does not meet such standards and an identification of any additional authority or appropriations required to for the element to meet such standards.
(e)
Submittal of Regulations and Policies to Congress.— Not later than 180 days after the date on which the standards required under subsection (b) are established, the head of an element of the intelligence community shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a copy of all internal regulations and policies governing the student loan repayment program of that element as well as copies of such policies redacted to remove classified information.
(f)
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(1)
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;
(2)
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(3)
with respect to an element of the intelligence community within the Department of Defense, the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives;
(4)
with respect to an element of the intelligence community within the Department of Justice, the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and House of Representatives;
(5)
with respect to an element of the intelligence community within the Department of Homeland Security, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives;
(6)
with respect to an element of the intelligence community within the Department of State, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(7)
with respect to an element of the intelligence community within the Department of Energy, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives; and
(8)
with respect to an element of the intelligence community within the Department of the Treasury, the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
(g)
Form of Reports.— Each of the reports required under subsections (c) and (d) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

Subtitle B Reports and Assessments Pertaining to the Intelligence Community

SEC. 321. Assessment by the Comptroller General of the United States on Efforts of the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense to Identify and Mitigate Risks Posed to the Intelligence Community and the Department by the Use of Direct-To-Consumer Genetic Testing by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

(a)
Assessment Required.— The Comptroller General of the United States shall assess the efforts of the intelligence community and the Department of Defense to identify and mitigate the risks posed to the intelligence community and the Department by the use of direct-to-consumer genetic testing by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.
(b)
Report Required.—
(1)
Definition of united states direct-to-consumer genetic testing company.— In this subsection, the term “United States direct-to-consumer genetic testing company” means a private entity that—
(A)
carries out direct-to-consumer genetic testing; and
(B)
is organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States.
(2)
In general.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit to Congress, including the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, a report on the assessment required by subsection (a).
(3)
Elements.— The report required by paragraph (2) shall include the following:
(A)
A description of key national security risks and vulnerabilities associated with direct-to-consumer genetic testing, including—
(i)
how the Government of the People’s Republic of China may be using data provided by personnel of the intelligence community and the Department through direct-to-consumer genetic tests; and
(ii)
how ubiquitous technical surveillance may amplify those risks.
(B)
An assessment of the extent to which the intelligence community and the Department have identified risks and vulnerabilities posed by direct-to-consumer genetic testing and have sought to mitigate such risks and vulnerabilities, or have plans for such mitigation, including the extent to which the intelligence community has determined—
(i)
in which United States direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies the Government of the People’s Republic of China or entities owned or controlled by the Government of the People’s Republic of China have an ownership interest; and
(ii)
which United States direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies may have sold data to the Government of the People’s Republic of China or entities owned or controlled by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.
(C)
Such recommendations as the Comptroller General may have for action by the intelligence community and the Department to improve the identification and mitigation of risks and vulnerabilities posed by the use of direct-to-consumer genetic testing by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.
(4)
Form.— The report required by paragraph (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(c)
Cooperation.— The heads of relevant elements of the intelligence community and components of the Department shall—
(1)
fully cooperate with the Comptroller General in conducting the assessment required by subsection (a); and
(2)
provide any information and data required by the Comptroller General to conduct the assessment, consistent with Intelligence Community Directive 114 or successor directive.

SEC. 322. Report on Use by Intelligence Community of Hiring Flexibilities and Expedited Human Resources Practices to Assure Quality and Diversity in the Workforce of the Intelligence Community.

(a)
In General.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on how elements of the intelligence community are exercising hiring flexibilities and expedited human resources practices afforded under section 3326 of title 5, United States Code, and subpart D of part 315 of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, or successor regulation, to assure quality and diversity in the workforce of the intelligence community.
(b)
Obstacles.— The report submitted under subsection (a) shall include identification of any obstacles encountered by the intelligence community in exercising the authorities described in such subsection.

SEC. 323. Report on Signals Intelligence Priorities and Requirements.

(a)
Report Required.— Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, and the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives a report on signals intelligence priorities and requirements subject to Presidential Policy Directive 28.
(b)
Elements.— The report required by subsection (a) shall cover the following:
(1)
The implementation of the annual process for advising the Director on signals intelligence priorities and requirements described in section 3 of Presidential Policy Directive 28.
(2)
The signals intelligence priorities and requirements as of the most recent annual process.
(3)
The application of such priorities and requirements to the signals intelligence collection efforts of the intelligence community.
(c)
Contents of Classified Annex Referenced in Section 3 of Presidential Policy Directive 28.— Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, in addition to the report submitted under subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the congressional intelligence committees, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, and the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives the contents of the classified annex referenced in section 3 of Presidential Policy Directive 28.
(d)
Form.— The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 324. Assessment of Demand for Student Loan Repayment Program Benefit.

(a)
In General.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall—
(1)
calculate the number of personnel of that element who qualify for a student loan repayment program benefit;
(2)
compare the number calculated under paragraph (1) to the number of personnel who apply for such a benefit;
(3)
provide recommendations for how to structure such a program to optimize participation and enhance the effectiveness of the benefit as a retention tool, including with respect to the amount of the benefit offered and the length of time an employee receiving a benefit is required to serve under a continuing service agreement; and
(4)
identify any shortfall in funds or authorities needed to provide such a benefit.
(b)
Inclusion in Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Submission.— The Director of National Intelligence shall include in the budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of the budget for the intelligence community for fiscal year 2022 (as submitted with the budget of the President under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code) a report on the findings of the elements of the intelligence community under subsection (a).

SEC. 325. Assessment of Intelligence Community Demand for Child Care.

(a)
In General.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community specified in subsection (b), shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that includes—
(1)
a calculation of the total annual demand for child care by employees of such elements, at or near the workplaces of such employees, including a calculation of the demand for early morning and evening child care;
(2)
an identification of any shortfall between the demand calculated under paragraph (1) and the child care supported by such elements as of the date of the report;
(3)
an assessment of options for addressing any such shortfall, including options for providing child care at or near the workplaces of employees of such elements;
(4)
an identification of the advantages, disadvantages, security requirements, and costs associated with each such option;
(5)
a plan to meet, by the date that is 5 years after the date of the report—
(A)
the demand calculated under paragraph (1); or
(B)
an alternative standard established by the Director for child care available to employees of such elements; and
(6)
an assessment of needs of specific elements of the intelligence community, including any Government-provided child care that could be collocated with a workplace of employees of such an element and any available child care providers in the proximity of such a workplace.
(b)
Elements Specified.— The elements of the intelligence community specified in this subsection are the following:
(1)
The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2)
The National Security Agency.
(3)
The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4)
The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(5)
The National Reconnaissance Office.
(6)
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

SEC. 326. Open Source Intelligence Strategies and Plans for the Intelligence Community.

(a)
Requirement for Survey and Evaluation of Customer Feedback.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the head of each element of the intelligence community, shall—
(1)
conduct a survey of the open source intelligence requirements, goals, monetary and property investments, and capabilities for each element of the intelligence community; and
(2)
evaluate the usability and utility of the Open Source Enterprise by soliciting customer feedback and evaluating such feedback.
(b)
Requirement for Overall Strategy and for Intelligence Community, Plan for Improving Usability of Open Source Enterprise, and Risk Analysis of Creating Open Source Center.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director, in coordination with the head of each element of the intelligence community and using the findings of the Director with respect to the survey conducted under subsection (a), shall—
(1)
develop a strategy for open source intelligence collection, analysis, and production that defines the overarching goals, roles, responsibilities, and processes for such collection, analysis, and production for the intelligence community;
(2)
develop a plan for improving usability and utility of the Open Source Enterprise based on the customer feedback solicited under subsection (a)(2); and
(3)
conduct a risk and benefit analysis of creating an open source center independent of any current intelligence community element.
(c)
Requirement for Plan for Centralized Data Repository.— Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and using the findings of the Director with respect to the survey and evaluation conducted under subsection (a), the strategy and plan developed under subsection (b), and the risk and benefit analysis conducted under such subsection, the Director shall develop a plan for a centralized data repository of open source intelligence that enables all elements of the intelligence community—
(1)
to use such repository for their specific requirements; and
(2)
to derive open source intelligence advantages.
(d)
Requirement for Cost-sharing Model.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act and using the findings of the Director with respect to the survey and evaluation conducted under subsection (a), the strategy and plan developed under subsection (b), the risk and benefit analysis conducted under such subsection, and the plan developed under subsection (c), the Director shall develop a cost-sharing model that leverages the open source intelligence investments of each element of the intelligence community for the beneficial use of the entire intelligence community.
(e)
Congressional Briefing.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the National Security Agency shall jointly brief the congressional intelligence committees on—
(1)
the strategy developed under paragraph (1) of subsection (b);
(2)
the plan developed under paragraph (2) of such subsection;
(3)
the plan developed under subsection (c); and
(4)
the cost-sharing model developed under subsection (d).

TITLE IV Matters Relating to Elements of the Intelligence Community

SEC. 401. Establishment of Office of the Ombudsman for Analytic Objectivity.

(a)
Office of the Ombudsman for Analytic Objectivity.— The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 24. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FOR ANALYTIC OBJECTIVITY.

“(a) Establishment.—

“(1) In general.—There is established in the Agency an Office of the Ombudsman for Analytic Objectivity (in this section referred to as the ‘Office’).

“(2) Appointment of ombudsman.—The Office shall be headed by an Ombudsman, who shall be appointed by the Director from among current or former senior staff officers of the Agency.

“(b) Duties and Responsibilities.—The Ombudsman shall—

“(1) on an annual basis, conduct a survey of analytic objectivity among officers and employees of the Agency;

“(2) implement a procedure by which any officer or employee of the Agency may submit to the Office a complaint alleging politicization, bias, lack of objectivity, or other issues relating to a failure of tradecraft in analysis conducted by the Agency;

“(3) except as provided in paragraph (4), upon receiving a complaint submitted pursuant to paragraph (2), take reasonable action to investigate the complaint, make a determination as to whether the incident described in the complaint involved politicization, bias, or lack of objectivity, and prepare a report that—

“(A) summarizes the facts relevant to the complaint;

“(B) documents the determination of the Ombudsman with respect to the complaint; and

“(C) contains a recommendation for remedial action;

“(4) if a complaint submitted pursuant to paragraph (2) alleges politicization, bias, or lack of objectivity in the collection of intelligence information, refer the complaint to the official responsible for supervising collection operations of the Agency; and

“(5) continuously monitor changes in areas of analysis that the Ombudsman determines involve a heightened risk of politicization, bias, or lack of objectivity, to ensure that any change in the analytic line arises from proper application of analytic tradecraft and not as a result of politicization, bias, or lack of objectivity.

“(c) Reports.—

(1) On an annual basis, the Ombudsman shall submit to the intelligence committees a report on the results of the survey conducted pursuant to subsection (b)(1) with respect to the most recent fiscal year.

“(2) On an annual basis, the Ombudsman shall submit to the intelligence committees a report that includes—

“(A) the number of complaints of submitted pursuant to subsection (b)(2) during the most recent fiscal year; and

“(B) a description of the nature of such complaints, the actions taken by the Office or any other relevant element or component of the Agency with respect to such complaints, and the resolution of such complaints.

“(3) On a quarterly basis, the Ombudsman shall submit to the intelligence committees a report that includes—

“(A) a list of the areas of analysis monitored during the most recent calendar quarter pursuant to subsection (b)(5); and

“(B) a brief description of the methods by which the Office has conducted such monitoring.

“(d) Intelligence Committees Defined.—In this section, the term ‘intelligence committees’ means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.”

(b)
Reference.— Any reference in any law, regulation, map, document, paper, or other record of the United States to the Ombudsman for Analytic and Collection Objectivity of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be deemed to be a reference to the Office of the Ombudsman for Analytic Objectivity of the Central Intelligence Agency established by section 24(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), as added by subsection (a).
(c)
Report on Surveys for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019.— Not later than 10 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees any reports previously prepared by the Ombudsman for Analytic and Collection Objectivity with respect to the surveys of analytic objectivity conducted for fiscal years 2018 and 2019.

SEC. 402. Expansion of Personnel Management Authority to Attract Experts in Science and Engineering.

Section 1599h of title 10, United States Code, is amended—
(1)
in subsection (a), by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(7) NGA.—The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency may carry out a program of personnel management authority provided in subsection (b) in order to facilitate recruitment of eminent experts in science or engineering for research and development projects and to enhance the administration and management of the Agency.”

(2)
in subsection (b)(1)—
(A)
in subparagraph (E), by striking “ ; and”;
(B)
in subparagraph (F), by striking the semicolon and inserting “ ; and”; and
(C)
by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(G) in the case of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, appoint individuals to a total of not more than 7 positions in the Agency, of which not more than 2 such positions may be positions of administration or management in the Agency;”

; and

(3)
in subsection (c)(2), by striking “ or the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center” and inserting “ the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, or the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency”.

SEC. 403. Senior Chief Petty Officer Shannon Kent Award for Distinguished Female Personnel of the National Security Agency.

The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“SEC. 21. SENIOR CHIEF PETTY OFFICER SHANNON KENT AWARD FOR DISTINGUISHED FEMALE PERSONNEL.

“(a) Establishment.—The Director of the National Security Agency shall establish an honorary award for the recognition of female personnel of the National Security Agency for distinguished career contributions in support of the mission of the Agency as civilian employees or members of the Armed Forces assigned to the Agency. The award shall be known as the ‘Senior Chief Petty Officer Shannon Kent Award’ and shall consist of a design determined appropriate by the Director.

“(b) Award.—The Director shall award the Senior Chief Petty Officer Shannon Kent Award to female civilian employees, members of the Armed Forces, or former civilian employees or members, whom the Director determines meet the criteria under subsection (a).”

SEC. 404. Department of Homeland Security Intelligence and Cybersecurity Diversity Fellowship Program.

(a)
Program.— Subtitle D of title XIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (5 U.S.C. 3301 note et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“SEC. 1333. INTELLIGENCE AND CYBERSECURITY DIVERSITY FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.

“(a) Definitions.—In this section:

“(1) Appropriate committees of congress.—The term ‘appropriate committees of Congress’ means—

“(A) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

“(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

“(2) Excepted service.—The term ‘excepted service’ has the meaning given that term in section 2103 of title 5, United States Code.

“(3) Historically black college or university.—The term ‘historically Black college or university’ has the meaning given the term ‘part B institution’ in section 322 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1061).

“(4) Institution of higher education.—The term ‘institution of higher education’ has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001).

“(5) Minority-serving institution.—The term ‘minority-serving institution’ means an institution of higher education described in section 371(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(a)).

“(b) Program.—The Secretary shall carry out an intelligence and cybersecurity diversity fellowship program (in this section referred to as the ‘Program’) under which an eligible individual may—

“(1) participate in a paid internship at the Department that relates to intelligence, cybersecurity, or some combination thereof;

“(2) receive tuition assistance from the Secretary; and

“(3) upon graduation from an institution of higher education and successful completion of the Program (as defined by the Secretary), receive an offer of employment to work in an intelligence or cybersecurity position of the Department that is in the excepted service.

“(c) Eligibility.—To be eligible to participate in the Program, an individual shall—

“(1) be a citizen of the United States; and

“(2) as of the date of submitting the application to participate in the Program—

“(A) have a cumulative grade point average of at least 3.2 on a 4.0 scale;

“(B) be a socially disadvantaged individual (as that term in defined in section 124.103 of title 13, Code of Federal Regulations, or successor regulation); and

“(C) be a sophomore, junior, or senior at an institution of higher education.

“(d) Direct Hire Authority.—If an individual who receives an offer of employment under subsection (b)(3) accepts such offer, the Secretary shall appoint, without regard to provisions of subchapter I of chapter 33 of title 5, United States Code, (except for section 3328 of such title) such individual to the position specified in such offer.

“(e) Reports.—

“(1) Reports.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this section, and on an annual basis thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the Program.

“(2) Matters.—Each report under paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to the most recent year, the following:

“(A) A description of outreach efforts by the Secretary to raise awareness of the Program among institutions of higher education in which eligible individuals are enrolled.

“(B) Information on specific recruiting efforts conducted by the Secretary to increase participation in the Program.

“(C) The number of individuals participating in the Program, listed by the institution of higher education in which the individual is enrolled at the time of participation, and information on the nature of such participation, including on whether the duties of the individual under the Program relate primarily to intelligence or to cybersecurity.

“(D) The number of individuals who accepted an offer of employment under the Program and an identification of the element within the Department to which each individual was appointed.”

(b)
Clerical Amendment.— The table of contents for such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1332 the following new item:

“Sec. 1333. Intelligence and cybersecurity diversity fellowship program.”.

SEC. 405. Climate Security Advisory Council.

(a)
Study on Advisory Council Model for Strategic or Transnational Threats.—
(1)
Study required.— The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of other elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Director, shall conduct a study on the effectiveness of the Climate Security Advisory Council as a potential model for future advisory councils that—
(A)
focus on optimizing the collection and analysis of intelligence relating to strategic or transnational threats to the national security of the United States (including threats posed by disease outbreaks, pandemics, or other global health threats); and
(B)
are composed of elements of the intelligence community and relevant elements of the Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence community.
(2)
Report.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the findings of the study under paragraph (1).
(b)
Technical Correction.— Section 120(c)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3060(c)(4)) is amended by striking “ security indicators” and inserting “ intelligence indications”.

TITLE V Matters Relating to Emerging Technologies

SEC. 501. Requirements and Authorities for Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to Improve Education in Science, Technology, Engineering, Arts, and Mathematics.

The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), as amended by section 401, is further amended by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 25. IMPROVEMENT OF EDUCATION IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, ARTS, AND MATHEMATICS.

“(a) Definitions.—In this section:

“(1) Eligible entity.—The term ‘eligible entity’ includes a department or agency of the Federal Government, a State, a political subdivision of a State, an individual, and a not-for-profit or other organization in the private sector.

“(2) Educational institution.—The term ‘educational institution’ includes any public or private elementary school or secondary school, institution of higher education, college, university, or any other profit or nonprofit institution that is dedicated to improving science, technology, engineering, the arts, mathematics, business, law, medicine, or other fields that promote development and education relating to science, technology, engineering, the arts, or mathematics.

“(3) State.—The term ‘State’ means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any other territory or possession of the United States.

“(b) Requirements.—The Director shall, on a continuing basis—

“(1) identify actions that the Director may take to improve education in the scientific, technology, engineering, arts, and mathematics (known as ‘STEAM’) skills necessary to meet the long-term national security needs of the United States for personnel proficient in such skills; and

“(2) establish and conduct programs to carry out such actions.

“(c) Authorities.—

“(1) In general.—The Director, in support of educational programs in science, technology, engineering, the arts, and mathematics, may—

“(A) award grants to eligible entities;

“(B) provide cash awards and other items to eligible entities;

“(C) accept voluntary services from eligible entities;

“(D) support national competition judging, other educational event activities, and associated award ceremonies in connection with such educational programs; and

“(E) enter into one or more education partnership agreements with educational institutions in the United States for the purpose of encouraging and enhancing study in science, technology, engineering, the arts, and mathematics disciplines at all levels of education.

“(2) Education partnership agreements.—

“(A) Nature of assistance provided.—Under an education partnership agreement entered into with an educational institution under paragraph (1)(E), the Director may provide assistance to the educational institution by—

“(i) loaning equipment to the educational institution for any purpose and duration in support of such agreement that the Director considers appropriate;

“(ii) making personnel available to teach science courses or to assist in the development of science courses and materials for the educational institution;

“(iii) providing sabbatical opportunities for faculty and internship opportunities for students;

“(iv) involving faculty and students of the educational institution in Agency projects, including research and technology transfer or transition projects;

“(v) cooperating with the educational institution in developing a program under which students may be given academic credit for work on Agency projects, including research and technology transfer for transition projects; and

“(vi) providing academic and career advice and assistance to students of the educational institution.

“(B) Priorities.—In entering into education partnership agreements under paragraph (1)(E), the Director shall prioritize entering into education partnership agreements with the following:

“(i) Historically Black colleges and universities and other minority-serving institutions, as described in section 371(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(a)).

“(ii) Educational institutions serving women, members of minority groups, and other groups of individuals who traditionally are involved in the science, technology, engineering, arts, and mathematics professions in disproportionately low numbers.

“(d) Designation of Advisor.—The Director shall designate one or more individuals within the Agency to advise and assist the Director regarding matters relating to science, technology, engineering, the arts, and mathematics education and training.”

SEC. 502. Seedling Investment in Next-Generation Microelectronics in Support of Artificial Intelligence.

(a)
Findings.— Congress finds that—
(1)
developing faster, more energy efficient, and more resilient computing is important to the future of the national security of the United States and the leadership by the United States in artificial intelligence; and
(2)
multidisciplinary teams co-designing microelectronics for artificial intelligence will lead to unprecedented capabilities that will help ensure that the United States maintains its superiority in this worldwide competition for economic and national security.
(b)
Awards for Research and Development.— The Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, shall award contracts or grants, or enter into transactions other than contracts, to encourage microelectronics research.
(c)
Use of Funds.— The Director shall award contracts or grants to, or enter into transactions other than contracts with, entities under subsection (b) to carry out any of the following:
(1)
Advanced engineering and applied research into novel computing models, materials, devices, architectures, or algorithms to enable the advancement of artificial intelligence and machine learning.
(2)
Research efforts to—
(A)
overcome challenges with engineering and applied research of microelectronics, including with respect to the physical limits on transistors, electrical interconnects, and memory elements; or
(B)
promote long-term advancements in computing technologies, including by fostering a unified and multidisciplinary approach encompassing research and development into algorithm design, computing architectures, microelectronic devices and circuits, and the chemistry and physics of new materials.
(3)
Any other activity the Director determines would promote the development of microelectronics research.
(d)
Award Amounts.— In awarding contracts or grants, or entering into transactions other than contracts, under subsection (b), the Director may award not more than a total of $15,000,000.

TITLE VI Reports and Other Matters

SEC. 601. Report on Attempts by Foreign Adversaries to Build Telecommunications and Cybersecurity Equipment and Services for, or to Provide Such Equipment and Services to, Certain Allies of the United States.

(a)
Definitions.— In this section:
(1)
Appropriate committees of congress.— The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(A)
the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B)
the Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Five eyes country.— The term “Five Eyes country” means any of the following:
(A)
Australia.
(B)
Canada.
(C)
New Zealand.
(D)
The United Kingdom.
(E)
The United States.
(b)
Report Required.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on attempts by foreign adversaries to build telecommunications and cybersecurity equipment and services for, or to provide such equipment and services to, Five Eyes countries.
(c)
Elements.— The report submitted under subsection (b) shall include the following:
(1)
An assessment of United States intelligence sharing and intelligence and military force posture in any Five Eyes country that currently uses or intends to use telecommunications or cybersecurity equipment or services provided by a foreign adversary of the United States, including China and Russia.
(2)
A description and assessment of mitigation of any potential compromises or risks for any circumstance described in paragraph (1).
(d)
Form.— The report required by subsection (b) shall include an unclassified executive summary, and may include a classified annex.

SEC. 602. Report on Threats Posed by Use by Foreign Governments and Entities of Commercially Available Cyber Intrusion and Surveillance Technology.

(a)
Report Required.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a report on the threats posed by the use by foreign governments and entities of commercially available cyber intrusion and other surveillance technology.
(b)
Contents.— The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1)
Matters relating to threats described in subsection (a) as they pertain to the following:
(A)
The threat posed to United States persons and persons inside the United States.
(B)
The threat posed to United States personnel overseas.
(C)
The threat posed to employees of the Federal Government, including through both official and personal accounts and devices.
(2)
A description of which foreign governments and entities pose the greatest threats from the use of technology described in subsection (a) and the nature of those threats.
(3)
An assessment of the source of the commercially available cyber intrusion and other surveillance technology that poses the threats described in subsection (a), including whether such technology is made by United States companies or companies in the United States or by foreign companies.
(4)
An assessment of actions taken, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, by the Federal Government and foreign governments to limit the export of technology described in subsection (a) from the United States or foreign countries to foreign governments and entities in ways that pose the threats described in such subsection.
(5)
Matters relating to how the Federal Government, Congress, and foreign governments can most effectively mitigate the threats described in subsection (a), including matters relating to the following:
(A)
Working with the technology and telecommunications industry to identify and improve the security of consumer software and hardware used by United States persons and persons inside the United States that is targeted by commercial cyber intrusion and surveillance software.
(B)
Export controls.
(C)
Diplomatic pressure.
(D)
Trade agreements.
(c)
Form.— The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 603. Reports on Recommendations of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission.

(a)
Appropriate Committees of Congress.— In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(1)
the Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; and
(2)
the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.
(b)
Reports Required.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, each head of an agency described in subsection (c) shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the recommendations included in the report issued by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission under section 1652(k) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232).
(c)
Agencies Described.— The agencies described in this subsection are the following:
(1)
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2)
The Department of Homeland Security.
(3)
The Department of Energy.
(4)
The Department of Commerce.
(5)
The Department of Defense.
(d)
Contents.— Each report submitted under subsection (b) by the head of an agency described in subsection (c) shall include the following:
(1)
An evaluation of the recommendations in the report described in subsection (b) that the agency identifies as pertaining directly to the agency.
(2)
A description of the actions taken, or the actions that the head of the agency may consider taking, to implement any of the recommendations (including a comprehensive estimate of requirements for appropriations to take such actions).

SEC. 604. Assessment of Critical Technology Trends Relating to Artificial Intelligence, Microchips, and Semiconductors and Related Supply Chains.

(a)
Assessment Required.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall complete a detailed assessment of critical technology trends relating to artificial intelligence, microchips, and semiconductors and related supply chains.
(b)
Elements.— The assessment required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1)
Export controls.—
(A)
In general.— An assessment of efforts by partner countries to enact and implement export controls and other technology transfer measures with respect to artificial intelligence, microchips, advanced manufacturing equipment, and other artificial intelligence enabled technologies critical to United States supply chains.
(B)
Identification of opportunities for cooperation.— The assessment under subparagraph (A) shall identify opportunities for further cooperation with international partners on a multilateral and bilateral basis to strengthen export control regimes and address technology transfer threats.
(2)
Semiconductor supply chains.—
(A)
In general.— An assessment of global semiconductor supply chains, including areas to reduce United States vulnerabilities and maximize points of leverage.
(B)
Analysis of potential effects.— The assessment under subparagraph (A) shall include an analysis of the potential effects of significant geopolitical shifts, including those related to Taiwan.
(C)
Identification of opportunities for diversification.— The assessment under subparagraph (A) shall also identify opportunities for diversification of United States supply chains, including an assessment of cost, challenges, and opportunities to diversify manufacturing capabilities on a multinational basis.
(3)
Computing power.— An assessment of trends relating to computing power and the effect of such trends on global artificial intelligence development and implementation, in consultation with the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, including forward-looking assessments of how computing resources may affect United States national security, innovation, and implementation relating to artificial intelligence.
(c)
Report.—
(1)
Definition of appropriate committees of congress.— In this subsection, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(A)
the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(B)
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
(2)
In general.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the findings of the Director with respect to the assessment completed under subsection (a).
(3)
Form.— The report submitted under paragraph (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 605. Combating Chinese Influence Operations in the United States and Strengthening Civil Liberties Protections.

(a)
Updates to Annual Reports on Influence Operations and Campaigns in the United States by the Chinese Communist Party.— Section 1107(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3237(b)) is amended—
(1)
by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (9); and
(2)
by inserting after paragraph (7) the following:

“(8) An identification of influence activities and operations employed by the Chinese Communist Party against the United States science and technology sectors, specifically employees of the United States Government, researchers, scientists, and students in the science and technology sector in the United States.”

(b)
Plan for Federal Bureau of Investigation to Increase Public Awareness and Detection of Influence Activities by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.—
(1)
Plan required.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan to increase public awareness of influence activities by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.
(2)
Consultation.— In carrying out paragraph (1), the Director shall consult with the following:
(A)
The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy.
(B)
Such other stakeholders outside the intelligence community, including professional associations, institutions of higher education, businesses, and civil rights and multicultural organizations, as the Director determines relevant.
(c)
Recommendations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Strengthen Relationships and Build Trust With Communities of Interest.—
(1)
In general.— The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in consultation with the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division and the Chief Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer of the Department of Justice, shall develop recommendations to strengthen relationships with communities targeted by influence activities of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and build trust with such communities through local and regional grassroots outreach.
(2)
Submittal to congress.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to Congress the recommendations developed under paragraph (1).
(d)
Technical Corrections.— The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended—
(1)
in section 1107 (50 U.S.C. 3237)—
(A)
in the section heading, by striking “ communist party of china” and inserting “ chinese communist party”; and
(B)
by striking “ Communist Party of China” both places it appears and inserting “ Chinese Communist Party”; and
(2)
in the table of contents before section 2 (50 U.S.C. 3002), by striking the item relating to section 1107 and inserting the following new item:

“Sec. 1107. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the United States by the Chinese Communist Party.”.

SEC. 606. Annual Report on Corrupt Activities of Senior Officials of the Chinese Communist Party.

(a)
Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.— In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(1)
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2)
the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(b)
Annual Report Required.—
(1)
In general.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through 2025, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the corruption and corrupt activities of senior officials of the Chinese Communist Party.
(2)
Elements.—
(A)
In general.— Each report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(i)
A description of the wealth of, and corruption and corrupt activities among, senior officials of the Chinese Communist Party.
(ii)
A description of any recent actions of the officials described in clause (i) that could be considered a violation, or potential violation, of United States law.
(iii)
A description and assessment of targeted financial measures, including potential targets for designation of the officials described in clause (i) for the corruption and corrupt activities described in that clause and for the actions described in clause (ii).
(B)
Scope of reports.— The first report under paragraph (1) shall include comprehensive information on the matters described in subparagraph (A). Any succeeding report under paragraph (1) may consist of an update or supplement to the preceding report under that subsection.
(3)
Coordination.— In preparing each report, update, or supplement under this subsection, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate as follows:
(A)
In preparing the description required by clause (i) of paragraph (2)(A), the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate with the head of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(B)
In preparing the descriptions required by clauses (ii) and (iii) of such paragraph, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate with the head of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury.
(4)
Form.— Each report under paragraph (1) shall include an unclassified executive summary, and may include a classified annex.
(c)
Sense of Congress.— It is the sense of Congress that the United States should undertake every effort and pursue every opportunity to expose the corruption and illicit practices of senior officials of the Chinese Communist Party, including President Xi Jinping.

SEC. 607. Report on Corrupt Activities of Russian and Other Eastern European Oligarchs.

(a)
Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.— In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(1)
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2)
the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(b)
Report Required.— Not later than 100 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs a report on the corruption and corrupt activities of Russian and other Eastern European oligarchs.
(c)
Elements.—
(1)
In general.— Each report under subsection (b) shall include the following:
(A)
A description of corruption and corrupt activities among Russian and other Eastern European oligarchs who support the Government of the Russian Federation, including estimates of the total assets of such oligarchs.
(B)
An assessment of the impact of the corruption and corrupt activities described pursuant to subparagraph (A) on the economy and citizens of Russia.
(C)
A description of any connections to, or support of, organized crime, drug smuggling, or human trafficking by an oligarch covered by subparagraph (A).
(D)
A description of any information that reveals corruption and corrupt activities in Russia among oligarchs covered by subparagraph (A).
(E)
A description and assessment of potential sanctions actions that could be imposed upon oligarchs covered by subparagraph (A) who support the leadership of the Government of Russia, including President Vladimir Putin.
(2)
Scope of reports.— The first report under subsection (a) shall include comprehensive information on the matters described in paragraph (1). Any succeeding report under subsection (a) may consist of an update or supplement to the preceding report under that subsection.
(d)
Coordination.— In preparing each report, update, or supplement under this section, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate as follows:
(1)
In preparing the assessment and descriptions required by subparagraphs (A) through (D) of subsection (c)(1), the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate with the head of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(2)
In preparing the description and assessment required by subparagraph (E) of such subsection, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate with the head of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury.
(e)
Form.—
(1)
In general.— Subject to paragraph (2), each report under subsection (b) shall include an unclassified executive summary, and may include a classified annex.
(2)
Unclassified form of certain information.— The information described in subsection (c)(1)(D) in each report under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form.

SEC. 608. Report on Biosecurity Risk and Disinformation by the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

(a)
Definitions.— In this section:
(1)
Appropriate committees of congress.— The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(A)
the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(B)
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
(2)
Critical infrastructure.— The term “critical infrastructure” has the meaning given such term in section 1016(e) of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)).
(b)
Report Required.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report identifying whether and how officials of the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of the People’s Republic of China may have sought—
(1)
to suppress information about—
(A)
the outbreak of the novel coronavirus in Wuhan;
(B)
the spread of the virus through China; and
(C)
the transmission of the virus to other countries;
(2)
to spread disinformation relating to the pandemic; or
(3)
to exploit the pandemic to advance their national security interests.
(c)
Assessments.— The report required by subsection (b) shall include assessments of reported actions and the effect of those actions on efforts to contain the novel coronavirus pandemic, including each of the following:
(1)
The origins of the novel coronavirus outbreak, the time and location of initial infections, and the mode and speed of early viral spread.
(2)
Actions taken by the Government of China to suppress, conceal, or misinform the people of China and those of other countries about the novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan.
(3)
The effect of disinformation or the failure of the Government of China to fully disclose details of the outbreak on response efforts of local governments in China and other countries.
(4)
Diplomatic, political, economic, intelligence, or other pressure on other countries and international organizations to conceal information about the spread of the novel coronavirus and the response of the Government of China to the contagion, as well as to influence or coerce early responses to the pandemic by other countries.
(5)
Efforts by officials of the Government of China to deny access to health experts and international health organizations to afflicted individuals in Wuhan, pertinent areas of the city, or laboratories of interest in China, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
(6)
Efforts by the Government of China, or those acting at its direction or with its assistance, to conduct cyber operations against international, national, or private health organizations conducting research relating to the novel coronavirus or operating in response to the pandemic.
(7)
Efforts to control, restrict, or manipulate relevant segments of global supply chains, particularly in the sale, trade, or provision of relevant medicines, medical supplies, or medical equipment as a result of the pandemic.
(8)
Efforts to advance the economic, intelligence, national security, and political objectives of the Government of China by exploiting vulnerabilities of foreign governments, economies, and companies under financial duress as a result of the pandemic or to accelerate economic espionage and intellectual property theft.
(9)
Efforts to exploit the disruption of the pharmaceutical and telecommunications industries as well as other industries tied to critical infrastructure and bilateral trade between China and the United States and between China and allies and partners of the United States in order to advance the economic and political objectives of the Government of China following the pandemic.
(d)
Form.— The report required under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 609. Report on Effect of Lifting of United Nations Arms Embargo on Islamic Republic of Iran.

(a)
Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.— In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(1)
the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(2)
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(b)
Report Required.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, in consultation with such heads of other elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on—
(1)
the plans of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to acquire military arms if the ban on arms transfers to or from such government under United Nations Security Council resolutions are lifted; and
(2)
the effect such arms acquisitions may have on regional security and stability.
(c)
Contents.— The report submitted under subsection (b) shall include assessments relating to plans of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to acquire additional weapons, the intention of other countries to provide such weapons, and the effect such acquisition and provision would have on regional stability, including with respect to each of the following:
(1)
The type and quantity of weapon systems under consideration for acquisition.
(2)
The countries of origin of such systems.
(3)
Likely reactions of other countries in the region to such acquisition, including the potential for proliferation by other countries in response.
(4)
The threat that such acquisition could present to international commerce and energy supplies in the region, and the potential implications for the national security of the United States.
(5)
The threat that such acquisition could present to the Armed Forces of the United States, of countries allied with the United States, and of countries partnered with the United States stationed in or deployed in the region.
(6)
The potential that such acquisition could be used to deliver chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.
(7)
The potential for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to proliferate weapons acquired in the absence of an arms embargo to regional groups, including Shi’a militia groups backed by such government.
(d)
Form.— The report submitted under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 610. Report on Iranian Activities Relating to Nuclear Nonproliferation.

(a)
Definition of Appropriate Committees of Congress.— In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(1)
the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(2)
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(b)
Report Required.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report assessing—
(1)
any relevant activities potentially relating to nuclear weapons research and development by the Islamic Republic of Iran; and
(2)
any relevant efforts to afford or deny international access in accordance with international nonproliferation agreements.
(c)
Assessments.— The report required by subsection (b) shall include assessments, for the period beginning on January 1, 2018, and ending on the date of the submittal of the report, of the following:
(1)
Activities to research, develop, or enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium with the intent or capability of creating weapons-grade nuclear material.
(2)
Research, development, testing, or design activities that could contribute to or inform construction of a device intended to initiate or capable of initiating a nuclear explosion.
(3)
Efforts to receive, transmit, store, destroy, relocate, archive, or otherwise preserve research, processes, products, or enabling materials relevant or relating to any efforts assessed under paragraph (1) or (2).
(4)
Efforts to afford or deny international access, in accordance with international nonproliferation agreements, to locations, individuals, and materials relating to activities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3).
(d)
Form.— The report required under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 611. Annual Reports on Security Services of the People’s Republic of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

(a)
Finding.— Congress finds that the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China promulgated the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on June 30, 2020.
(b)
Reports.— Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), is amended by inserting after section 1107 the following new section:

“SEC. 1107A. ANNUAL REPORTS ON SECURITY SERVICES OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION.

“(a) Definitions.—In this section:

“(1) Appropriate congressional committees.—The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—

“(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

“(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and

“(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

“(2) Chinese security services.—The term ‘Chinese security services’ means—

“(A) the security services of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, including the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Public Security; and

“(B) any known front organizations or aliases associated with such security services, including officers associated with the national security division of the Hong Kong Police Force and other officers of the Hong Kong Police Force selected by the Committee for Safeguarding National Security to work on matters relating to national security.

“(b) Requirement.—On an annual basis through 2047, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the presence and activities of Chinese security services operating within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

“(c) Contents.—Each report under subsection (b) shall include, with respect to the year covered by the report, the following:

“(1) Identification of the approximate number of personnel affiliated with Chinese security services operating within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, including a breakdown of such personnel by the specific security service and the division of the security service, and (to the extent possible) an identification of any such personnel associated with the national security division of the Hong Kong Police Force.

“(2) A description of the command and control structures of such security services, including information regarding the extent to which such security services are controlled by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

“(3) A description of the working relationship and coordination mechanisms of the Chinese security services with the police force of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

“(4) A description of the activities conducted by Chinese security services operating within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, including—

“(A) information regarding the extent to which such security services, and officers associated with the national security division of the Hong Kong Police Force, are engaged in frontline policing, serving in advisory and assistance roles, or both;

“(B) an assessment of the likelihood of such security services conducting renditions of individuals from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to China and a listing of every known individual subject to such rendition during the year covered by the report; and

“(C) an assessment of how such activities conducted by Chinese security services contribute to self-censorship and corruption within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

“(5) A discussion of the doctrine and tactics employed by Chinese security services operating within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, including an overview of the extent to which such security services employ surveillance, detection, and control methods, including ‘high-tech’ policing models and ‘preventative policing tactics’, that are consistent with the rise of digital authoritarianism, and used in a manner similar to methods used in the Xinjiang region of China.

“(6) An overview of the funding for Chinese security services operating within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, including an assessment of the extent to which funding is drawn locally from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government or from the Government of China.

“(7) A discussion of the various surveillance technologies used by security services operating within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, including—

“(A) a list of the key companies that provide such technologies; and

“(B) an assessment of the degree to which such technologies can be accessed by Chinese security services operating within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

“(d) Coordination.—In carrying out subsection (b), the Director shall coordinate with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and any other relevant head of an element of the intelligence community.

“(e) Form.—Each report submitted to the appropriate congressional committees under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.”

(c)
Clerical Amendment.— The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1107 the following new item:

“Sec. 1107A. Annual reports on security services of the People’s Republic of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.”.

SEC. 612. Research Partnership on Activities of People’s Republic of China.

(a)
Research Partnership.—
(1)
Requirement.— Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall seek to enter into a partnership with an academic or non-profit research institution to—
(A)
carry out joint unclassified geospatial intelligence analyses of the activities of the People’s Republic of China that pose risks to the national security interests of the United States; and
(B)
make available on a publicly available internet website unclassified geospatial intelligence products relating to such analyses.
(2)
Elements.— The Director shall ensure that the activities of China analyzed under paragraph (1)(A) include the following:
(A)
Any notable developments relating to the global activities of the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force, the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force, and the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force Coast Guard Corps.
(B)
Infrastructure projects associated with the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative.
(C)
Maritime land reclamation activities conducted by China in the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean region, and the broader maritime commons.
(D)
Matters relevant to global public health and climate security, including—
(i)
indications and warnings of disease outbreaks with pandemic potential;
(ii)
the activities of China likely contributing to climate change; and
(iii)
any environmental degradation directly resulting from the practices of China.
(3)
Consortium.— In carrying out paragraph (1), the Director may enter into a partnership with—
(A)
one research institution; or
(B)
a consortium of research institutions if the Director determines that the inclusion of multiple institutions will result in more effective research conducted pursuant to this section or improve the outcomes of such research.
(4)
Duration.— The Director shall carry out a partnership under this section for a period that is not less than 10 years following the date of the enactment of this Act.
(5)
Improvements to partnership.— The Director may modify the partnership under paragraph (1) or select a new research institution with which to enter into such a partnership if—
(A)
the Director consults with the congressional intelligence committees with respect to the proposed modified or new partnership;
(B)
the modified or new partnership is carried out in accordance with this section; and
(C)
the Director determines that the modified or new partnership will result in more effective research conducted pursuant to this section or improve the outcomes of such research.
(b)
Open-Source Data.—
(1)
Identification and publication.— During the life of the partnership under subsection (a), the Director shall regularly—
(A)
identify raw, unclassified geospatial data that could improve the research conducted under the partnership if the data was made publicly available; and
(B)
make such data publicly available.
(2)
Consultation.— The Director shall carry out paragraph (1) in consultation with the research institution or consortium of research institutions involved with the partnership under subsection (a).
(c)
Briefings.— Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter during the life of the partnership under subsection (a), the Director shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the partnership. Each such briefing shall include the following:
(1)
The outcomes of research conducted under the partnership.
(2)
Identification of the actions that have been taken to increase the quantity and quality of unclassified geospatial analysis products made publicly available under the partnership, including the quantity and types of raw data the partnership has made publicly available.
(3)
Identification of actual and projected costs to carry out the partnership.
(d)
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(1)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(2)
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(3)
Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 613. Report on the Pharmaceutical and Personal Protective Equipment Regulatory Practices of the People’s Republic of China.

(a)
Report.— Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on—
(1)
the pharmaceutical and personal protective equipment regulatory practices of the People’s Republic of China; and
(2)
the effects of such practices on the national security of the United States.
(b)
Contents.— The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1)
An assessment of the quantity of active pharmaceutical ingredients produced annually within China.
(2)
An estimate of the percentage of active pharmaceutical ingredients produced globally that originate in China.
(3)
A description of the National Medical Products Administration of China, including with respect to—
(A)
the roles and responsibilities of the Administration;
(B)
the organizational structure of the Administration; and
(C)
any affiliated institutions of the National Medical Products Administration.
(4)
An assessment of the capacity of the National Medical Products Administration to effectively develop safety standards, efficacy standards, and any other relevant standards concerning the production of active pharmaceutical ingredients and pharmaceutical drugs.
(5)
An assessment of the capacity of the National Medical Products Administration to enforce standards on the production and distribution of active pharmaceutical ingredients and pharmaceutical drugs.
(6)
An overview of qualitative disparities between active pharmaceutical ingredients and pharmaceutical drugs approved by the National Medical Products Administration and similar drugs subject to regulatory oversight and approval in the markets of the member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
(7)
An assessment of the qualitative disparities between the standards and enforcement practices of the National Medical Products Administration on the production and distribution of active pharmaceutical ingredients and pharmaceutical drugs and the good manufacturing practice guidelines issued by the International Council for Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use.
(8)
An assessment of the susceptibility of the National Medical Products Administration, the subordinate organizations of the National Medical Products Administration, and other associated personnel to engage in corrupt practices, particularly practices that relate to assessing the safety of pharmaceutical ingredients and other pharmaceutical drugs within the authority of the National Medical Products Administration.
(9)
An assessment of the national security risks associated with the reliance by the United States on pharmaceutical ingredients and pharmaceutical drugs originating in China, including an assessment of how and whether China could leverage its production of certain pharmaceutical ingredients as a means to coerce the United States or the partners and allies of the United States.
(10)
An assessment of the percentage of personal protective equipment produced globally that originates in China.
(11)
An assessment of the national security risks associated with any reliance by the United States on personal protective equipment originating in China, including an assessment of how and whether China could leverage its production of personal protective equipment as a means to coerce the United States or the partners and allies of the United States.
(c)
Coordination.— In carrying out subsection (a), the Director shall coordinate with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and any other relevant head of an element of the intelligence community as well as the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration.
(d)
Form.— The report submitted to the appropriate congressional committees under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(e)
Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(1)
the congressional intelligence committees;
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives; and
(3)
the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Finance of the Senate.

SEC. 614. National Intelligence Estimate on Situation in Afghanistan.

(a)
Requirement.— The Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall produce a National Intelligence Estimate on the situation in Afghanistan.
(b)
Matters.— The National Intelligence Estimate produced under subsection (a) shall include an assessment of the prospects of a durable intra-Afghan settlement of the conflict in Afghanistan that leads to—
(1)
a permanent ceasefire and sustained reduction in violence;
(2)
a verifiable break between the Taliban and al-Qaeda;
(3)
verifiable cooperation by the Taliban in efforts against al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Khorasan, and associated international terrorists the intelligence community determines are active in Afghanistan and pose a threat to the United States homeland or United States interests abroad; and
(4)
sustainment of the social and human rights progress achieved by Afghan women and girls since 2001.
(c)
Submission to Congress.—
(1)
Submission.— Not later than February 1, 2021, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the National Intelligence Estimate produced under subsection (a), including all intelligence reporting underlying the Estimate.
(2)
Notice regarding submission.— If before February 1, 2021, the Director determines that the National Intelligence Estimate produced under subsection (a) cannot be submitted by such date, the Director shall (before such date)—
(A)
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report setting forth the reasons why the National Intelligence Estimate cannot be submitted by such date and an estimated date for the submission of the National Intelligence Estimate; and
(B)
testify before the congressional intelligence committees on the issues that will be covered by the National Intelligence Estimate.
(3)
Form.— The National Intelligence Estimate shall be submitted under paragraph (1) in classified form.
(d)
Public Version.— Consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, at the same time as the Director submits to the congressional intelligence committees the National Intelligence Estimate under subsection (c), the Director shall make publicly available on the internet website of the Director an unclassified version of the key findings of the National Intelligence Estimate.

SEC. 615. Assessment Regarding Tensions Between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

(a)
Assessment Required.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written assessment regarding tensions between the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan, including with respect to the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Such assessment shall include each of the following:
(1)
An identification of the strategic interests of the United States and its partners in the Armenia-Azerbaijan region.
(2)
A description of all significant uses of force in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh region and the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan during calendar year 2020, including a description of each significant use of force and an assessment of who initiated the use of such force.
(3)
An assessment of the effect of United States military assistance to Azerbaijan and Armenia on the regional balance of power and the likelihood of further use of military force.
(4)
An assessment of the likelihood of any further uses of force or potentially destabilizing activities in the region in the near- to medium-term.
(b)
Form of Assessment.— The assessment required under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 616. Sense of Congress on Third Option Foundation.

It is the sense of the Congress that—
(1)
the work of the Third Option Foundation to heal, help, and honor members of the special operations community of the Central Intelligence Agency and their families is invaluable; and
(2)
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency should work closely with the Third Option Foundation in implementing section 19A of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b), as added by section 6412 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (Public Law 116–92).

SEC. 617. Annual Reports on Worldwide Threats.

(a)
In General.— Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 108A the following new section:

“SEC. 108B. ANNUAL REPORTS ON WORLDWIDE THREATS.

“(a) Definition of Appropriate Congressional Committees.—In this section, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—

“(1) the congressional intelligence committees; and

“(2) the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate.

“(b) Annual Reports.—Not later than the first Monday in February 2021, and each year thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing an assessment of the intelligence community with respect to worldwide threats to the national security of the United States.

“(c) Form.—Each report under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex only for the protection of intelligence sources and methods relating to the matters contained in the report.

“(d) Hearings.—

“(1) Open hearings.—Upon request by the appropriate congressional committees, the Director (and any other head of an element of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the committees in consultation with the Director) shall testify before such committees in an open setting regarding a report under subsection (b).

“(2) Closed hearings.—Any information that may not be disclosed during an open hearing under paragraph (1) in order to protect intelligence sources and methods may instead be discussed in a closed hearing that immediately follows such open hearing.”

(b)
Clerical Amendment.— The table of contents at the beginning of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 108A the following new item:

“Sec. 108B. Annual reports on world-wide threats.”.

SEC. 618. Annual Report on Climate Security Advisory Council.

Section 120 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3060), as amended by section 405, is further amended—
(1)
by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
(2)
by inserting after subsection (c) the following new subsection (d):

“(d) Annual Report.—Not later than January 31, 2021, and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the chair of the Council shall submit, on behalf of the Council, to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing the activities of the Council as described in subsection (c) during the year preceding the year during which the report is submitted.”

SEC. 619. Improvements to Funding for National Security Education Program.

(a)
Funding for Scholarship, Fellowship, and Grant Programs.— Section 810 of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1910) is amended—
(1)
in subsection (c), by striking “ for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2005,” and inserting “ for each of fiscal years 2005 through 2021”; and
(2)
by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(d) Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 2022.—In addition to amounts that may be made available to the Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, there is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2022, $8,000,000, to carry out the scholarship, fellowship, and grant programs under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), respectively, of section 802(a)(1).”

(b)
Funding for National Flagship Language Initiative.— Section 811 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1911) is amended—
(1)
in subsection (a), by striking “ $10,000,000” and inserting “ $16,000,000”; and
(2)
in subsection (b), by striking “ for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2005,” and inserting “ for each of fiscal years 2005 through 2021”.
(c)
Funding for Scholarship Program for Advanced English Language Studies.— Section 812 of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1912) is amended—
(1)
in subsection (a), by striking “ for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2005,” and inserting “ for each of fiscal years 2005 through 2021”;
(2)
by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);
(3)
by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b):

“(b) Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 2022.—In addition to amounts that may be made available to the Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, there is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2022, $2,000,000, to carry out the scholarship programs for English language studies by certain heritage community citizens under section 802(a)(1)(E).”

; and

(4)
in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by striking “ subsection (a)” and inserting “ this section”.

SEC. 620. Report on Best Practices to Protect Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Civil Rights of Chinese Americans.

(a)
Report.— Section 5712 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 2171) is—
(1)
transferred to title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.);
(2)
inserted after section 1109 of such title, as added by section 308;
(3)
redesignated as section 1110; and
(4)
amended—
(A)
in the heading, by striking “ and civil liberties” and inserting “ , civil liberties, and civil rights”; and
(B)
in subsection (b)—
(i)
in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking “ Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,” and inserting “ On an annual basis,”; and
(ii)
by striking “ and civil liberties”, each place it appears and inserting “ , civil liberties, and civil rights”.
(b)
Clerical Amendment.— The table of contents at the beginning of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1109, as added by section 308, the following new item:

“Sec. 1110. Report on best practices to protect privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of Chinese Americans.”.

SEC. 621. National Intelligence Estimate on Threat of Global Pandemic Disease.

(a)
National Intelligence Estimate.—
(1)
Requirement.— The Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall produce a National Intelligence Estimate on the threat of global pandemic disease, including with respect to the following:
(A)
An assessment of the possible courses of the COVID–19 pandemic during the 18 months following the date of the Estimate, including—
(i)
the projected spread of COVID–19 outside the United States and the likelihood of subsequent major outbreaks;
(ii)
the capacity of countries and international organizations to combat the further spread of COVID–19, including risks and opportunities for further global cooperation; and
(iii)
the risks to the national security and health security of the United States if COVID–19 is not contained abroad.
(B)
An assessment of the global public health system and the responses of the system to the COVID–19 pandemic, including—
(i)
prospects for an effective global disease surveillance and response system, opportunities to advance the development of such a system, and signposts for evaluating whether or not an effective system has been developed before a disease outbreak occurs; and
(ii)
an assessment of global health system capacity.
(C)
An assessment of—
(i)
the humanitarian and economic implications of the COVID–19 pandemic; and
(ii)
the consequences of the COVID–19 pandemic with respect to political stability, armed conflict, democratization, and the global leadership by the United States of the post-World War II international system.
(D)
An assessment of—
(i)
likely threats by global pandemic diseases during the 10-year period following the date of the Estimate;
(ii)
global readiness to avert a future global pandemic;
(iii)
challenges and opportunities for the policy of the United States to advance global pandemic preparedness; and
(iv)
the potential role of non-state and state-backed global influence activities or disinformation campaigns involving COVID–19 or future potential global pandemics.
(E)
Any other matters the Director determines appropriate.
(2)
Submission to congress.—
(A)
Submission.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate the National Intelligence Estimate produced under paragraph (1), including all intelligence reporting underlying the Estimate.
(B)
Notice regarding submission.— If before the end of the 90-day period specified in subparagraph (A) the Director determines that the National Intelligence Estimate under paragraph (1) cannot be submitted by the end of that period, the Director shall (before the end of that period)—
(i)
submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report setting forth—
(I)
the reasons why the National Intelligence Estimate cannot be submitted by the end of that period; and
(II)
an estimated date for the submission of the National Intelligence Estimate; and
(ii)
testify before such committees on the issues that will be covered by the National Intelligence Estimate.
(C)
Form.— The National Intelligence Estimate shall be submitted under subparagraph (A) in classified form.
(3)
Public version.— Consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, at the same time as the Director submits to the congressional intelligence committees the National Intelligence Estimate under paragraph (2), the Director shall make publicly available on the internet website of the Director, an unclassified version of the National Intelligence Estimate.
(4)
Consultation.— The Director shall prepare the National Intelligence Estimate under paragraph (1) in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Secretary of State, and any other head of an element of the Federal Government the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate.
(b)
Future Pandemic Plan.—
(1)
Requirement.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall make publicly available on the internet website of the President a report containing a whole-of-government plan for an effective response to subsequent major outbreaks of the COVID–19 pandemic and for other future global pandemic diseases.
(2)
Matters included.— The plan under paragraph (1) shall address how to improve the following:
(A)
Pandemic planning.
(B)
Homeland preparedness.
(C)
International disease surveillance.
(D)
Diagnostic testing.
(E)
Contact tracing.
(F)
The role of the Federal Government with respect to the regulation, acquisition, and disbursement, of medical supplies and other public health resources necessary to respond to COVID–19 or other diseases with pandemic potential (including diagnostic testing equipment, biomedical equipment, drugs and medicines, and hygiene equipment).
(G)
The procurement and distribution of personal protective equipment.
(H)
Early domestic response to future global pandemic diseases in the United States.
(c)
Global Strategy.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall make publicly available on the internet website of the President a report containing a global strategy for mobilizing international institutions to combat the COVID–19 pandemic.

SEC. 622. Modification of Requirement for Briefings on National Security Effects of Emerging Infectious Disease and Pandemics.

Section 6722(b)(2) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (division E of Public Law 116–98) is amended—
(1)
in the paragraph heading, by striking “ Quinquennial” and inserting “ Annual”;
(2)
by striking “ beginning on the date that is 5 years after the date on which the Director submits the report under paragraph (1), and every 5 years thereafter” and inserting “ not later than January 31, 2021, and annually thereafter”; and
(3)
by inserting “ required under paragraph (1)” before the period at the end.

SEC. 623. Independent Study on Open-Source Intelligence.

(a)
Study.— The Director of National Intelligence shall seek to enter into an agreement with a federally funded research and development center or a nongovernmental entity to conduct a comprehensive study on the future of the collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, dissemination, and evaluation of open-source intelligence by the intelligence community. The Director shall select such entity in consultation with the congressional intelligence committees.
(b)
Matters Included.— The study under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1)
Recommendations with respect to the governance of open-source intelligence within the intelligence community, including regarding—
(A)
whether such governance of open-source intelligence should be assigned to a functional manager or an executive agent, or use another governance structure;
(B)
which official of the intelligence community should serve as such a functional manager, executive agent, or the leader of such other governance structure, and what authorities the official should have in serving in such role;
(C)
which official of the intelligence community should be responsible for conducting oversight by the executive branch for open-source intelligence;
(D)
which elements of the intelligence community should retain capabilities to collect, process, exploit, and disseminate open-source intelligence;
(E)
how to effectively integrate such collection capabilities among the elements of the intelligence community; and
(F)
whether to establish a new agency as an element of the intelligence community dedicated to open-source intelligence or to establish a fusion center to co-locate open-source intelligence capabilities of the elements of the intelligence community, including a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each such approach.
(2)
Recommendations regarding the requirements processes for open-source intelligence, including with respect to—
(A)
the utility (or disutility) of a unified collection management process for open-source intelligence for all of the intelligence community;
(B)
what such a process might look like;
(C)
ways to integrate an open-source requirements process into all-source collection management; and
(D)
ways that automation might be leveraged to facilitate open-source requirements and collection management.
(3)
An assessment of the value of rejuvenating a career service for a professional cadre of the intelligence community that focuses on collecting and disseminating open-source intelligence and recommendations for such a rejuvenation.
(4)
Recommendations regarding the need to adjust any legal and policy frameworks (including any applicable guidelines of the Attorney General) that would facilitate the collection, retention, and dissemination of open-source intelligence while balancing customer needs with the privacy interests of United States persons.
(5)
An assessment of methods to use open-source intelligence to support the operations of the intelligence community, including recommendations on when and how open-source intelligence should support such operations.
(6)
With respect to the data management of open-source intelligence, recommendations on proposed data ingestion tools, scraping capabilities, and other tools and capabilities to collect, process, exploit, and analyze the volume of open-source intelligence, including recommendations on how the intelligence community can increase the speed and security with which the intelligence community adopts open-source technology and unclassified commercial products.
(7)
Any other matters the Director or the entity selected to conduct the study determines appropriate.
(c)
Cooperation.— The Director shall make available to the entity selected to conduct the study under subsection (a) the necessary information and materials to conduct the study, including with respect to—
(1)
accessing secure workspaces;
(2)
accessing directives and policy guidance of the intelligence community and other policy documents regarding the governance and execution of open-source intelligence;
(3)
reviewing technological systems used to conduct open-source intelligence collection;
(4)
interviewing senior personnel of the intelligence community, including such personnel with responsibility for the open-source intelligence mission of the intelligence community; and
(5)
ensuring that each head of an element of the intelligence community provides the cooperation described in this subsection.
(d)
Consultation.— The entity selected to conduct the study under subsection (a) shall consult with the congressional intelligence committees before beginning to conduct such study.
(e)
Report.— Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the study under subsection (a), without change. The report shall be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 624. Survey on Open Source Enterprise.

(a)
Survey.— The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (as the open source functional manager for the intelligence community), in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and any other head of an element of the intelligence community that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency determines appropriate, shall conduct a survey to measure the satisfaction of customers of open-source intelligence with the Open Source Enterprise of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(b)
Purpose.— The Director shall ensure that the survey under subsection (a)—
(1)
evaluates which types of open-source intelligence supports the missions of the customers of such intelligence, regardless of whether the customers are elements of the intelligence community and regardless of whether the customers are receiving such intelligence from the Open Source Enterprise;
(2)
evaluates how responsive the Open Source Enterprise is to the missions of the elements of the intelligence community and the other customers of the Open Source Enterprise;
(3)
enables the Open Source Enterprise to set strategic priorities; and
(4)
enables Congress to better oversee the strategic direction of the Open Source Enterprise and to provide support to the collection and analysis of open-source intelligence.
(c)
Contents.—
(1)
Assessment.— The survey under subsection (a) shall include qualitative and quantitative questions designed to assess the following:
(A)
The value of support provided by the Open Source Enterprise to the mission of the customer taking the survey.
(B)
The accessibility of the products of the Open Source Enterprise.
(C)
The frequency that such products are used in accomplishing the mission of the customer.
(D)
The responsiveness of the Open Source Enterprise to tasking requests.
(E)
Areas in which the Open Source Enterprise could improve.
(F)
The in-house open-source intelligence capabilities of the customer taking the survey, including—
(i)
a description of such capabilities;
(ii)
how such capabilities are tailored to the mission of the customer;
(iii)
when such capabilities were established; and
(iv)
whether and to what extent the customer coordinates with the Open Source Enterprise regarding such capabilities.
(2)
Survey answers.— A customer who receives the survey under subsection (a) shall make all reasonable efforts to respond fully and frankly to the survey.
(d)
Design Methodology.— In carrying out subsection (a), the Director of Central Intelligence shall seek advice regarding design methodology for customer satisfaction surveys from—
(1)
experts in survey design of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and
(2)
senior executives of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State who conduct a survey similar to the survey under subsection (a).
(e)
Report.—
(1)
Strategy.— Not later than 180 days after the date on which the survey is completed under subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the strategic direction of the Open Source Enterprise based on the results of the survey, including explanations of how the Open Source Enterprise will—
(A)
build off the successes of the Open Source Enterprise; and
(B)
fill gaps in the collection, production, analysis, or dissemination of open-source intelligence.
(2)
Form.— The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form.
(3)
Briefing.— Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director submits to the congressional intelligence committees the report under paragraph (1), the Director shall provide to such committees a briefing on the strategic direction of the Open Source Enterprise.

SEC. 625. Sense of Congress on Report on Murder of Jamal Khashoggi.

(a)
Findings.— Congress finds the following:
(1)
There is a strong bipartisan conviction, shared widely throughout the legislative and executive branches of the United States Government and elsewhere, that ensuring full accountability for the brutal murder on October 2, 2018, of Jamal Khashoggi, a former Washington Post columnist and resident of the United States, is in the public interest and also the national interest of the United States.
(2)
Section 5714 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (division E of Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 2173) required the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a written report in “unclassified form” that includes “identification of those who carried out, participated in, ordered, or were otherwise complicit in or responsible for the death of Jamal Khashoggi.”.
(3)
Section 1277 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 1701) likewise obligated the Director to submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a written report on the assessment of the intelligence community regarding Mr. Khashoggi’s brutal murder.
(4)
Such section 1277 specifically called, among other things, for a determination and presentation of evidence with respect to the advance knowledge and role of any current or former official of the Government of Saudi Arabia or any current or former senior Saudi political figure over the directing, ordering, or tampering of evidence in relation to Mr. Khashoggi’s murder.
(5)
Such section 1277 also required the Director to submit a list of foreign persons whom the Director has high confidence were responsible for, complicit in, or otherwise knowingly and materially assisted the murder, or impeded its impartial investigation, or who ordered or otherwise directed an act or acts contributing to or causing the murder.
(6)
Contrary to the unambiguous and lawful command of Congress under such sections 5714 and 1277, the Director did not produce any unclassified report as required by either such section, and instead, on February 20, 2020, the Director submitted to such committees a classified report, which the Director referred to as an “annex”.
(7)
The evident belief of the Director that no unclassified information can be produced in accordance with the directives of Congress is dubious, in light of the extensive body of credible, unclassified reporting available regarding the murder of Mr. Khashoggi, and the roles and culpability of officials at the highest levels of the Government of Saudi Arabia.
(b)
Sense of Congress.— It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence should reasonably have been able to produce an unclassified report pursuant to section 5714 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 and section 1277 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 that did not alter or obscure, in any way, the intelligence community’s core determinations, its presentation of evidence, or identification of relevant persons, as required, without putting sources and methods at risk.