“ Section 1. Policy. Foreign nations and criminals continue to conduct cyber campaigns targeting the United States and Americans. The People's Republic of China presents the most active and persistent cyber threat to United States Government, private sector, and critical infrastructure networks, but significant threats also emanate from Russia, Iran, North Korea, and others who undermine United States cybersecurity. These campaigns disrupt the delivery of critical services across the Nation, cost billions of dollars, and undermine Americans' security and privacy. More must be done to improve the Nation's cybersecurity against these threats. I am ordering additional actions to improve our Nation's cybersecurity, focusing on defending our digital infrastructure, securing the services and capabilities most vital to the digital domain, and building our capability to address key threats.”;
(b) striking subsection 2(c) and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:
“(c) Relevant executive departments and agencies (agencies) shall take the following actions:
(i) By August 1, 2025, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, shall establish a consortium with industry at the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence to develop guidance, informed by the consortium as appropriate, that demonstrates the implementation of secure software development, security, and operations practices based on NIST Special Publication 800-218 ( Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF)).
(ii) By September 2, 2025, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, shall update NIST Special Publication 800-53 ( Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations ) to provide guidance on how to securely and reliably deploy patches and updates.
(iii) By December 1, 2025, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, in consultation with the heads of such agencies as the Director of NIST deems appropriate, shall develop and publish a preliminary update to the SSDF. This preliminary update shall include practices, procedures, controls, and implementation examples regarding the secure and reliable development and delivery of software as well as the security of the software itself. Within 120 days of publishing the preliminary update, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, shall publish a final version of the updated SSDF.”;
(c) striking from subsection 4(b) the phrase “The security of Internet traffic depends on data being correctly routed and delivered to the intended recipient network. Routing information originated and propagated across the Internet, utilizing the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), is vulnerable to attack and misconfiguration.” and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:
“Relevant agencies shall take the following actions:”;
(d) striking subsection 4(f) and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:
“(f) A quantum computer of sufficient size and sophistication—also known as a cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer (CRQC)—will be capable of breaking much of the public-key cryptography used on digital systems across the United States and around the world. National Security Memorandum 10 of May 4, 2022 (Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems), directed the Federal Government to prepare for a transition to cryptographic algorithms that would not be vulnerable to a CRQC.
(i) By December 1, 2025, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and in consultation with the Director of the National Security Agency, shall release and thereafter regularly update a list of product categories in which products that support post-quantum cryptography (PQC) are widely available.
(ii) By December 1, 2025, to prepare for transition to PQC, the Director of the National Security Agency with respect to National Security Systems (NSS), and the Director of OMB with respect to non-NSS, shall each issue requirements for agencies to support, as soon as practicable, but not later than January 2, 2030, Transport Layer Security protocol version 1.3 or a successor version.”;
(e) striking former section 6 (newly designated section 5) and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following: